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ABSTRACT
The study of fundamentalist religious-nationalist movements in the IsraeliPalestinian conflict has often diminished women’s political participation and deemed it a
force that causes or hastens moderation. Contrary to this claim, women’s involvement in
Gush Emunim and Hamas occurred after their respective groups’ moderation, and
demonstrated strong ideological commitment to their movements’ original tenets. As
both groups became institutionalized, they were forced to moderate their stances toward
their expansionist territorial goals. These concessions restricted the political and military
freedoms o f the leaderships. Criticizing the men’s political ineffectiveness, exemplary
women assumed more prominent positions within their movements by advocating actions
that were in line with their movements’ founding principles. Initially lacking the support
of their male counterparts, these women, unconstrained by their movements’
institutionalization, forced the formal leadership of Gush Emunim and Hamas to accept
their new roles in the quests for settlement expansion and military jihad respectively.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

The successful militarization of ethnoreligious societies, such as Israel and
Palestine, entails instilling the conviction in both men and women that men’s “own
manhood will be fully validated only if they perform as soldiers either in the state’s
military or in insurgent autonomous or quasi-autonomous forces.”1 In these wars, some
argue that it is women who suffer the most, “united around their identities as mothers.”2
The existing literature, however, misconstrues women’s experiences in nationalist
struggles and religious conflicts by depicting women as maternal pacifists. This reductive
approach ultimately fails to appreciate women’s active roles in militant religiousnationalist fundamentalist groups.
On both sides of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, women’s participation in acts of
aggression in the nationalist struggle has been discursively cloaked with overtly
‘feminine’ symbols: Palestinian fighters become roses, female Israel Defense Forces
soldiers embody charm, suicide bombers personify purity and settlers exemplify fashion
savvy.

Labelling women as flowers, and stressing their purity and beauty, masks

women’s violence as perpetrators. It underscores their vulnerability, sensuality and
victimhood. This imagery contradicts the fact that many Israeli and Palestinian women
are as militant and willing to engage in political violence as their male counterparts.4 By
highlighting the seemingly paradoxical political activities of women who perpetrate
patriarchal and violent religious-nationalist systems, this study addresses the need for
scholarship in this area.

1
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Using the cases of Gush Emunim and Hamas, this work argues that after
fundamentalist religious-nationalist groups become moderate, their female members
challenge gender norms within the parameters of the organizations’ discourses. Due to
their institutionalization, these movements make pragmatic choices that do not reflect
their original ideological tenets. These changes are indicative of political and ideological
moderation. Nevertheless, after this moderation has occurred, some women continue to
adhere to the original ideology and act accordingly. In demonstrating their commitment
to the original and more ‘extreme’ political and gender ideologies, women challenge
some of their movements’ gender expectations.
In each nation, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict shapes national identity and informs
perceptions of gender. These identities, in turn, affect women’s political, economic and
social status. Moreover, how one perceives gender helps mould one’s national identity.5
An understanding of women’s social and political relationships with men, as well as
prevalent attitudes toward masculinity and femininity,

are

essential to

comprehending religious-nationalist politics in Israel and Palestine.

fully

As this chapter

makes evident, a discussion of women’s involvement in Gush Emunim and Hamas
necessarily entails contextualizing women’s actions within the discourses of maternal
pacifism, nationalism, religion, fundamentalism and feminism. Together, these discourses
form a multiple critique framework, in which this work is best situated.

Women and Pacifism
Women have sometimes used their identities as mothers as a platform on which to
protest war, thereby contributing to the myth that women are innately more peaceful than

2
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men.6 Among the strong proponents of this myth is Sara Ruddick, who questions “in the
glare of war’s destruction and the light of women’s hope, what mother would hesitate to
n

‘cast her lot’ with peacemakers.”

In her pivotal book Maternal Thinking: Toward a

Politics of Peace. Ruddick asserts that “women devote the thinking and practices of
motherhood to peacekeeping and world repair rather than to war making and world
destruction.” 8 Women’s preference for peace over war, however, may not arise from an
aversion to destruction, but a competition for resources. Mark Tessler and Ina Warriner
suggest that “women might be more predisposed than men toward the peaceful resolution
of international conflicts because they are the principal users of social programs that
compete with the military for governmental funds.”9 In either case, maternal thinkers are
still depicted as pacifists.10
The portrayal of women as pacifists relies upon linking motherhood with
protectiveness, morality, nurture and love. First, women’s potentiality for motherhood is
relied upon by society, which instills in women a moral obligation to preserve life.
“Maternal thinking,” explains Nancy Scheper-Hughes, “begins in a stance of
protectiveness,” where protectiveness is equated with pacifism.11 Second, unlike men,
women are credited with the inability to divorce their actions from “the moral and human
significance of their actions.” 12 This moral obligation, as Carol Gilligan argues, is
directed toward “the concrete needs of particular individuals in the private realms of
necessity,” rather than in the public sphere.

1 "2

Third, their role as nurturers is believed to

encourage women to be more compromising. Conversely, men are perceived to be less
accommodating and therefore more violent. Since they are seldom nurturers, their
negotiation and co-operation skills are less developed than those of women. For this

3
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reason, maternal feminists claim that men are more concerned with “hierarchy, hegemony,
and justice in intercommunal and international relations” than they are with
compromise. 14
Women’s capability for compromise, along with protectiveness, morality and
nurture, foster a quality that, as Ruddick argues, ultimately renders women pacifist: love.
Viewed as the antithesis of violence, “preservative love is opposed in its fundamental
values to military strategy” and seeks to ensure the well-being of all people.15 For
Ruddick,
the contradiction between military destruction and preservative love is obvious.
Seen by “the patient eye of love” in the light of maternal humility, military fantasies
of violent control, defense, and domination seem like garish nightmares that
threaten a living world. Military endeavours endanger what a mother seeks to
preserve, wasting the bodies, insulting the sensibilities, threatening the sanity of
beings she has treasured.16
Learned by daughters from their mothers, preservative love and maternal thinking
counter militarism and death with motherhood, birth and “feminine connection.” 17 A
mother-warrior, therefore, is paradoxical because
when a maternal thinking takes upon itself the critical perspective of a feminist
standpoint, it reveals a contradiction between mothering and war. Mothering begins
in birth and promises life; military thinking justifies organized, deliberate deaths. A
mother preserves the bodies, nurtures the psychic growth, and disciplines the
conscience of children. . . Mothers protect children who are at risk; the military
risks the children mothers protect.18
Thus, preservative love is often portrayed as diametrically opposed to military destruction.
Women are not only labelled as preservers, but also as non-combatants, while
men play the role of designated combatants.19 Mothers, wives and sisters, observes Jean
Bethke Elshtain, “are designated noncombatants because of the part they play in the
reproductive process; because women have been linked symbolically to images of

4
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succoring nonviolence; because men have had a long history of warrioring and
policing.”20 Women who vicariously crave heroism through the military actions of their
men, and who sacrifice far more than what is demanded of them, are labeled “aggressive
mother[s].”21 Yet in spite of their strong support, “aggressive mothers” still remain noncombatants.
Many Israeli and Palestinian women, particularly those affiliated with the
movements Gush Emunim and Hamas, might be deemed “aggressive mothers” for their
overwhelming support for their husbands’ and sons’ military involvement. More often,
however, they and other Israeli and Palestinian are labelled by maternal thinkers as
“women of sorrow. . . meant to accept their suffering, protesting only against enemy
aggressors.”

00

Their public mourning becomes a site of empowerment, according to

Ruddick: “Women who act as women in public spaces transform the passions of
attachment and loss into political action, transform the women of sorrow from icon to
00
agent.” These “women of sorrow,” exhausted from mourning the loss of their children,
use ‘private’ suffering as a ‘public’ platform for political protest.24
Beliefs in women’s preservative love, innate pacifism and inherent capacities for
motherhood and nurture offer distressingly faulty explanations for women’s involvement
in fundamentalist religious-nationalist movements.

In the past, critiques of these

supposedly innate traits have pointed to the exclusion of childless women from the
‘maternal thinking’ viewpoint; they are simply ignored. 26 Also neglected are the
“aggressive mothers,” who may promote the very actions that give rise to the “women of
sorrow,” but who may also join the “women of sorrow” in using public mourning for
political ends. Clearly, different concerns can motivate women’s political protest.

5
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Alternatively, the aforementioned inherent capacities attributed to women may
actually encourage women to become violent, especially in cases where women’s
protection o f their own children can only be ensured by attacking the enemies’ children.
For this reason, Tessler and Warriner caution that “an emphasis on motherhood and
maternal thinking reduces women to unidimensional actors and obscures the diversity of
the factors that influence their attitudes and behaviour.”

O '?

Nevertheless, scholars may

consider women one-dimensional political actors for reasons other than motherhood.
For Tami Amanda Jacoby, women are unified actors not because they are mothers,
but because they are products of conflict zones that foster subjugation:
Women and men struggle together in zones of conflict for rights and representation;
however, women often encounter structures of patriarchal authority - in the national
movement, the military, the private sphere, and through the discourses and practices
of dominant belief systems. In these structures, women are either domesticated or
rendered subordinate to men. As a result, a cross-cultural component of women’s
organizing in zones o f conflict is women’s contestation of gendered norms and
practices within their own societies in order to promote the liberation of women
alongside the liberation of society as a whole.28
Jacoby challenges the idea of a global sisterhood, which she argues is a “Western
feminist notion linked to the perceived coincidence between women and pacifism in the
OQ

field of international relations.” In this contestation, however, Jacoby fails to indicate
when women’s attempts to destabilize patriarchal structures are most likely to occur. The
timing of women’s subversion of gender norms within a conflict raises questions as to
why women do not act immediately, whether their actions are the result of male absence
due to war, whether they are forced to appropriate alternative roles because o f war, and

whether they allow nationalist aspirations to overshadow ‘women’s’ concerns. In the
Middle East, where the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has embodied six decades of war and
social change, when and how women contest gender norms is significant; so too is the

6

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

question o f which women and which norms, and the perspective from which the
problems are studied.

Past Approaches to Women’s Issues in the Middle East
The unleashing of male aggression in the Middle East has traditionally been
examined from an androcentric perspective. Both male and female scholars have
habitually excluded women and gender issues from political accounts of the Middle
East.30 Margaret L. Meriwether and Judith E. Tucker, in their book A Social History of
Women and Gender in the Modem Middle East, outline different approaches to women’s
issues in the Middle East. These methodologies include highlighting the contributions of
exceptional women and their impact, and using the frameworks of political and
institutional history, social and economic history, cultural history and discourse, law,
property, family and/or religion.

T1

In nationalist narratives, men have used gender differences to emphasize
citizenship and the quest for nationalist fulfillment as “masculine prerogatives defined in
contrast to the feminine.”32 This diminishes the role of women in the nationalist cause.33
Feminism and women’s issues compete with the nationalist agenda outlined by men and
consequently, women are expected to demonstrate their devotion to the nationalist cause
by deferring gender concerns until after liberation is achieved. For example, numerous
Algerian women fought for nationalist objectives without overtly campaigning for
women’s rights, mistakenly believing that Algerian men would address women’s issues
after independence. Explaining this deferral, Algerian feminist Marie-Aimee Helie-Lucas
stated:

7
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Most of the women [at the symposium]. . . take for granted that they belong to a
country, a nation, which does not have to prove its existence; it allows for
transcending the concept of nation, and criticizing it. It has not been allowed for
[Algerian women].34
Much feminist literature has also negated women’s roles as nationalist actors.35 By
viewing nationalist identity as a solely masculine construct that entirely oppresses women,
feminist writers erase the presence of the female actors who harbour strong nationalist,
but not feminist, affiliations, such as some of the women of Gush Emunim and Hamas.36
For this reason, “femininity as a concept and women as actors need to be made
the objects o f analytical curiosity when we are trying to make sense of international
political processes.”

Feminist literature continues to ignore the limited number of

women who solely identify with nationalism, despite recent recognition in mainstream
literature that women and gender roles have always coexisted with other marginalized
groups in nationalist struggles. Furthermore, very little attention has been paid to
politically active women who fully identify with fundamentalist religious-nationalist
causes.

In other words, women who advocate these fundamentalist systems are absent

from Israeli-Palestinian fundamentalist religious-nationalist discourse. The dearth of
literature mendaciously promotes the myth that religious-nationalist women never enter
the public realm.

IQ

As the next section explains, when women are discussed, they are

depicted as “victims o f fundamentalist belief systems rather than active participants.”40

Religion, Fundamentalism and Women
Israelis and Palestinians share a decades-long history that is marked by intensive
struggle for the same land. Not surprisingly, parallel religious or fundamentalist groups
have emerged in both communities. Moreover, two of these groups even share the same

8
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belief structure: both sanctify the land and rigidly believe their possession of it is divinely
ordained. Astonishingly, until now, these two movements have never been contrasted.
Neither their ideologies and processes of moderation, nor the political activities of their
women, have received academic attention in comparative literature.41
On the Israeli side, the Gush Emunim (Bloc of the Faithful) became the forefront
settlement movement. Viewing retention of the Land of Israel as a religious
commandment, Gush Emunim deems surrendering any land as serious an offence to God
as forfeiting one’s life.42 Similarly, on the Palestinian side, Harakat al-Muqawama alIslamiya (Islamic Resistance Movement) or Hamas, considers the British Mandatory
Palestine as land entrusted by Allah to all Muslims. Here, too, control over the land is a
religious obligation. This goal also sanctions violence and if necessary, the sacrifice of
one’s life.43 In order to ensure victory in the seemingly eternal conflict over the same land,
each movement reinforces the need for its group’s cohesiveness.
Marty and Appleby define fundamentalism as a “strategy, or set of strategies by
which beleaguered believers attempt to preserve their distinctive identity as a people or
group.” 44 The need for the preservation of the group’s distinctiveness often affects
women’s status within the groups, for as the symbolic cultural bearers who reproduce the
nation, women “are therefore in need of protection.”45 Consequently, scholars describe
fundamentalism as simultaneously modem, vis-a-vis politics and the economy, and anti
modem, because of the emphasis on women’s familial obligations in the protected private
sphere.46 This dichotomization, however, ignores the instances in which women have
extended their roles within the family and the private sphere to the political realm. In
instances where women are required to be politically active, they are expected to do so

9
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while adhering to traditional gender norms.47 Women must preserve tradition at any cost,
while men may change according to the environment.
Others have pointed to fundamentalism as a “backlash against women’s
participation in the public sphere.” 49 In this view, the group’s identity is retained through
the preservation o f women’s roles. For instance, modifications in familial structure,
caused by women working outside the home, or by perceived gains vis-a-vis their
independence, including property, inheritance and citizenship rights and freedoms, are
changes that can result in subsequent restricted access to the public sphere.50 This does
not imply that non-fundamentalist men do not react at all: rather, they may confront the
issues differently. Nor does it assume that women abstain from participating in the
backlashes. For example, in many regions, well-educated women are consistently the
most eager to assume religious roles in ideologically patriarchal religions. 51 If
fundamentalism is indeed a “protest against the assault on patriarchal structural principles
in the family, economy and politics,” as Martin Riesebrodt argues, then it must cease to
be treated as a gender-neutral term.52
There exists what Janet Bauer deems a “men’s studies” of fundamentalism, which
includes studying the movement’s creation, its male leader, its followers’ socioeconomic
backgrounds, its recruitment methods, its ideology and its public political persona. In
each of these instances, minimal attention is paid to individuals’ perceptions, attitudes
and feelings. Furthermore, as a result of this distance, the experiences of these individuals
can become generalized and essentialized to the extent that the ideological commitment
of women is questioned.53 This begs the question of whether the paradox of women’s

10
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choice to immerse themselves in a religion or movement that “oppresses” them exists
only from an outsider’s viewpoint.
Accordingly, an undertaking of a “women’s studies” of fundamentalism, in which
the emphasis is placed on agency rather than structure, is imperative. This is not to
suggest that women are unaffected by factors such as class, socioeconomic conditions,
political structures or policies; rather, in order to determine whether and to what degree
women gain autonomy in religious fundamentalist movements, these factors are not as
relevant as those based on ethnography.

A “women’s studies” approach entails a

methodological adjustment, in which the woman’s standpoint is the centre of reference.54
In fundamentalist discourse, for example, the meaning of the term anomie (alienation)
varies between the sexes. For “men’s studies,” it is “used to convey emotions of
dissatisfaction and displacement, presumed from particular external conditions, often
with little reference to actual individuals’ perceptions, while ‘women’s studies’ more
frequently talks of ‘life crises,’ with a focus on personal responses to those conditions.”55
Significantly, the relationships in which individuals negotiate their ideological and social
positions with themselves and with others become interwoven in the political fabric of
fundamentalism. Thus, the incorporation of “women’s studies” in the study of
fundamentalist discourse is essential to fully understanding fundamentalism.
The goals of movements such as Gush Emunim and Hamas include “attempts to
reconstruct the fundamentals of an ideational system in modem society, in accordance
with political and ideological positions taken in relation to current issues and
discourses.”56 Nearly all fundamentalist movements aspire to return to an era in which
people were perceived as content, perhaps as a result of everybody fulfilling their

11
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“proper” roles within society.57 Women are therefore relegated to the private or
‘maternal’ realm, within which women’s political actions can be contextualized and
deconstructed for feminist content. Consensus is lacking, however, in how the actions of
women should be interpreted. These actions they take place within an environment where
women are ‘double-bound’ to the matemalism found within both religious and nationalist
contexts, where “militarized motherhood. . . also requires marginalizing or suppressing
alternative notions of motherhood.”58
Motherhood is militarized in both instances and the womb is consequently
conceived as a means by which one can increase national security through the creation o f
potential fighters.59 Both Israeli and Palestinian women “have had to consider and
reconsider their understandings of mothering’s relationships to militarism, to children, to
nationalism, and to the state and the would-be state.”60 Nevertheless, there have been
significant instances in which women have occupied public space for the sake of the
movement’s religiopolitical goals: as settlers, settlement founders, politicians and suicide
bombers. These actions draw attention to the tension between women’s private and public
roles, and whether women’s actions reinforce or subvert normative notions of
motherhood and femininity. Through their actions in the public domain, Gush Emunim
and Hamas women challenge some of their movements’ gender expectations, but through
actions that cannot be immediately labelled feminist.

Feminism: A Problematic Term
Feminism not only motivates or is motivated by political movements, it also seeks
to explain how sex-based expectations create unjust circumstances primarily, though not

12
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exclusively, for women.61 In her work The Second Sex. Simone de Beauvoir attributes
the root of women’s subordinate status as follows: “Humanity is male and man defines
woman not in herself but as relative to him; she is not regarded as an autonomous
(\)
being.” Miriam Cooke asserts that feminism “provides a cross-cultural prism through
which to identify moments of awareness that something is wrong in the expectations for
women’s treatment or behaviour, of rejection of such expectations, and of activism to
effect some kind of change”63 The expectations that women identify as unjust are often
the products o f patriarchal systems.
Privileging men and elders over women, minorities, and men of low
socioeconomic status, patriarchy is
a system for monopolizing resources, maintaining kinship status, reproducing the
patriline, controlling women’s sexuality and bodies, legitimizing violence,
regulating education to reproduce the roles and relations socialized in the family,
focusing healthcare exclusively on maternity and procreation, and limiting women’s
access to the labour market as well as defining the types of work in which women
may engage.64
The patriarchal systems found today in the Middle East are the products of “the
intersection between the colonial and indigenous domain of state and political
processes.”65 Feminism’s goal of destabilizing the hegemony of patriarchal hierarchies
is to allow other non-patriarchal relationships to exist.66 By pushing for women’s equal
access to opportunities and by encouraging women to shape their own destinies, feminist
movements seek to realize this goal.

While this understanding of patriarchy helps

situate women’s position in both Israeli and Palestinian societies, it remains “unsuitable
as a universal framework for analyzing women’s oppression” as citizens.68
Because of the nationalist element of Gush Emunim and Hamas, women’s actions
must also be analyzed within citizenship discourse. Social contract theory, which

13
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emerged with the modem nation-state and became the “compulsory political form for the
rest of the world,” stipulates that in return for certain freedoms granted by the state, the
citizen relinquishes natural freedom.69 John Locke explains that
men being, as has been said, by nature, all free, equal, and independent, no one can
be put out o f this estate, and subjected to the political power of another, without his
own consent. The only way, whereby any one divests himself of his natural liberty,
and puts on the bonds of civil society, is by agreeing with other men to join and
unite into a community, for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one
amongst another, in a secure enjoyment of their properties, and a greater security
against any, that are not of it.70
Within the social contract narrative, this theory was seen as eclipsing the familial
patriarchy with the creation of constitutional government, which embodies civil rights,
laws, freedoms and the concept of a detached individual.71 According to Jean-Jacques
Rousseau, this individual relinquishes some of his power to a higher authority: “Each of
us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the
general will; and we as a body receive each member as an individual part of the whole.”

77

The question o f who constitutes an individual has caught the attention of some feminists,
who assert that without modification, this theory cannot be applied to feminism for three
reasons.
First, the citizen of contract theory is an individual male property owner.
Throughout the theory’s evolution, from John Locke to Jean-Jacques Rousseau, women
and members of certain minorities could not hold property.73 For this reason, Carole
Pateman has deemed the modem state a “fraternal patriarchy.” 74 Moreover, the
exclusively masculine character of the citizen supports a second criticism: not all citizens
are equal and not all individuals are citizens. Scholars approach the problem of the
unequal standing of the citizen in a variety of ways. Liberal feminist thought attempts to
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incorporate women into the existing state framework.75 Marxist criticism, however,
asserts that the liberal approach only benefits elite women, leaving the issue of gendered
citizenship largely unaddressed. The majority of women, along with working-class and
minority men, are not granted full citizenship and therefore, cannot fully participate as
political citizens.76 This predicament can only be remedied by a transformation of the
class structure.
Utilizing both Marxist and liberal critiques, other feminists cite patriarchy and
class as equally oppressive tools that reinforce each other and are thus equally responsible
for women’s oppression.77 Alongside this critique is yet another that regards the issue of
class as embedded within a greater patriarchal framework. This approach is common
among some Palestinian feminists, who view the economic emancipation of women as a
precondition for the eradication of patriarchy. Although each concern addresses the
unequal standing of the female citizen, consensus is clearly lacking regarding the main
form of oppression for Palestinian, and to a lesser extent Israeli, women.
The last of these three critiques of social contract theory, and the most pertinent
when discussing the Middle East, is that the social contract overcomes patriarchy only in
the civil arena, not in the private sphere.

This division is not always viewed along

gendered lines. For instance, Jurgen Habermas does not explicitly use sex as a means of
dividing the public and private spheres. Alternatively, he argues that the two spheres are
products of modernity:
In bourgeois society, over against those areas of action that are systemically
integrated in the economy and the state, socially integrated areas of action take the
shape of private and public spheres, which stand in a complementary relation to one
another. The institutional core of the private sphere is the nuclear family, relieved of
productive functions and specialized in tasks of socialization; from the systematic
perspective of the economy, it is viewed as the environment of private households.
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The institutional core of the public sphere comprises communicate networks
amplified by a cultural complex. . . From the systemic perspective of the state, the
cultural and political public spheres are viewed as the environment relevant to
generating legitimation.78
The public sphere, therefore, embodies social labour and the economic system. The
private sphere becomes the locus of socialization, cultural education and raising a family.
Rather than defining actions primarily in terms of the public or private realms,
Habermas instead identifies two spheres that he calls system and lifeworld.

70

The former

fuses capitalism and administration, and the latter constitutes the “subsystem that defines
the pattern of the social system as a whole.”80 Habermas’s lifeworld involves welding the
concept of the modem family or private sphere, with the political arena or public sphere.
Together, the family and the space in which one can politically participate are responsible
for

symbolic

reproduction.

Habermas’s

public

and

private

spheres

embody

contradistinctive attributes. The public is the site of conflict and the family the site of
love and freedom, and there can be no overlap between the two sites.81 Seyla Benhabib
observes that Habermas’s theory of system and lifeworld could have been universal had
he not assumed a male world and relegated women to a familial role.82
Evidently, Habermas’s implicit gendered division is problematic. Many
contemporary feminists draw attention to the biological and gendered division of the
public and private spheres, where men are seen as “naturally” occupying the former and
women the latter. Because this order is understood as “natural,” women accept, even
unconsciously, their subordinate position in the home.

This division ultimately produces

inequality in different realms. In the private realm, using social contract theory as a basis,
the economic and social inequalities found in employment contracts are reflected in the
sexual inequality articulated in marriage contracts. Both contracts involve exploitation,
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and marriage contracts in particular create a “relationship of domination and
subordination.”84
In the political realm, women are absent, since politics is “public” and women
exist in the “private” realm.85 Contemporary scholar Hanna Herzog views the publico/

private division as a “basic cultural mechanism to exclude women from politics.” This
division has been and is still justified biologically. Sex differences between men and
women are imbued with social meanings, which are understood as “natural” as the sex
differences themselves. Together, the social meanings constitute gender, which refers to
the “traits and roles that are defined in the social universe as feminine or masculine and
which are therefore human products deriving from social-cultural definitions and are
transmitted from one generation to the next through social arrangements.”87 Through this
socialization process, an individual appropriates not only gender, but also sexual identity.
This process is shaped by both religious and legal systems, which themselves are framed
within a greater social context. Because this social context influences the ways in which
religious and legal systems are perceived, a feminist critique challenges the public-private
division and its consequences.88
Feminists are divided over the question of whether these consequences would be
minimized if the public-private distinction were abolished. Some individuals argue that
the public-private distinction must be eradicated, since the division between the two
realms is thought to reproduce women’s subordinate status in the private sphere.89 In this
explanation, in which the public and the private are perceived as completely separate
domains, the private sphere is thought not to affect that of the public. Others argue that
the private sphere does in fact offer input to the public sphere.90 The rationale is that
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within the private sphere, individuals are raised and socialized by their families. It is
within the private sphere that individuals learn how to be citizens, taking what they learn
in the family framework and applying it in the public domain. Conversely, some theorists
argue for the retention of the public-private division.91 They claim that the private sphere
is not a prison, but a refuge. Where the public sphere is cold and hostile, the private
sphere is warm and welcoming. Merging the two spheres would eradicate the autonomy
the individual has within the private sphere, which would be reflected in the political
arena.92 Gush Emunim and Hamas women demonstrate that the two spheres are not as
divisible as social contract theorists suggest.
Mervat Hatem has observed that “political scientists theorized the Middle Eastern
state in terms of modernity, tradition, and the struggle between the two.”93 Consequently,
gender-related issues are not addressed directly. The fundamental problem in confronting
the public-private distinction in a Middle Eastern context is that citizens reside in “several
layers of private or semi-private spheres.”94 The blurring of the two domains hinges on
the citizen’s “universality.” In Western discourse, the citizen of social contract theory is
understood as universal and detached from any community.95 Nevertheless, as Suad
Joseph explains, “notions of relational or a connective self are particularly common in
many Middle Eastern countries.”96 Unlike the Western social contract male citizen, the
Middle Eastern female citizen is not detached from her community.97 To a much lesser
extent, the male Middle Eastern citizen is also defined by his connection to his
community. Despite the multitude of contemporary Middle Eastern family patterns, a
commonality among them is that “the intersection of patriarchy and patrilineality
increases the range o f men with authority over their female counterparts.”98 Thus, the
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roots of the woman’s inequality as a citizen must be found in connective, and not
detached, circumstances.
The inequality of the connective citizen can be found in relation to two
institutions: religion and fam ily." Citizenship is shaped by religion, which in the Middle
East carries heavy social, cultural, political and legal implications, as Suad Joseph and
Susan Slymovics explicate:100
With the exception of Tunisia and Turkey, family and religion are legally
intertwined [in Middle Eastern and North African countries]. Most Arab-Islamic
countries defer personal status laws (also called family law) to religious institutions,
as does Israel. Laws concerning marriage, divorce, inheritance, and child custody
are under the aegis of the legally recognized religious institutions. There is no civil
recourse: no civil marriage, divorce, or inheritance rules.101
Consequently, some scholars “include religious affiliation in their general definitions of
nation-states and nationalism in general.”102
Like religion, the family also provides an entrance into the political community.
In Middle Eastern politics, the family, not the individual, is considered by many as the
“basic unity of [political] membership.”103 One’s citizenship depends upon one’s personal
status in the family, as well as the status of the family within society.

Because

citizenship is dependent upon the family and not the individual alone, patriarchy plays a
heavier role than in Western societies in reinforcing women’s inequality. Hanita Brand
proposes that
in the cultural discourse, all women in the area, Jewish and Arab alike, were viewed
as belonging to their national groups via membership in families. . . rather than
directly, as men were. This in itself opens the possibility o f discrimination and

exclusion, suggesting that a woman’s proper place was in the home, not in the
public sphere.
Conversely, a family’s upper status within Palestinian society could also allow women to
act within the public domain. For example, many of the female heads of Palestinian non-

19

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

governmental organizations, especially those relating to human rights, come from
established families whose names lend them enough respectability to allow them the
political movement denied to women from lesser or non-established families.104 Brand
perceives that for the majority of women, however, the family is an institution that
curtails rather than enlarges their political freedom.
In confronting women’s lack of participation in the Middle Eastern public sphere,
many scholars do not attribute women’s absence to the public-private division. For some
scholars, the interrelationships among the public domain, the state, and the domestic
domain are subordinate to the problem of gender hierarchy.105 Focusing on the publicprivate distinction rather than on patriarchy, they argue, slows the process of full
citizenship for women. These scholars prefer to address the roles of religion and the
family, although these roles can be heavily influenced by a military milieu.
Consequently, the prolonged Israeli-Palestinian conflict has dramatically affected
personal status law with regards to women. With religious institutions carrying the sole
authority over family law, issues that are especially pertinent to women fall under the
jurisdiction of religious, rather than civil, courts. All clerics are male and many feminists
deem the religious institution to be a patriarchal hierarchy.106 In the Middle Eastern
context, therefore, the Western citizen becomes a “connective citizen” or “relational
•

•

•

•

•

•

.

.

self,” which - in conjunction with patriarchy - generates “patriarchal relationality.”

107

Because o f the family’s embedded position within this patriarchal relationality, women
are often expected to abandon their individual concerns not only for the welfare of the
family, but also that of the national community.
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In addition to religious institutions, yet another factor that can affect women’s
citizenship status is a movement’s institutionalization. Because democratization and
citizenship are narrowly defined in ways that often exclude women, women and gender
studies have largely been absent from discourses that examine the institutionalization
process, namely democratization transition and frame alignment theories.108 Issues of
social or economic equality have traditionally not informed discussions of political
equality, and this is reflected in the definition of citizenship in purely political terms.
Consequently, gender and women’s issues are peripheral to the discussion.109 Georgina
Waylen draws attention to the neglect of gender studies within institutionalization
discourses:
Until recently the bottom-up focus meant that links between grassroots political
activity and the wider context, particularly the relationship with political parties and
the state, were ignored. Second. . . the majority of writers fail to discuss gender
issues, despite the frequent acknowledgment that the majority of participants in
popular movements are women. Because women often participate on the basis of
the social roles associated with their gendered identities (for example, as mothers
and household providers), the analysis of these movements will be incomplete if
this is ignored.1 0
To date, women’s political and social participation in the democratization process, often
allowing women to gain more political and/or social rights, is thought to signal or
encourage a group’s moderation.111 Nevertheless, their participation does not imply that
their concern is with promoting a feminist agenda.
The modem or egalitarian understanding of feminism does not take into account
feminists whose goals are not gender specific. Women who advocate maternal feminism

seek to infuse the political culture with their own agendas rather than those that
seemingly affect all women. For example, many maternal movements are founded on
anti-war platforms pertaining to specific conflicts in which their countries are involved.
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119

Moreover, women’s involvement in movements that are undergoing institutionalization
does not guarantee increased rights, for “political cultures intersect with democratic
institutions to produce different kinds of connections between the state and civil society,
and these in turn can promote or curtail women’s involvement in politics.”

1n

Women’s

positions along the political spectrum vary, and not all women advance feminist issues,
while those who do may disagree over which issues have priority and how they are
defined. Therefore, a sophisticated approach is needed to take into account these
manifold differences.

A Paradoxical Critique of Gender Discourse
A multiple critique in gender discourse incorporates what a patriarchal framework
does not, namely, women’s contradictory roles. Religious-nationalist movements recruit
women, whose maternal roles form the backbone of the “quest to build a moral society
based on the moral family.”114 Furthermore, women serve as religious role models and
are often better skilled at recruiting others to the movements.115 For these reasons, social
and political opportunities arise for women within the religious framework. Conversely,
women are restricted to a confined space in which they cannot develop alternative
identities, and are denied opportunities outside the religious movement.116 In most cases,
even though women may desire to act outside the identity spaces that have been forged
for them, they are unlikely to do so. Not only is this a matter of religious fidelity, but
many women “believe in the possibility of creating the conditions in which multiple
identities, including the religious, can coexist in safety and dignity.”117
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This coexistence occurs when a “subalterized group can assume its essentialized
representations and use them strategically against those who have ascribed them.” 118
Women who belong to religious groups that espouse traditional values have, in the past,
successfully employed this tactic. For instance, Mary Hegland describes how Shi‘a
women in Pakistan typify paradoxical roles, as skilled political workers on the one hand,
and submissive, strong and secluded women on the other.119 In actively placing
themselves in religious communities, while assuming roles of political activism, women
in fundamentalist religious-nationalist movements demonstrate that their identities are not
fixed, but are the creations of “new, contingent subject position[s].”

19 0

In the case of the

activist Pakistani Shi‘a women, their promotion of their group’s beliefs, which heavily
stress women’s seclusion, also expands their own opportunities usually denied to other
Shi‘a women, such as travelling unaccompanied to other communities.121
Through their work with other women, the activist Shi‘a women’s new
contradictory positions in the communities are contingent on their political roles. As these
women demonstrate, connecting seemingly dichotomous identities can potentially
become a subversive act. Stuart Hall, in discussing how the marginalized place between
identities can become a locus for power, explains that
new subjects, new genders, new ethnicities, new regions, and new communities all hitherto excluded as decentred or subaltern - have emerged and have acquired
through struggle, sometimes in very marginalized ways, the means to speak for
themselves for the first time. And the discourses of power in our society, the
discourses of the dominant regimes, have been certainly threatened by this
•

1 99

decentred cultural empowerment o f the marginal and the local.

Like the Shi‘a women, therefore, women in fundamentalist religious-nationalist
movements can use their religious and nationalist identities to both criticize and
transform regional gender discourses.
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Miriam Cooke labels this strategy a multiple critique, or “a multilayered discourse
that allows them to engage with and criticize the various individuals, institutions, and
systems that limit and oppress them while making sure that they are not caught in their
own rhetoric.”

i

Given the above complexities pertaining to women in religious,

nationalist, fundamentalist, feminist and citizenship discourses, women’s activities within
Gush Emunim and Hamas are best analysed using the multiple critique framework. The
following chapters highlight the dual forms of resistance and engagement by women in
the context o f the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
The following chapter outlines the ideological origins of the Bloc of the Faithful,
and the movement’s success in establishing settlements through support by local, regional
and national administrative bodies. Gush Emunim’s decline in influence and its
pragmatic adjustments in the 1980s point to a lessening commitment to the movement’s
original aspirations. This occurred years before some women established the Rachelim
settlement. These women’s intentions, actions and self-perceptions, as Chapter Three
illustrates, reveal the contradictions of their prescribed roles.
Turning to the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), Chapter Four discusses
Hamas’s ideology and describes its subsequent modifications, largely the result of the
need to secure approval from the Palestinian population. In comparing the periods before
and after the signing o f the Declaration of Principles, the group’s approach to the
possibility o f a long-term ceasefire with, and its use of violence against, Israel
significantly altered. These changes occurred years before women were actively involved
in Hamas’s military and political structures, which Chapter Five examines in further
detail.
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In chronicling each movement’s institutionalization and moderation, this study
demonstrates that women’s increased political participation is not a moderating force in
either movement. Governing this work are the questions o f how some women become
more active in the public realm after their movement’s moderation, why the women’s
actions appear more extreme than those of their male counterparts and what contradictory
motives drive these women’s actions. Finally, this study concludes that some women
become more politically and publicly assertive toward their movements’ original goals
upon the realization that their male counterparts, as a result of their movements’
moderation, have been rendered politically impotent.
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CHAPTER TWO
GUSH EMUNIM AND THE SETTLEMENT ENTERPRISE

In spite of the Palestinian residents and refugees already living in the territories
that Israel acquired following the 1967 war, Gush Emunim has always harboured the
hope of populating these areas through the creation of settlements like Rachelim. Nira
Yuval-Davis is among those who describe Gush Emunim’s settlement goal as
uncompromising, citing it as
an example of a Zionist fundamentalist group. They initiated a project, which was
initially illegal, o f Jewish settlement in the Occupied Territories, especially near the
Jewish holy places. In their actions, the settlers, many of whom were the product of
the Israeli state religious educational system, combined Zionist pioneering myths
with religious practice, and produced a new mode of Jewish religion in which the
“Land o f Israel” gained a cardinal importance; its control and settlement by Jews
became a precondition for the arrival of the messiah. Their vision is total, and there
is no space in it for any recognition of the national aspirations of the Palestinians,
nor any compromise or negotiated peace with the Arabs. Its most extreme wings,
however, turned themselves into paramilitary units terrorizing and counterterrorizing the Palestinians, as well as threatening to resist by force any attempt by
Israel to withdraw from the Occupied Territories. 24
Nevertheless, this chapter counters the erroneous claims of Gush Emunim’s (GE)
inflexibility by demonstrating that GE moderated as a result of its institutionalization.
This process occurred between its formal establishment in 1974, following the disastrous
1973 Yom Kippur War and GE’s opposition to the National Religious Party’s decision to
participate in the centrist government’s coalition, and the creation of the Rachelim
settlement in late 1991.125
During this period, as some GE men accrued political influence and subsequently
lost much of it, women were largely absent from formal leadership positions within the
movement. Although they supported their husbands’ actions throughout GE’s
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institutionalization, the literature on GE women does not point to women’s political
involvement outside familial roles.126 Only when GE men had lost much of their power
within the movement did women emerge as the new pioneers of the settlement movement.
Before discussing women’s avant-garde approach to settlement creation, it is first
•

•

•

•

•

•

necessary to detail GE’s institutionalization.

177

The following pages outline the movement’s ideology, which emphasizes the
holiness o f the Land o f Israel. This doctrine explains why, in GE’s view, giving up any
land, even for the sake of peace, is theoretically impossible. The paper then shifts its
focus to the movement’s success in establishing settlements in the 1970s and early 1980s.
Parallel to these achievements was the increased institutionalization of the movement
through the acquisition of support from local, regional and national administrative bodies.
This institutionalization became more apparent with the movement’s inability to cope
effectively in times of internal crisis, particularly when a minority of adherents carried
out actions demonstrating their full commitment to the movement’s original goals, which
were otherwise met with public disapproval. The discovery of the “Jewish Underground”
(JU), some of whose members were Gush members or supporters, and GE’s subsequent
denunciation of the JU’s terrorist activities revealed the movement’s moderation. Further
demonstrating GE’s moderation, this chapter concludes with a section highlighting the
movement’s reaction to the land concessions made by the Israeli government.

Membership and Ideology
Gush Emunim’s religious nationalism is an ideology based on traditional
messianism, which safeguards the Jewish nation and seeks to realize the full biblical
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Zionist dream. Protecting the family and the nation entails military service, a driving
principle o f GE ideology.128 Following their military service, GE men graduate from the
best universities in Israel, while women attend post-secondary religious seminaries.
Although no formal membership list exists, studies by David Weisburd and Elin Waring
in the early 1980s revealed significant information about Gush settlers in Judea and
Samaria.129 In terms of age, only 10 percent of the settlers were over forty.130 Hardly any
of the settlers were single, and more than one third of settler couples had four children or
more.131 GE believers therefore tend to be educated, young and family-oriented. Clearly,
religious and national importance was and still is placed on the close-knit individual
family and the obligation to have children. Within these families, as some scholars
observe, men and women have tended to have complimentary roles: traditionally men
have been the ‘public’ representative of the family, while women have been that of the
‘private.’132 A detailed explanation of their roles, as well as of the adherence of men and
women to these expectations, is discussed in the following chapter.
GE’s structure is a macrocosm of the familial unit, with Rabbi Abraham Yitzchak
HaCohen Kook and his son Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook acting as the religious and political
parental authorities o f the movement. Grasping GE’s political motivations entails
examining the ideology of these two rabbis, who were important figures in twentieth
century religious Zionism and whose beliefs have influenced and transformed the Israeli
political milieu.133 Gush Emunim adheres not only to Kookist dogma, but also to the
philosophy of merkaz harav, a close relationship with one’s rabbi.134 In instances where a
rabbi’s approval can encourage members to break civil or criminal law, potentially
resulting in civilian death, this close relationship is especially crucial. Neither the
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centrality of merkaz harav nor the exclusivity of the male leadership has ever been a
source of contention for its young family-oriented followers, even after GE became
institutionalized in the late 1970s. 135 The importance of a rabbinic authority in
influencing GE activities reappears in the discussion of the JU, but it must be emphasized
that the Kook rabbis in particular played a paramount role in determining GE’s course of
action.
Rabbi A.Y. Kook, or Rav Kook Senior, emphasized “elements of faith, secrecy,
unearthly intuition, supernatural illumination, mystery and paradox” in his theology.136
Bom at the end of the nineteenth century, he witnessed pivotal events in Zionist history.
The Balfour declaration, the aliya or immigration movements to Israel, and the ploughing
of the land were among the prominent events which led him to proclaim that the era of
redemption was at hand: “The whole people believes that, following the redemption now
beginning before our very eyes, there will be no more exile, and this deep faith is itself
the secret o f [our] existence.”137 Like his contemporaries, Kook Sr. believed the messiah
would be sent by God and would free the Jews from political subjugation. The world
would recognize the uniqueness of the Jewish people while living in an age of peace.
Although this proclamation angered some of his fellow Orthodox rabbis, who
were firm believers in Jewish political passivity until the messiah’s arrival, he gained the
support o f the early secular Zionists.138 In need of Orthodox approval to legitimize their
cause in Europe for an ethnoreligious homeland, the secular Zionists were eager to secure
the support of Rav Kook Sr. To justify this alliance, Rav Kook Sr. relied upon his
theoretical teachings about the important role of secular Zionists in ushering in the
messianic era. The symbiotic relationship persisted until the 1980s, helping GE gain
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support from secular Israelis. Kook Sr.’s teachings, in spite of the support they received,
were vague and his death in 1935 left many questions about the redemption
unanswered.139 For example, if the Jews were unique, this alone should have been
enough to usher in the messianic era, yet Kook Sr. made the timing of the redemption
conditional on the behaviour and moral improvement of the Jewish people.140 Kook Sr.’s
followers turned to his son for clarification. His son, however, applied his father’s ideas
in a more deterministic way.
Rabbi Z.Y. Kook elucidated his father’s theoretical teachings into more pragmatic
terms for the secular public. He first equated the holiness of the land itself to that of the
people. According to Rav Kook Junior, the biblical term Am Yisrael, or the nation/people
of Israel, referred not only to the Jewish people, but to the Land of Israel. Having made
clear that the two entities were inseparable and equal, he then proclaimed that the
redemption could only occur in a full Eretz Yisrael. While Rav Kook Jr. did not
emphasize this aspect initially, it acquired particular significance after 1967, when Israel
gained control o f Arab territory.
Israel’s post-1967 territories, including the Gaza Strip, Judea and Samaria were
included in Kook Jr.’s interpretation of the Land of Israel. His biblical reading of Israel’s
borders also included large parts of Jordan, Syria and Iraq. Unabashedly, he declared that
“all this land [Greater Israel] is ours, absolutely, belonging to all of us; it is nontransferable to others even in part. . . it was promised to us by God, Creator of the
World.” 141 Unlike his father, Kook Jr. did not make these positive historical events
contingent on the spiritual transformation of the Jews.142 The significance of Kook Jr.’s
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ideology was an uncompromising stance concerning the Arab territories acquired during
the 1967 war.
For religious messianists, the 1967 and 1973 wars further strengthened their
desire to retain the land. The wars, especially the 1973 Yom Kippur War, were not
viewed as consequences o f Israeli military or political strategy; rather, the 1973 war in
particular was understood as a desperate attempt by non-Jewish nations to prevent the
redemption.143 The combination of these three convictions, the equivalence of the Jewish
land with the people, the precondition of a full Israel for redemption, and the intervention
of non-Jewish nations in Jewish destiny, had implications for personal sacrifice.
For GE members, the acceptance of any land-for-peace proposition was
impossible, since the land, people and Torah were equally important; one could not be
sacrificed in place of, nor for the sake of, the other. The equivalence of these three
constituents alludes to and parallels the concept of pikuach nefesh, in which one must
channel all efforts into saving the life of another.144 This law also requires a Jew, under
conditions of duress, to forfeit one’s life rather than kill another Jew. Rather than
transgress the divine prohibitions against idolatry, incest or murder, a Jew must give up
his or her life. 145 Kook Jr., however, added yet another instance in which pikuach nefesh
was applicable. Preventing territorial confiscation by other nations, precluding Israel’s
relinquishment of acquired territories, and preserving the integrity of Eretz Yisrael now
became legitimate reasons for endangering one’s life.146 Yet as the evacuation of the
Sinai settlements reveal, as addressed later in this chapter, the unwillingness of GE
members to heed to this interpretation of pikuach nefesh indicates an ideological shift
within the movement. As the next section makes evident, this change in approach
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questions not only the necessity of land settlement in the territories, but the supposition of
an imminent messianic era.

Land Settlement and Redemption
Gush Emunim’s brand of religious nationalism seeks the realization of a national
utopia, whose creation is expected during the lifetime of GE members.147 Despite their
belief that the redemption will be experienced not solely by Israel, but by the entire world,
GE perceives some nations and individuals as intent on preventing this momentous
event.

14 o

Those persons and countries apply international pressure on Israel to relinquish

the territories, thereby jeopardizing Israel’s right to the land and its right to full
sovereignty. The conflict of interests is understood as a “fierce struggle” and accordingly,
the desire to retain the acquired territories is immense.149
The liberation of Judea and Samara is integral to the messianic redemptive
process for several reasons. First, settlement of these territories is believed to hasten
salvation by ushering in the messianic era.150 In establishing settlements in the Sinai
Peninsula, the Gaza Strip and the heart of the West Bank, GE transformed a political
undertaking into an instrument of religious salvation.151 Second, the messiah’s arrival
and subsequent salvation are conditional on “the Jewish people restor[ing] itself
politically by its own actions.” Political renewal is therefore linked to the creation of
settlements in Judea, Samaria and the Greater Land of Israel.152 Moreover, control over
the entire Land o f Israel must be taken as an uncompromising ideology. To accept only
part of the land indicates a lack of understanding of the redemptive process.153 Finally,
even though the integrity of Israel is but the first step in the redemptive process, it is
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currently the most important goal. As one GE leader said hopefully, upon achieving this
goal, “the entire Jewish people will constitute Gush Emunim.” 154 Thus, Jewish
sovereignty over the acquired territories catalyses the messianic process.
The liberation o f Judea and Samaria is also vital in the mystical redemptive
process. First, political sovereignty over the land will affect the spiritual realms. Tikkun,
the kabbalistic notion of spiritual healing, will occur at the cosmic level.155 These changes
are universal and in the best interest of all peoples, and are thought to prevent a further
decline in morality worldwide. Rabbi Moshe Levinger, the movement’s spiritual leader
since GE’s creation, emphasizes the idea that “enforcing the Israeli national will on the
Arabs will foster a religious revival among them, eventually to be expressed in their
spontaneous desire to join the reconstruction of the Third [Jewish] Temple.” 156 In
addition, there remains another mystical aspect that is more heavily emphasized.
GE ideology includes a belief in reincarnation, a conviction not unusual in
Judaism, but carrying practical implications. The commandment of settling in the Land of
Israel was unstressed by previous Orthodox generations, and therefore not observed in the
past lives o f GE members. Consequently, this negligence must now be rectified in order
for members to take part in the redemption.157 Living in Israel becomes a means of
attaining the spiritual perfection of one’s past life. It is this spiritual fulfillment of a
commandment once unobserved that will cause the messiah’s arrival. GE members,
however, are more concerned with a contemporary threat to the Jewish people: Western
values.
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The Rejection of Western Values
While GE co-operates with its secular political allies, it follows the trend of some
parallel religious movements, including Hamas, in taking an anti-Western stance.158 Its
members attribute a multitude of social problems, perceived as by-products of Western
values, to secular society. These ills include
reckless radical leftism, permissiveness, drug addiction, teenage prostitution, a
decline in the work ethic, alienation from one’s country, abetting the enemy,
emigration, the refusal to do army service in Judea and Samaria, contempt for the
spirit of Judaism, juvenile delinquency, corruption, violence, murder,
robbery... .159
Not surprisingly, the movement rejects these values, which are viewed as the product of
modernity and its emphasis on the individual.160 For GE members, the individual is but a
conduit to fulfilling the divine commandments, such as raising families and settling the
land.161 The values of the nation supersede those of the individual and when the two
differ for women, the movement’s interests must precede women’s own fulfilment. From
Gush Emunim’s perspective, Western values such as “bra-burning” feminism threaten the
group’s cohesiveness, which relies upon prescribed roles for men and women that are
outlined in the following chapter.

An emphasis on the unity of the family and the

movement helps explain why settlers are willing to live in areas that endanger their
families’ lives, a theme that is further developed below.
Just as Gush Emunim rejects Western values, so too does it shun some aspects of
the Western concept o f democracy. GE’s stance on democracy is conflicted. On the one
hand, GE accepts the validity of the Israeli parliament, particularly because Rav Kook Jr.
sanctioned it on Independence Day 1967. To his followers, Kook Jr. called Medinat
Yisrael (the State of Israel) the “Kingdom of Israel in the Making” and the “Kingdom of
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Israel as the Kingdom of Heaven on Earth.” 162 The legitimacy of the state and its
institutions hinge on their being manifestations of God’s will. On the other hand, the
language used to describe the state institutions is monarchical, not democratic.
While Gush Emunim has not articulated an anti-democratic ideology, one cannot
assume that it supports democracy.163 Rav Kook Jr. declared, “We are commanded by
the Bible, not by the government. The Bible overrides the government, it is eternal and
this government is temporary and invalid.”164 In circumstances where settlement in Judea
or Samaria is opposed by the government, GE opinion is that divine will precludes
democracy. Moreover, international politics are morally wrong, since land relinquishment
contradicts divine will. Goldberg and Ben-Zadok explain that
Gush Emunim in effect rejects the view accepted by the large majority of the Israeli
public that defence and foreign policy is governed, among others, by circumstantial
considerations, including the constrains of international politics. Gush Emunim
rejects one o f the cornerstones of Israeli foreign policy shared by hawks and doves
alike since 1950, according to which Israel identifies with the west in the global
conflict.165
While GE explicitly does not condemn Western democracy, since the movement needs
secular support, it nonetheless perceives democracy and other Western values as
detrimental to Jewish morality. As discussed below, Gush Emunim’s decision in the early
1980s to collectively partake in the institutional processes of democracy therefore
indicates a growing accommodation to political realities than GE’s rhetoric might
otherwise suggest.
According to its own theology, GE claims to support the government only when
the government’s actions accord with the movement’s conception of divine will.
Similarly, the movement can militarily or politically oppose the government whenever
government actions, such as the evacuation of settlements in the early 1980s, explicitly
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violate divine law. The movement’s decision to severely restrict its use of violence in the
face of settlement evacuations is a significant marker of the group’s moderation.
Nevertheless, the movement in its early stages still required, in addition to the strong
religious conviction of its members, political support to help implement its settlement
agenda. As discussed below, the institutionalization of the movement largely contributed
to Gush Emunim’s moderation.

External Political Involvement and Support
Gush Emunim emerged as an independent religious political entity in February
1974. Founded by Rabbi Chaim Druckman, its political leaders have always been men,
and Avner Yaniv and Yael Yishai’s comment that GE is “joined by women and children”
affirms that men constitute the primary membership.166 GE began its political life as a
faction within Israel’s National Religious Party (NRP), in which most of the movement’s
leaders were still active members of the influential NRP.167 David Schnall observes that
“the NRP has participated in almost all of Israel’s coalition governments, holding a
virtual monopoly on certain ministries and areas of government activity.”

1£(»

Moreover, as

a result of NRP control over the religious ministries, GE indirectly acquired support from
other minority parties. In addition to religious messianists, Arab minorities in Israel also
supported the NRP, in spite of its settlement policy. The Arab minorities, under the
NRP’s treatment o f religious minorities, “fall under the jurisdiction of their own
respective religious establishments,” instead of under the direct control of the state.169
The NRP has thus played a vital role in securing direct and indirect support for GE.
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In addition to the NRP, other parties also supported GE. The Labour
government’s tacit approval of the settlements, or at least its unwillingness to dismantle
them immediately, was the result of both official and unofficial support by parliament
members. Likud’s win over Labour in 1977 resulted in further aid for settlement activity.
In the following few years, two other parties chose to back GE. In the 1981 election,
Tehiya won three seats and was included in the 1981 government coalition.170 Formed by
Begin cabinet minister Yuval Neimen and Knesset members Geula Cohen and Moshe
Shamir, Tehiya sought to represent GE’s settlement agenda in parliament.
Tehiya co-operated with other parties and persons with similar platforms,
including Chaim Druckman of the NRP.171 The Tehiya platform was clear: dismantling
Yamit, the largest settlement in Sinai, or returning any parts of Sinai or the West Bank,
could never be an option.

As noted above, GE has always traditionally believed that

any forfeiture of land reveals an inability to fully comprehend the redemptive process.173
This hard-line approach to peace negotiations garnered much approval. The newly
created religious party in 1984 and regurgitated form of Tehiya, Morasha, also supported
GE policy.174 Thus, many parties that often disagreed with one another’s policies found
common ground in their support of the settlers.
The parties’ motivations in supporting the settlers, however, greatly varied. For
the socialist Zionists, the settlement/dismantlement issue carried heavy sociopolitical
implications. Many Israelis at the time were affected by GE’s use of rhetoric that alluded
to the early settler years. In its nascent years, GE attempted to “portray itself in
humanistic terms hearkening back to the binationalism of Socialist Zionist thinking of
the ’30s and ’40s.” 176 This socialist Zionist thinking, then, was not restricted exclusively
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to the importance o f tilling the land, but extended to relations with Arabs. Citing
instances o f hiring Arab contractors to build new homes, the movement emphasized its
role in promoting interaction with local Arabs in daily life and stimulating market
economy through job creation for the locals. Despite GE’s militant stance regarding
settlement, it believed peace necessitated Jews and Arabs living in close proximity.177
This policy o f co-operation, in addition to the early settler allusions, swayed many
Labour members and supporters to favour settlement establishment. Goldberg and BenZadok summarize the settlement appeal to different parties:
The three arguments for the territorial integrity of the land of Israel are rooted in
three world-views: ‘security hawkishness’, which can be found even within the
Labour movement; ‘historical hawkishness’, which accepts the need to retain
extensive territories for security reasons but adds to this the historical tie of the
Jewish people to those territories which were in the past under Jewish rule, a view
characteristic of the Herut movement (Likud); ‘religious hawkishness,’ which does
not deny either of the above arguments but adds to them the idea of the sanctity of
the land of Israel and the settlement of the land as an element of religious belief and
observance. The proportion of the Israelis who hold this latter view is very small,
despite the strengthening of the hawkish ideology in general.178
Despite the small number of religiously motivated supporters, the settlement issue was
nonetheless supported for different reasons by the Labour and Likud parties.
Yet another way in which GE gained support was by manipulating strained
relationships among Knesset members. For example, GE men exploited tensions between
Moshe Dayan and Yigal Allon, between Yitchak Rabin and Shimon Peres, and among
Labour party members in general. Meanwhile, the NRP ministers backed and lobbied GE
activities throughout these political intrigues.179 Add Labour support to that of the NRP,
Likud and later Tehiya, and GE appeared to have gained the support of a large sector of
the Israeli public.
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Between the group’s inception and the 1977 win of the Likud government, GE
acquired public support due to the renewal of nationalism, the unpopularity of IsraeliArab peace talks, the popularization of settlement in the acquired territories and the
establishment of settlements in these areas. At the outset, settlement activity inspired
nationalism amongst its supporters. Non-practicing Jews, who constitute the majority of
Israel’s Jewish population, were among those who were affected by GE. While they may
not have subscribed to the religious ideology, they nonetheless backed this religious
group that had assumed a leading role in political life, and had reawakened political
•

»

»

•

•

nationalism among those disenchanted with religion’s role in state affairs.

isn

Furthermore, the wave of nationalist sentiment contributed to public opposition to
the peace talks. In opposing them, the public became a de facto ally of GE. IsraeliEgyptian and Israeli-Syrian peace talks fuelled protest among GE followers, as was
clearly indicated by the number of public rallies, petitions, traffic blockades and
extensive picketing.181 Protests against the peace talks did not suffice and they were soon
superseded by events intended to promote Israeli acceptance of settlement creation. For
instance, thousands o f protesters lit candles in unison and undertook marathons, while GE
members organized the “Movement to Stop the Withdrawal from Sinai.” 182 Women
were presumably continuing to improve settlement conditions, for the organizers were
1 0 -1

mostly men.

These activities were staged in order to attract the public’s attention to the

need for populating Judea and Samaria for strategic, historical and religious purposes.
Emphasizing the tactical advantage of the territories, GE tapped into a voter pool
previously foreign to the religious parties: the Jewish laity. By promoting secular
explanations such as security, instead of religious justifications such as the messianic
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arrival, GE encouraged the growth of public interest in territorial settlement. With the
assistance o f Likud, which assumed power in 1977, the annual average of new settlers in
i a a

the territories increased from 300 to 4400.

Finally, GE implemented its ideology

alongside its protests by creating settlements whose locations and times of creation were
determined by GE men.

18^

These settlements were often just outside the more populated

Arab urban centres in Judea and Samaria and included Kiryat Arba and Elon Moreh.

18A

Although the creation of these settlements was illegal, it gained support from the public
and even Labour members who officially opposed this policy. While the events of the
peace talks, rallies and settlements themselves increased GE popularity, the role of
nationalism propelled the movement.
Therefore, the GE transition from an NRP faction to an extra-parliamentary
movement in the late 1970s was largely a result of its ability to combine “expressibility
with instrumentality” and “vocal protest with action and building.”

187

GE acquired its

external political support from a variety of sources. These included the NRP, which
supported GE’s policy for religious reasons; the Labour party, for its pioneering history;
and the Likud, for its settlement policy. Founded by GE members, Tehiya naturally
supported the movement. Finally, the public also backed GE for security reasons and
nationalist sentiment.

Settlement Success and Political Lobbying
The political success of Gush Emunim depended on the government’s acceptance
of the settlement policy. In 1968, six years before Gush Emunim’s formal establishment,
the legality o f the acquired territories was still ambiguous. Rather than wait for a formal
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decision to be issued by the government, the movement established its first settlement.
Acting alone under the authority of their spiritual leader Rabbi Moshe Levinger, the
group members rented out rooms in the Park Hotel in Hebron and proclaimed it their new
residence, much to the chagrin of their Arab neighbours. Despite protests from locals, no
military evacuation occurred. The military and settlers eventually reached a compromise
that resulted in the settlement Kiryat Arba, outside of Hebron’s municipal boundaries.188
Eleven years later, the settlers undertook a more ambitious settlement goal and
occupied the Davoya/Beit Haddasah building in Hebron. Twelve women and their
children occupied the hotel for nearly a year, until the government gave permission for
the settlers and additional families to live in Hebron, as a compromise for the Sinai land
concessions m the Begin-Sadat peace treaty.

180

The women, led by Rabbi Levinger’s wife,

acted under the instructions of GE’s male leadership. Miriam Levinger recounts, “I went
to my husband [Rabbi Moshe Levinger] and I said that the women wanted to live in
Hebron. He consulted with others who came to the conclusion that we had a good idea.
They worked out the plan.” 190 At the hotel, women reproduced their roles as religious
Jewish homemakers in an attempt to improve their new living conditions.191 They cooked,
they cleaned, and they raised their children as they had done before moving to the
hotel.192 Women’s voice in the settlement negotiation process was absent. Tamara
Neuman concurs that women’s
primary advocates in bureaucratic-administrative circles are men, tactically
negotiating the public-private divide. Moreover, religious women’s apparent non
political status strengthens the hands of their male counterparts, who by this
gendered logic are better able to take up their roles as the “real” political advocates
and to argue for increased security measures.193
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Thus, in creating the settlements, women neither negotiated with the government, nor did
they act without the consent of male GE members.
To achieve its goals, Gush Emunim used four operational approaches. The first
and most effective method that it employed was the creation, on multiple occasions, of a
fa it accompli. As Ehud Sprinzak summarized, this precedent of creating a settlement by
a fa it accompli involved four phases. First, religion was used as a pretext in asserting a
“temporary” presence. Second, religion was cited as a valid excuse for a refusal to leave
the grounds. Ideally, this refusal would generate an abundant supply of media attention,
which would portray GE as intent on resolving the tensions between itself and the
military in a peaceful manner. Third, an agreement would be reached whereupon GE
would evacuate the land on the conditions that a religious institution be built thereafter on
that site, or that the settlers be permitted to reside in close vicinity to a military base. The
last stage would involve the eventual permanent construction of a Jewish settlement. Not
only was Kiryat Arba established using this method, but so too were many other
settlements, including Keshet and Ellon Moreh in 1977, and Rachelim in 1991. Thus, the
tactic of creating settlements through an “overnight surprise presence, creation of new
facts, and rapid use of new political manoeuvres to sustain the momentum” was both
consistent and effective.194
The creation of settlements could not have occurred without tacit approval at the
administrative level o f the government. Gush Emunim’s supporters targeted different
bodies in their lobbying efforts to permit settlement creation. Ministry officials were
recruited, including those in the Ministry of Agriculture and particularly in ministries that
involved religious matters and were headed by the N R P.195 Individual members of
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kibbutzim and moshavim, as well as the Ein Vered group, which had acquired political
influence, also supported G E .196 In addition, military officers and various officials
throughout the military administration were enlisted to the settlement cause.197 In
recruiting the above supporters, GE selected its lobbyists and its rhetoric carefully. Using
its soft-spoken male members to advocate advancing its settlement cause, GE presented
their cause to the Israeli public as one resembling the early secular Zionist pioneers rather
than the messianic scripture. Overall, finding supporters in the administration, be they
ministerial or military, was initially not a challenge for GE.
The most effective lobbying was targeted at the highest political stratum. Potential
recruits included Knessnet members. Without their co-operation, settlement in the
occupied territories would not be possible, and GE leaders recognized at the outset the
need for these alliances. They used their connections in the NRP to oppose the Allon plan,
which called for military control of the territories without Jewish settlement.198 Moreover,
GE welcomed Shimon Peres’s tacit approval of the settlers’ surprise settlement in the
Ba’al Hazor military base.199 The election of the pro-settlement Likud government in
1977 eradicated the need to increase contacts within the government, or justify Jewish
settlement in the occupied territories. Consequently, the GE secretariat dissolved. Since
the movement’s leaders had met regularly to discuss the settlements’ oversight
administrations, Amana and Yesha, the need for a specific GE ruling body was never
formally articulated.200
Nonetheless, GE members needed to reinforce their rights to the land to a
government that might succumb to international pressure to relinquish the territories; this
involved persuading the head of parliament himself.201 By reminding Prime Minister
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Begin o f his commitment to the Land of Israel, GE leaders were able to secure their right
to establish new settlements. Thus, by using their connections in the NRP and forcing an
already pro-settlement government to recall its commitment to them, GE members
obtained temporary support for their settlements’ establishment.

Political and Policy Impact
Both Labour and Likud regimes felt the tremors of GE’s political impact. Under
the Labour regime, GE lobbied for support in the government and the military, causing a
transformation in the territories’ status. GE’s vision of a greater Israel began to eclipse
the idea of the territories serving as mere bargaining chips in peace talks with Arab
neighbours. Moreover, the GE settlements allowed the Labour government to pursue its
policy concerning the territories without open involvement. Labour’s uncertainty
regarding the creation of Jewish settlements, along with the overnight presence of GE
settlements, provided the government with an opportunity to postpone the questions of
territorial surrender and Palestinian autonomy. This hesitancy is exactly what GE
anticipated; members hoped that the creation of new settlements in the territories would
make it more difficult for the government to relinquish them in peace talks. Labour was
therefore complicit in settlement creation. The public did not allow Labour much time to
mull over the settlement issue, however, for Likud’s ascension to power carried a promise
of creating settlements throughout the West Bank. While Likud actively promoted
settlement and Labour did not, both parties were sympathetic to the young settlers.
Gush Emunim also significantly affected the ways in which the Likud government
implemented its settlement plans. Upon gaining power, Likud immediately outlined a
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plan to erect administrative buildings, create a judicial subsystem to oversee the
territories, and fulfill the promise of settling 100 000 Israelis in the West Bank within
three years. Consequently, Likud channelled millions of dollars into creating suburban
housing complexes that were not fashioned in the Israeli style, but in the American way.
Since GE had a network of programs aimed at enticing Westerners to immigrate,
emulating American housing encouraged immigration.
In addition, Likud provided various funding opportunities for families who took
part in the “Build Your Own Home” programme. These incentives were particularly
lucrative for families, due to the horrendous inflation and a near-stagnant economic
period.202 GE supporter Yuval Neiman represented Tehiya in its 1982 coalition with the
government, and consequently, more money was allocated to immigration recruitment
campaigns and advancing the religious-nationalist ideology. 203 Furthermore, as David
Schnall aptly writes, “no matter what the [Labour or Likud] position on the wisdom of
settlement, few Israelis can accept the idea that it is illegal for a Jew to reside anywhere
he chooses, most especially on land with historic Jewish links. Thus, strategy has been
traded for legitimacy.”204 GE was clearly successful in securing acquiring support for
immigration campaigns and the creation of settlements from the Likud government.
Settlement activity in the territories not only altered the role the occupied land
would play in bargaining, it transformed the very way the religious parties behaved
politically. First, it forced the religious parties to have stances on secular issues.
Traditionally, religious parties were solely concerned with the dominating facets of
Israeli society that concerned personal religious matters. Since they maintained power
because of their small but vital role in coalition governments, issues such as security,
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foreign policy and economics were usually shunted to the Labour party.205 GE, under the
influence o f Rabbi Kook Jr., altered its role: religious parties now held positions on issues
other than what had concerned them in the past. These issues included the rights and
status of non-Jews in the state of Israel, the lawfulness of occupying the territories, and
the conditions that would justify conceding land won in war.
Second, as a result of the religious parties’ concern with these issues, a revival of
medieval rabbinic sources occurred in the political sphere, in the NRP and smaller
parties.207 As a result of GE’s success and the subsequent revival of religious parties,
many o f them, particularly the NRP, migrated to the right of the political spectrum. They
adopted a more militant attitude when it came to the issue of the territories and
Palestinian autonomy.

Finally, the movement renewed interest in religion and religious

issues among the non-Orthodox communities. Unlike the NRP, GE was not perceived as
having a stale institutionalized religious platform; rather its “activist and emotional”
agenda and its unwavering loyalty to the creation of settlements drew support from across
the spectrum.209
Thus, GE was successful in implementing its policy, even with a change of
government. Exploiting Labour’s uncertainty regarding the occupied territories and its
willingness to ignore the issue, the settlers created permanent settlements that were later
sanctioned by the Likud government. Moreover, GE policy affected religious parties,
policies, and their alignment on the political spectrum. Yet over the following decade, GE
lost much o f its influence and consequently, the movement began to make pragmatic
adjustments.
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The Decline in Influence and Commitment
Gush Emunim’s political failure in the 1980s can largely be attributed to its
external political activities. While its leaders decided not to align the movement officially
with any one party, GE policies were nonetheless woven into the political fabrics of both
the NRP and Tehiya. In both instances, the association between the movement and the
party eventually caused a decline in GE’s influence. Two issues in particular encouraged
GE members to seek an alternative party for promoting their concerns. First, the increase
in secularization caused support for the NRP to wane, dropping five percentage points to
24.7 percent support among students.210 When GE declared itself a formal movement in
the 1970s, many of its members were actively involved with or supported the NRP. Thus,
GE members were concerned that a decline in NRP support would be reflected in a
decline in GE support.
Second, the territorial issue, which renewed interest in the NRP, now challenged
the party’s unity. The newer NRP, with its large GE membership, strove to persuade the
NRP leadership to form a coalition with Likud, a party unlikely to give up the territories.
In light of weakening support for the Labour party following the Yom Kippur War, the
long history o f settler affiliation with the Labour party was hampering the settlers’
primary aims.

211

These attempts were to no avail and the NRP’s decision to join the

Labour coalition compelled the GE to sever its ties to the party in 1974. Thus, in order to
maintain or increase popularity, GE needed to isolate itself officially from the NRP.
The creation of Tehiya in 1979 had the potential to increase Gush Emunim’s
support. Ardent settlers, with members from GE, the secular Land of Israel movement, as
well as secular nationalists who opposed the Begin-Sadat peace treaty, supported GE. In
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1981, the party had three members elected to the Knesset, including GE member Hanan
Porat. In 1984, under a different name and with a coalition, Tehiya was - with 5 out of
120 seats — the third largest party in Israel. Despite its initial success, Tehiya’s close
unofficial affiliation with GE encountered several challenges.
First, as Ehud Sprinzak succinctly explains, GE is a “homogeneous revitalization
movement whose main concern is the settlement of the West Bank. . . all members of the
GE

agree

on

fundamental

principles

and

live

within

the

same

exclusive

Weltanschauung.”212 Tehiya, however, had leaders representing the military, journalists,
the business sector, settlers and scientists. An issue-oriented movement such as GE
cannot have a party representing it on issues for which the movement has little or no
concern. Not surprisingly, GE’s decision to present an electoral list of candidates was met
with resistance within the party.

The creation of a political party was “seen as

motivated as much from a desire for personal gain as from the best interests of the
movement.”214 Thus, many GE members thought that the movement’s non-partisanship
was intrinsic to their identity, and that its motivated issue-based voting would fulfil their
aims without explicit party affiliation.
Second, this concern became concrete with Tehiya’s lack of success in the
elections. Three seats alone were far below what party hopefuls had expected. Schnall
attributes GE’s disappointing results to
partisan ties [that] run deep in Israel: most voters retain their political affiliations
over time and pass them along to their children. Aside from political ideology and
policy stance, the parties provide numerous social and welfare benefits, pension
programmes, and the like; these benefits tend to shore up voter loyalty (as does the
threat of their loss). For Tehiya to expect that large numbers of voters would spring
to answer its essentially ideological call was ill-advised and albeit naive; even its
supporters generally returned to their electoral moorings within the Likud bloc or
the NRP 215
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GE’s creation was initially a response to diminishing NRP political support and
‘routinized’ religious institutionalization; ironically, the movement was now undergoing
the same institutionalization process against which it had once rebelled.
Likud’s control over the territories also contributed to the decline in Gush
Emunim’s popularity. After winning a second term in office in 1981, Likud’s
organizations replaced GE as the driving force of settlement establishment in the
occupied territories. As the number of settlements increased under the Likud government,
so too did the need for an administrative body to govern them. As a result, GE lost its
best leadership with the creation of a specialized administration to govern the territories.
For instance, in 1976 the settlement movement institution Amana was established to
govern settlement affairs and was fully staffed with GE members.

71f\

While Amana governed settlement activities, Yesha, or the Council of Jewish
Settlements in Judea, Samaria and Gaza, oversaw administrative functions. These
successful GE advocates were chosen from the original GE leadership “to take over the
•

most organized and orderly institution of the movement.”

“517

The establishment of

settlements involved creating an administrative infrastructure to act as a liaison between
the local settlement administration and the Israeli government.

Yesha’s formation

involved hiring staff, all of whom belonged to GE, as well as regional representatives.
Women were intentionally excluded from sitting on settlement councils, and in some
cases, they were not allowed to vote.218 Some women stated that they “don’t mind that it
should be all men deciding. . . the rabbis aren’t all unsympathetic to [women], either.”219
Regardless, women had little formal influence in the settlements’ administration.
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The creation o f Amana and Yesha were examples of what Myron Aranoff
characterizes as the “routinization, bureaucratisation, and diversification of Gush
Emunim’s activities [that have] lead to the specialization of its leaders in different
organization spheres.”220 Consequently, in focusing on regional concerns, less attention
was devoted to promoting the movement at the national level. The integration of GE into
a political establishment, some could argue, demonstrates that it was indeed a strong
political movement. Aranoff, however, contends that since its organizational power had
been overtaken by the national level, and redirected to the regional level, “Gush Emunim
remains as only a symbol, the crown on the one-time joint activities of a number of
00 1

different groups.”

Amana evolved into a “very professional settlement organization,”

while the Yesha Council represented the needs of the Gaza, West Bank and East
Jerusalem settlements. This transfer of power, however, is typical when movements adopt
more pragmatic policies222
The very success of Gush Emunim’s operative aims undermined its need to exist.
In some respects, GE gained more support under the Labour party from 1974 to 1977.
During these years, the movement primarily served as a protest outlet for young Israelis
opposed to the Labour party’s settlement policy.223 While Labour preferred not to
evacuate the new settlements, it still considered them illegal.

00 A

At the outset, GE was

reactionary and its organizational basis was weak, if non-existent. Even though it was
considered renegade, GE nonetheless received much sympathy.
Likud’s victory over Labour, however, resulted in GE activities becoming
habitual, expected and even ignored, since the new pro-settlement government took
control over GE’s settlement ambitions.

Likud had such a sympathetic approach to
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Jewish settlement that GE squattings became the routine method in creating new
settlements. In the first month of its rule, Likud legalized three GE settlements and
approved the construction of three more. As a result of Likud’s rule, GE had no
significant contributions to politics. On the one hand, because of internal divisions on
numerous issues other than settlement, the movement was unable to take a stance that
would meet the approval of most of its members. On the other, the very issue that unified
the movement, that of territorial settlement, was relinquished to the government’s control.
Paradoxically, “the very success of Gush Emunim in achieving its operative goals was
the major cause o f its decline as a distinct political organization.”

Nevertheless, only

men’s political power declined throughout this process, since women had not yet played a
significant role in the political negotiations between the movement and the government.
Thus,

Gush Emunim encountered various

failures that emerged as it

institutionalized. The divisiveness of GE support toward Tehiya, the public’s perception
of the party as GE’s manifestation of a religious party like any other, the lack of success
in the elections, and the Likud government’s lead role in establishing settlements were all
issues that relegated GE from an avant-garde movement to a mere symbol.

These

combined factors contributed to GE’s decline in popularity. More detrimental than a loss
of electoral support was the loss of its leaders: the NRP, Tehiya, and Morasha attracted
the leading GE activists, leaving the movement’s secondary and less experienced leaders
in power.226
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The Jewish Underground
The 1984 discovery of the “Jewish Underground” (JU), whose existence was
unknown to GE leaders, exposed internal divisions within Gush Emunim.227 The JU plots
were isolated incidents and involved different individuals who were members or
supporters o f GE. Twenty-seven members were arrested, all of whom were men.228 With
the exception of the Temple Mount plot, their acts of terror occurred under a rabbi’s
authority. JU individuals conspired to severely maim five Arab mayors, in response to the
murder of yeshiva students in Hebron by Arab residents; level the Dome of Rock; attack
a Muslim college in Hebron; and blow up five Arab buses in retaliation for the bombing
of a bus full of Jewish passengers earlier that month. These events demonstrate that GE
members’ violent and even homicidal actions could be justified religiously.
Upon the discovery of the Underground, and in particular the Temple Mount plot,
the movement’s popularity suffered greatly. Initially, GE members denied the possibility
that anybody from their movement could have been involved, accusing left-wing parties
of fabricating the stories in an attempt to discredit them. Many Gush members were
extremely disturbed by the JU’s existence.229 The discovery of the existence of the
Underground immediately exposed the weakness of GE leadership. When it became
apparent that the Underground not only existed, but was composed of GE members, GE
leaders found themselves in the position of having to defend their movement while
simultaneously trying to absorb a flood of incriminating evidence against them. This
demonstrated their lack of control over their own members’ activities, but more
importantly, it revealed that only a minority of members had participated in the JU’s plots.
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The exposure of the Underground created an internal crisis between moderates and
hard-liners within the movement. First, the movement’s spiritual leader refused to
comment. Although more hard-line members did not mind Levinger’s refusal to condemn
the Underground’s activities, many moderate GE loyalists were perturbed by the apparent
silence o f their “most respected and influential leader.”230 Second, there were rumours
that Levinger himself had been well-connected to the organization’s activities. These
rumours were partially validated by the Underground’s “commander” Menachem Livni,
who admitted to state officials that Levinger was indeed a member. Despite being
detained for two weeks, the rabbi was not charged. The information that leaked and
circulated among GE members, however, was that Levinger had indeed approved of
9 -3 1

many of the terrorist activities.
Hanan Porat and numerous other members were particularly disturbed by
Levinger’s affiliation for two reasons: his serving as the rabbinic authority supporting the
Underground discredited the function of the rabbinic authority entirely; and his
involvement broke an agreement among GE leaders to steer clear of the Underground
activities. Consequently, many GE members for the first time began to distrust their
spiritual leader. Bearing in mind that GE members have a merkaz harav approach to life,
a fundamental difference such as the one presented here could make room in the future
for members to act independently of what their spiritual leader might promote or sanction.
The willingness to deviate from their spiritual leader’s position was already a sign of
moderation. Moreover, Underground members themselves “made it clear that they
believed they were acting in the name of the entire settler community. . . argu[ing] that
under different circumstances other settlers would have done the same”; they did not,
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however, articulate under which circumstances.232 The Underground thus created a rift in
the GE community between those who were “in the know” of the Underground’s
activities and those who were not, and between those who [decreasingly] supported
Levinger and the terrorists, and those who did not.

Militancy and Violence
The Begin-Sadat Tand-for-peace’ treaty, in which Begin promised to return the
Sinai Peninsula in exchange for peace, jeopardized GE’s dream of a Greater Israel. The
movement’s emphasis on land settlement as the most important contemporary religious
obligation, and the doctrinal contradiction of accepting the pre-1967 borders, forced the
movement to choose one of three options in the wake of the evacuation of the Sinai
settlements.
First, GE could abandon the core of its doctrine. Settlement in Israel would be
seen as a necessity in the renewed kingdom, but it would cause neither the messiah’s
arrival nor the subsequent spiritual salvation. In the second scenario, GE could reconsider
which religious values it would emphasize. Rather than stressing the importance of
settlement, the movement could devote more doctrinal attention to Judaism’s universal
ethics. Ironically, this could also be interpreted as the movement’s adoption of Western
values. These include the ethics of occupying an alien community, such as the
Palestinians, and the need for adhering to human rights.
Both of these instances are long-term solutions, where salvation is an event that is
relegated to the distant future, thereby undermining GE’s doctrine of imminent salvation.
This raises the question of whether GE could be able to retain the doctrine at all. For
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instance, what if the number of settlements required for salvation were to be reduced?
The potential for further expansion would be postponed for the future. If expansion is
deferred to the future, then so too is salvation, thereby invalidating the imminence of the
messianic area, which is the essence of GE ideology.
Moreover, once the imminence of salvation ceased to exist in GE doctrine, then
the validity o f the entire settlement project in the Greater Land of Israel would be
debatable. Considering that GE had declared land settlement to be above Israeli secular
law, doctrinally relegating salvation to the future would make land settlement subject to
Israeli law. Hence, were the Israeli government to declare certain settlements illegal, GE
would have no religious basis to violate civil law. Finally, if Israel’s expansion to a
Greater Israel were to be excluded from the preconditions for salvation, then the entire
religious need for settlements would dissolve. Thus, if the armistice borders of Israel
sufficed to make salvation imminent, the entire settlement project, along with the
movement’s ideology, would die. Neither of the above options appears to be a potentially
explosive situation. Nevertheless, GE could reject entirely the idea of land concessions,
along with the legitimacy of the government. Given GE’s accumulation of weaponry, the
potential for a violent confrontation would then seem inevitable.
An understanding o f GE’s military power can be found in explaining the outcome
of the 1967 war. Israel’s occupation of the West Bank marked the onset of an array of
security problems, such as guerrilla attacks and Palestinian anti-Jewish mobs. The
creation of settlements only aggravated these problems, and the military found itself in
need of greater security measures. Among these additional measures was giving settlers,
who themselves were either active or reserve soldiers, the right to defend themselves.233
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Thus, military responsibility - the permissibility to use violent forms of resistance ~ was
transferred directly from the army to the settlers.
If parts of Judea or Samaria were relinquished, therefore, a minority of Gush
Emunim members could likely turn to armed resistance to prevent their land from being
confiscated.

O'iA

Consequently, a conflict of interest between the government and GE could

result in a quasi-independent armed force. Moreover, the movement still had the
capabilities to do so; advanced weapons and military equipment were provided for
defensive purposes to GE members. How much weaponry, however, is unknown, for
“according to unconfirmed but persistent rumours, none of the responsible officers of the
Israeli army knows exactly how many arms are stored in the settlements caches, and no
one dares check.”
Despite GE’s potential for violence, there was little fighting on the part of the
settlers in the evacuations.

0'X(\

The vast majority of the Yamit residents, as well as those

from the thirteen other settlements in the Sinai, preferred to follow the Israel Defense
Forces soldiers than to be physically evicted by them from their homes. Some of the five
thousand settlers o f Yamit in the Sinai were dragged out of their homes by unarmed
soldiers.237 Even the most militant of these settlers only resorted to throwing debris out
of their windows or from rooftops, often purposefully aiming away from Israel Defense
Forces soldiers.238 Jerusalem Post correspondent Abraham Rabinovitch described how
the militants had thrown burning tires, bucketfuls of sand and other objects at the
soldiers on the scaling ladders and tried to hold them off with staves. But after two
days o f skirmishing, there was not a single injury of any consequence. The militants
had not tried to overturn the ladders and the Molotov cocktails had not been thrown
to hit. The soldiers had used force when necessary, but in measured doses.. . .
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More surprisingly for many, the defenders of Yamit had proved rational idealists,
not fanatics. I was far from sharing the militants’ worldview, but I could not help
admiring their dedication. And, in the end, their restraint.
Recalling that control over the Land of Israel was as important to GE as the Torah,
requiring one to defend the land to the death if necessary, regardless of land-for-peace
agreements; and bearing in mind that control over the entire Eretz Yisrael was an
uncompromising ideology, the peaceful evacuation o f the Sinai settlements in 1982 was a
clear indication of the movement’s pragmatic moderation. More significantly, the
evacuation o f the Sinai settlements occurred nearly a decade before a few dozen GE
women established Rachelim.

Conclusion
Gush Emunim had become more moderate in its practices as a result of its
institutionalization long before Rachelim’s creation in 1991. Adopting its territorial
expansionist ideology from that of the Rav Kook Jr., who elucidated and expanded his
father’s ideology, the movement stressed the retention of the territories occupied during
the war. This was of paramount religious importance, especially in light of their belief in
an imminent redemption.
Despite the political support GE received, particularly after the right-wing Likud
party won the 1977 elections, its influence began to wane by the early 1980s. By using
outside political parties, such as the NRP and Tehiya, to conduct its political affairs, GE
lost its influence among its members and the electorate who were unable to unite around
issues other than that o f settlement. Its supporters shunned the newly created religious
parties as unwanted forms of state-controlled religious institutions. Meanwhile, the
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creation of Amana and Yesha left an inexperienced leadership in control of Gush
Emunim.
The weakness of the movement’s leadership, as a result of its institutionalization,
revealed that many Gush members had changed their views regarding two issues of
intrinsic importance to the ideology. First, the diminished support for anti-Arab attacks
weakened the belief in merkaz harav. The refusal of GE’s spiritual leader to condemn the
activities of the Underground encouraged many GE members to question the authority of
their leader and his role in the political decision-making. GE’s response to the discovery
of the Jewish Underground also demonstrated the unwillingness of many GE members, in
spite of their conviction that the land was their entitlement, to violently antagonize their
Arab neighbours, who nonetheless maintained the same land claims. Second, the refusal
of GE members to risk their lives by fighting to preserve the integrity of the Land of
Israel also revealed the movement’s moderation. These instances point to a similar trend
discerned by Aviezer Ravitzky: “Since the evacuation of Yamit, there has been a marked
tendency in this [redemptionist] camp to moderate its political and even its theological
determinism.”240
The movement’s institutionalization and the decline of men’s political power
within the movement created the political space for the group’s increased moderation.
The responses of the Sinai settlers additionally demonstrated a more moderate approach
to the issue of settlement in the Greater Land of Israel than otherwise formulated by the
movement’s founders. As repeatedly iterated throughout the chapter, however, it was the
GE men who occupied the leadership roles outside the familial structure. The
movement’s institutionalization and subsequent decline in political influence coincided
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with its moderation. As the next chapter argues, when some of the Gush Emunim women
realized that the wellspring of their husbands’ political power had run dry, they became
more politically assertive over the settlement issue.
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CHAPTER THREE
RACHELIM: THE ‘MOURNING-AFTER’ SETTLEMENT

To recall from the previous chapter, between 1974 and 1991, Gush Emunim’s
institutionalization indefinitely postponed its ambitious territorial expansionist goals.
Gush Emunim emerged in the 1970s as the settler movement par excellence, whose
political goal of broadening the boundaries of the Israeli state, a “positive religious act,”
required creating illegal settlements in Israel’s post-1967 acquired territories.241 In the
early 1990s, after GE had adopted more pragmatic policies, approximately 5,000
nationalist-religious settlers lived in 144 settlements.242 The smaller settlements, scattered
across the hilltops o f the West Bank, were and still are considered “the moral backbone
and political stronghold of Gush Emunim.”243 One settlement, however, differs from all
others: it was founded solely by women.
Unarguably, the creation of a settlement by women indicates their involvement in
furthering GE’s settlement dream. Yet Tami Amanda Jacoby argues that religiousnationalist women are not active participants in the military struggle. She asserts that
“although [religious-nationalist] women were considered integral to this nationalist vision,
in their domain as keepers of home, culture, and children, they did not have a clearly
defined role in military conflict.”244 She also observes that
women often encounter structures of patriarchal authority - in the national
movement, the military, the private sphere, and through the discourses and practices
of dominant belief systems. In these structures, women are either domesticated or
rendered subordinate to men.245
Yet women’s establishment of the Rachelim settlement appears to counter Jacoby’s
claims of women’s domestication within Gush Emunim.
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This chapter argues that in the context of the creation of Rachelim, some
religious-nationalist women have occupied a significant military role in the IsraeliPalestinian conflict, within the confines of their domestic roles. While GE women used
matemalism to champion recognition of their illegal settlement, reminiscent of men’s
actions in the movement’s early days, they simultaneously challenged the very gender
ideals that their movement valorized. Unlike Hamas, Gush Emunim does not detail its
conception of gender roles in any charter. Therefore, in order to understand GE’s
normative role of women, religious, nationalist and settler discourses must be examined.

Gush Emunim’s Gender Ideology
The Orthodox Jewish community, regardless of denomination, considers
orthodoxy to refer to “Jews who observe all the religious commandments, and interpret
those commandments to require a traditional life strictly attached to religious ritual.”246
They regard “gender categorization as manifest, ongoing, and explicitly significant for
the course of life.” 247 Within each community, opinions over women’s role differ,
depending on how laws and customs are interpreted.248 Nira Yuval-Davis notes that “the
emphasis in Jewish fundamentalist movements is on the ‘natural’ differences between
men and women. . . that women were created differently and thus have different religious
duties and life careers.”249
This essentialism is also found within the secular stream. Frances Raday finds
Israel “striking” due to the endurance of the patriarchal religious familial structure within
a state that has made great efforts to ensure women’s legal, social and economic rights.
Similarly, Ruth Halperin-Kaddari observes that personal aspects of religious law are “still
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considered a basic tenet in the Israeli polity in general and in the delicate construction of
Jewish identity in particular”251 The emphasis on essentialist roles in both secular and
religious streams implies that it, too, exists within Gush Emunim culture. Nevertheless,
essentialism does not necessarily imply male superiority.
Within some religious communities, there has been considerable effort to
demonstrate that women’s roles, though different from those of men, are not inferior.
Adrienne Baker perceives that Orthodox women
in their homes, in the domain over which they preside and in which they transmit to
their children the essence of Judaism - and in their study groups - convey a dignity
of spirit which is very different from any suggestion of their feeling second best252
Currents within the religious feminist movement have raised awareness over women’s
position in Judaism. Yuval-Davis ascertains that “since the rise of the feminist movement,
a lot of energy has had to be spent to show that the Jewish woman’s position is ‘really’
even more important and powerful than the man’s,” although she is sceptical of these
arguments, “given the overall approach of the movement toward women.”253 Thus, one
might expect Gush Emunim women to feel empowered by their roles within the
movement. This can dictate a course of action, however, that departs from the original
rationale behind the empowerment.
Women’s empowerment of traditional roles, as Yuval-Davis iterates, is
problematic for Jewish religious fundamentalist movements.254 While the feminist
movement “resolved any problematic aspect of women claiming power” by
distinguishing ‘power o f from ‘power over,’ this difference could not be applied to the
private realm. 255 In the context of Gush Emunim, as well as in other Jewish
fundamentalist movements, women’s political involvement within the private sphere

62

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

must be recognized because “the reproduction of the Jewish fundamentalist system
depends on women, their co-operation, and their hard work.”

Moreover, women’s

confinement to the home “domesticates” their men, who are then responsible for
generating an income for a growing family.257 Therefore, women can function as political
actors within their roles in the private sphere.
Perhaps the most important of these roles, and one which is both idealized and
held as normative by the community, is motherhood. Within the religion, explains Baker,
“the married woman, especially the mother, is the paradigm idealized in Judaism. . . as
the ‘normative experience.’”258 Baker compares the biblical and modem ideal woman:
The proverbial ‘Woman of Worth’ freed her husband and sons from day-to-day
economic responsibilities so that they could pursue sacred tasks; her modem
counterpart still sees her family’s needs as her highest priority, and arranges her life
to fulfill them 259
Rachel, the historic wife of the martyred Rabbi Akiva, is idealized in the religious Jewish
tradition for her altruistic support of her husband.

Recognizing his fine qualities,

Rachel marries the destitute Akiva on the condition that he intensively study Torah. Upon
hearing of their marriage, Rachel’s father vows not to support her financially and she is
left poor and alone. The challenge of supporting Akiva’s decades of Torah study away
from home forces Rachel to cut and sell her hair. After 12 years away, Akiva returns with
12 000 students, but overhears Rachel telling her neighbour that she would have him
study yet another 12 years. Without seeing his wife, Akiva leaves and returns another 12
years later with double the students.
Rachel rushes to greet her husband, but is shoved aside by his students, who see
instead a poor beggar trying to touch their beloved master. Only Akiva recognizes Rachel
in her impoverished condition, and explains to his students, “That which is mine and
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which is yours is really hers.” According to Aviva Cantor, Rachel is “held up as a role
model of what the Jewish woman should be - devoted, appreciative of her husband’s
intellectual possibilities and (later) his accomplishments, and provider of support in his
academic endeavours to the point of self-sacrifice.”

These historic examples indicate

that the idealization of women’s self-sacrifice, as wives or mothers, is entrenched in the
religious tradition.262
Anthropologist Tamar El-Or’s research affirms that the identities of religiousnationalist women cannot be divorced from their roles as mothers. In spite of the gender
role challenges confronting these women, both in status and in literacy of oral law, El-Or
observes how motherhood is the “single station that is known from the start.”263 In a
study o f 185 subjects at an academic religious seminary, she found that all the women
united around their maternal roles.264 Within this role, religious-nationalist women have
attempted to locate “femininity as an area of power” for both religious and political
purposes.265 For example, through the study of ‘male’ texts, women have begun to
destabilize the definition of motherhood, calling into question its singularity.266 Forming
alternative identities, women oscillate between motherhood as ‘natural’ and as ‘work.’267
In viewing motherhood as work, women make motherhood a job transferable to others,
resulting in a shift in household responsibility for many married couples.268

In spite of

the debate over the definition of motherhood, the women still identify with this
prescribed role.269 This power is not only harnessed in their roles as mothers, but home
builders.
Gush Emunim women also play an essential role in building the home. The
importance o f the home in Judaism is undisputed, for the “family has always been the
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unit o f Jewish existence.” 270 Moshe Meiselman claims that “the centre of Jewish life has
been, and will always be, the home,” while Baker recounts the apologetic argument that
the “home is central and that in this sphere the woman’s role is respected and allimportant.”271 Defining a woman’s role as “the creator, moulder, and guardian of the
Jewish home,” Meiselman asserts that while “the man has always been the family’s
public representative, the woman has been its soul.”272 Women’s familial role is therefore
a private one, but one that is greatly respected by the community.
Women’s ultimate task within the home is not performing domestic duties, but
serving as the religious foundation for the family.273 She is allotted the responsibility of
guiding the family in a positive religious direction.274 In this role, Meiselman argues,
women express their individuality:
The Jewish woman is the soul and inspiration of the Jewish home. Through
building this home she achieves her ultimate Jewish self-definition, and the stamp
77S
she leaves on the home expresses her own uniqueness and individuality.
The home is not only an outlet for individuality, but a source of autonomy and economic
benefit. Raday discerns that “women’s status in the home plays an important role in
determining the extent of their autonomy and of their equality of opportunity in
socioeconomic terms, too.”276 Women’s link to the public arises through their roles as
mothers and as wives o f husbands who study religious texts.277 The public, in this context,
refers to social rather than economic spheres, as Jewish women historically have heavily
participated in the public economic arena.

In many Jewish fundamentalist families,

women are responsible for generating an income while their husbands pursue full-time
religious study, although this is more common among the ultra-Orthodox than among the
religious nationalists.

770
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The home plays a central role as the normative experience not only for religious
families, but for all Israeli families. Halperin-Kaddari explains that “Israel is a familyoriented society. Familism, the normative family’s centrality in the lives of the individual
and the collective, is one of the central characteristics of Israeli society.”280 The emphasis
on the home, and on sacrificial motherhood for the Zionist cause, can be traced
historically to the state’s inception. Motherhood and sacrifice were interwoven as
children grew into soldiers who gave their lives to the nation.281
Zionist motherhood demands that a mother be “be willing to sacrifice her son on
behalf of his homeland (motherland).”282 States and regions engaged in conflict demand
that women ‘offer’ their children to the cause. Yet Israel’s case is unique, argues Sachlav
Stoler-Liss:
The Zionist case is remarkable, not because it stressed the woman’s role in bearing
and raising children, but because it expanded the national boundaries of
motherhood to include the period before birth and the entire span of time between
birth and the child’s enlistment in the army.
Although women are conscripted, the military still regards them as [potential] mothers
and wives. Consequently, they are easily exempted from military service. Their twentyone-month obligation falls more than one year short of men’s three-year requirement and
requires them to perform different tasks from that of men. In the mid-1990s, more than 70
percent of female soldiers occupied “traditional military roles”: they typed, cooked,
cleaned, folded, and entertained for the benefit of the troops.284 The division of roles in
the nationalist cause, women as nurturers and men as soldiers, is perceived as an issue o f

national security. Simona Sharoni maintains that
the Israeli state’s doctrine of ‘national security’ depends both upon men who are
ready to serve as soldiers, as fighters on the battlefield, and upon women who are
ready to adjust to the needs of the Israeli collective experience. On one hand,
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women are socialized into the roles of unconditional supporters, exceptional
caretakers, and keepers of the home front; on the other hand, they are expected to
remain vulnerable and in need of protection.285
Through either the religious or nationalist ethos, all Israeli women are socialized in an
environment where motherhood is held as the normative experience. Any attempt to
divorce women from this fundamental role, as feminism seeks to do, is thus “conceived
as morally wrong for both religious and nationalistic reasons, presenting the divine order
and national virility with a challenge.”286
The normative experience of motherhood, however, is composed of two
contradictory expectations. In times of peace, women are expected to be the altruistic
nurturers. In this position, they are perceived as vulnerable. The ideal Israeli man, the
‘sabra,’ was not only limited to strengthening the enfeebled Jewish diaspora, but also
fighting for and protecting the defenceless mothers and mothers-to-be. 287 With reference
to the sabra, Sharoni succinctly states that “in the terms of this gendered juxtaposition,
men must be offensive on the battlefield in order to protect vulnerable women on the
home front.”288 Conversely, women are also expected to embody the sabra ideal in times
of war;
on the one hand, when Israeli men are on the home front, women are relegated to
conventionally gendered roles: they have to be inside, soft, tender and sweet. On the
other hand, during wartime when men are on the battlefield, women are expected to
step out of their traditional roles and to enter, if only temporarily, the public
political arena. During such periods pragmatic, assertive, and tough behaviour on
the part of women is praised as a significant contribution to the collective national
effort.289
Yet in a country that has been in a state of conflict since its founding, the dichotomy
between the vulnerable versus the aggressive female has often been blurred.
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Consequently, it is not apparent whether settler women, who live in direct zones
of conflict, are expected to embody the traditional and domestic position articulated in
religious expectations, or the temporary aggressive role defined by the nationalist
discourse. Michael Feige hypothesizes that like their nationalist counterparts,
fundamentalist men active in liberation movements expect the women fighting sideby-side with them to return to the traditional lifestyle after the battle is won, while
women find it difficult to retain the achievements of their emancipation. . . [this
motif is] concordant with the concepts of femininity in the settlers’ movement Gush
Emunim and the national-religious women’s camp in general.290
Given their perceived expected role of domesticity, and their absence from the top
political leadership of the movement, women’s role in Gush Emunim has largely been
neglected in favour o f a focus on the male political leadership of the movement.

Feige

relates that “within the Gush Emunim camp, political leadership of the early days was
uniformly male and the religious authority of rabbis. . . was an exclusively male
prerogative.”

■yQ')

El-Or concurs that “these dimensions of matemalism and the centrality of women
and children in settlement expansion have been largely ignored in favour of more malecentred explanations of militancy.”293 One might even be tempted to think, given the
emphasis o f the latter, that women have in no way influenced any of the political
decisions o f the movement. The movement’s women, however, do not perceive this to be
the case. They understand their roles to be no less important than those of men in formal
leadership positions, who determine when and where settlements will be established.
More importantly, they attest that without the “real leaders,” the Gush Emunim women,
the settlements could not exist.294
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Both GE women and men are highly aware of the importance of women within
the movement. First, women’s embrace of motherhood is considered vital to the strength
of Gush Emunim. In El-Or’s study, one prominent teacher explained to her students that
motherhood
is natural for women, and giving birth is an experience they all share. This is their
purpose in this world, and it is their merit for the next world. To be a mother is to be
yourself, and therefore it is a task of endless happiness. Motherhood is the source of
moral judgment and national strength, which the national religious community is in
need of. . . Motherhood is an identity that embraces everything. It accompanies the
woman-mother wherever she goes and is present in every other facet of her identity.
This is gender-conditioned motherhood, carried out by women only.295
Motherhood is not only needed to fortify Gush Emunim, but the entire national religious
community. Jacoby observes that the immense respect conferred to Gush Emunim
women, who are viewed as equal to men in their spiritual devotion to the movement’s
goal,
may arise partly from women’s necessary role in raising large families, which [are]
necessary for fulfilling the commandment to settle the land. Indeed, Jewish settlers
tend to have high birthrates. The large settler family is highly politicized and
mobilized as a means of fighting the “demographic struggle” . . . ,296
Second, within this struggle, women often decide where the family is going to
live.297 Moreover, they help their families cope with the difficult living conditions of the
settlements in the initial stages and the perceived constant threat of terrorist attacks.298
Commenting on women’s role in maintaining the integrity of the settlements, one settler
explained that it is a “very natural thing that the women are actually in the everyday life
those who hold the settlements together because they hold the family together in the

settlements, despite difficulties that may come.” 299 Through their roles as mothers,
therefore, Gush Emunim women play an extremely significant role in preserving the
cohesiveness of the family unit and the settlement community.
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Rachelim’s Establishment
GE’s leadership, as mentioned in the previous chapter, considered Palestinian
attacks or killings of Jews, regardless of whether the latter were civilians or soldiers, as
valid grounds for creating settlements. In October 1991, in what settlers then “considered
the most severe attack,” bus driver Yitzhak Rofeh and settler mother of seven Rachel
Druk were shot and killed by a Palestinian near the Shiloh settlement in the West
Bank.300 The GE’s proclamation of the 1991 attack as the “most severe” should have
further impelled them than in previous cases to push for a new settlement’s creation. In
contrast to this expectation and yet another indication of their moderation, however, GE
men did not participate from the outset, and intentionally avoided any confrontation with
the military or government.301
The establishment of Rachelim by GE women was in large part a consequence of
their husbands’ political impotence. Even after women had established themselves at the
site, their husbands lacked any desire to confront the military.

Justifying male inaction,

one female settler explained that the men “were used to working with the official
authorities.”

Since the government at the time was officially pro-settlement, rather than

risk acting against it, the men preferred to wait until they had received its permission.304
The women, however, “couldn’t just stay home after Rachel was murdered on that
road.”305 Instead, they chose to pursue an “irrational” act, which, according to the settlers,
had
become a necessary and logical strategy: women can bring off what the dominant
but immobilized men cannot permit themselves [because the men] work to further
their objectives through accepted conventional channels, while the women do not
feel constrained by the establishment and are free to act as “madwomen.”306
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Through the creation of Rachelim, therefore, Gush Emunim women eclipsed their
husbands as the new pioneers of the settlement movement.
Immediately after the funeral, female settlers “staked a claim” near the site of
Druk’s murder and refused to leave. 307 With their children and small babies
accompanying them, the women remained overnight to demonstrate their refusal to allow
anybody to shoot them “on their own land.”308 They were all mothers and therefore
considered their actions to be a “natural reaction” to the death of a fellow settler
mother.309 These few dozen Gush Emunim women decided that the creation of a
settlement, named Rachelim (“Rachels”) primarily after Rachel Druk, but also after
Rachel Weiss, killed three years earlier, and the Biblical matriarch Rachel, would be a
proper way to commemorate the women.310
Rachelim became the first instance in which women fully undertook the initiative
of creating a settlement, thereby marking a milestone in settlement history.

11 I

Future

settlements, such as Nofei Nehemia, replicated the justifications and tactics used at
Rachelim.312 The 25 Rachelim founders were all between the ages of 35 and 45, and
affiliated with Gush Emunim.313 All were married with children, and employed.314 In
addition to these founders, 200 women from across the West Bank descended on
Rachelim in the early stages, in order to spend a few hours, a day or a night in support of
Rachelim.

Men also assisted the women at night and Rachelim quickly developed into

“the social, political and ritualistic centre for the West Bank Jewish settlers’
community.”316
Due to the illegality of the settlement under Israeli law, the women were not
permitted to establish a permanent presence.

T 17

This deterrence proved unsuccessful and
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the women were able to justify staying the night, then shiva (week of mourning) and then
shloshim (month o f mourning).318 After a few weeks of dispute between the Rachelim
women and the military, the latter agreed to establish a military outpost and memorial
vigil near the spot where the killings occurred. 319 Within a few months, Amana
nominated a woman, Orit Rapaport, to be officially in charge of the settlement.

One

year later, the government gave permission for people to live permanently at the military
settlement.321 In 1999, the Israeli government recognized Rachelim as a legal civilian
settlement.322
During the initial period of the settlement’s creation, women obeyed the
government’s prohibition against the building of permanent structures. Instead, they used
two tents as temporary dwellings: one for the kitchen, a study room and a “makeshift
synagogue,” and the other for lodging.

While women were at the site, their husbands

“stayed at home to attend to the household chores and cater to the women.”324 The
women, meanwhile, studied religious texts, cared for their children and entertained
visitors.
In the early days of the settlement, the women’s actions outwardly contradicted
the strong tendency among politically right-wing Israeli women to be more militant than
their husbands.

Regarding the presence of children at the settlement, Tamara Neuman

remarks that “the sheer numbers of children at play, tended by religious mothers in flow
skirts and stylish hats, is a panoply of nature and nurture that disrupts one’s
preconceptions of how militant communities are constituted.”

Although the Rachelim

women understood their act as a peaceful response to a violent action, settler presence is
often perceived by Palestinians as more threatening than uniformed soldiers, since the
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duration of the settlements is intended to long surpass that of the Israel Defense Forces in
the territories.

If the Rachelim women are indeed “enthusiastic participants in the Gush

Emunim project, impelling their husbands towards greater radicalism,” then there is much
justification in the Palestinian perception.

In this view, the matemalism that drove

Rachelim’s creation is a more destructive force than overt military action alone.
The Gush Emunim women’s spontaneous creation of Rachelim mirrored and
defied their movement’s gender expectations. Their ability to employ matemalism as a
mechanism for settlement gain relied on the perceived public-private division of the
settlers, the expansion of their home-building role, and their conscious use of gender as a
tool to confront the Israeli military. In each of these instances, women superficially
conformed to gender expectations.
The public-private division found in religious-nationalist discourse, as explained
above, suggests that Gush Emunim men work primarily within the public realm, while
women reign over the private.

In the case of Rachelim, one may argue that such a

division was constantly maintained. First, although women’s actions occurred under the
public eye, the women followed the well-established male settlement script. Sharing this
sentiment, Michael Feige suggests that
the acts of conquest by Gush Emunim, the penetration into hostile social
environments and erecting settlements, are inherently masculine, and the women of
Rehelim suggested no reinterpretation or subversive perspective on the allimportant practice of settlement, occupation, let alone the rights of the occupied
Palestinian Arabs.330
He notes further that the women “merely performed according to the script they had
received,” implying that their actions were in no way subversive toward the movement’s
•

gender expectations.

331

•

•

Their decision to create a settlement in response to a murdered
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Israeli was “a standardized and ritualized practice” of the movement.332 He concludes
that the very creation of Rachelim was a metaphor for the Gush Emunim movement, and
that in following this narrative, women were acting in accordance with previously
established gender expectations.
Second, the women’s actions demonstrated a full commitment to both the gender
expectations and founding nationalist aspirations of their movement. On the one hand,
women’s role in Rachelim was an expansion of their settlement responsibilities and a
continuation of
a project o f private and national home building. The struggle for a national home is
conducted through the creation of private homes, and the private homes receive
their unique value from their being contributions to the establishment of a national
home.333
Because o f “the presumed exceptionalism of [religious] mothers in the political arena,”
the military had difficulty opposing them .334 Soldiers fulfilled women’s domestic
requests, allowing them to improve the decrepit settlement conditions in which they lived.
Despite the government’s edict that only tents could be erected, the military permitted the
women to build brick walls on the outside of the tents in order to keep warm in the winter.
Women’s requests, therefore, addressed the needs of the home, rather than Israel’s need
for greater security measures.
Similarly, whenever an illegal settlement had been established in the past, Gush
Emunim men successfully lobbied for its legalization on both ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’
grounds. As men, they argued for security considerations, but they deplored the women’s
appalling living conditions on behalf of their wives and m others.335 Rachelim women
continued GE’s sexual division of requests, basing their own needs on their maternal
roles as homemakers, leaving the men once again to detail security measures. As one
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female settler stated, “We, more than others, determine the nation’s policy by giving our
support behind the scenes to those around us, to grow, develop, contribute and build.”336
In acting like concerned, fully-committed mothers, the women ensured better
treatment by the Israel Defense Forces. The Israeli military treats women differently than
men because women’s primary supportive role is regarded as “behind the scenes,”
implying a greater vulnerability, since they are not the primary fighters and are therefore
in need o f protection. Since their support of their husbands’ and sons’ military
participation is crucial to the maintenance of the nationalist vision, women must be
approached with increased sensitivity.337 This differential treatment is based on several
considerations, the first of which is the military’s function to protect the family unit,
seeing “itself as a guardian of Jewish civilian life, rather than as a force to be used against
its own women and children.”

Consequently, soldiers would have greater difficulty in

removing female settlers, a detail on which the settlers capitalized by establishing a
dominant female and child presence at Rachelim.339 The presence of mothers and
children on the settlement site demonstrated “how rooted they [were] in their newly
established homes,” augmenting the challenge to the soldiers to uproot them.340
Nevertheless, female settlers counter the claims of having used women
strategically at Rachelim.341 They argue that the Israel Defense Forces is fully capable of
removing women. Shortly after midnight on the first night, a truck full of female soldiers
who were prepared to remove the women were brought onto the site.342 Although the
female Israel Defense Forces soldiers “almost managed to do so,” like their male
counterparts, they were reluctant to physically drag the women away.343 The female
soldiers were apparently as affected as the male soldiers by the presence of mothers and
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children at the newly-formed settlement. The Rachelim women negotiated with the [male]
commander, who permitted them to stay.344
Not only were all the settlers mothers, but they acted according to a ‘female’
social script. For example, in welcoming an array of visitors, the women received their
guests in “traditionally feminine ways.”345 Tamar El-Or and Gideon Aran observed that
the women “played the role of gracious hostess, and offered food and drink and warmth
by the stove,” while they cared for the multitude of children they had brought with
them.346 They were also attentive to the needs of the soldiers. Emuna Elon, one of the
founding women, lamented that
these poor men had to stand there in the biting cold. But the women went up to
them and offered them homemade cakes sent by their families. They invited them to
warm themselves by the small heater.
Women embodied the role of the traditional mother for the soldiers and devoted
substantial amounts of time toward preparing meals, cleaning and taking care of the
children.347
Their discussions at the site primarily revolved around motherhood issues such as
feeding, child-rearing, cleaning, education and kitchen duties.348 Settlement and security
concerns were not addressed.349 Not only were they concerned about ‘female’ issues, they
also worried about their physical appearance. In the words of one settler, they considered
it important to appear “pretty and feminine,” rather than risk looking like “Amazons on
the mount.” 350 One of the women, writing for the settler newsletter, observed that
“anyone passing by would probably have been surprised to see a group of tired, eccentric
women dressed in long, full skirts and head scarves, sitting around a rabbi and listening to
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a lesson.”351 The goal was, as Rachelim settler Geula Tzroia aptly stated, to demonstrate
that their strength was “quiet, beautiful, and positive.”352
In apparent contrast to this desire to exhibit strength, Rachelim women also
utilized their perceived vulnerability, thereby fostering public empathy. The women
feared for their children’s safety, as well as that of other settlers.

OCT

“Unafraid of being

accused of melodramatics,” the settlers described to visitors various instances in which
they had been the victims of Palestinian attacks.354 Their visible commitment to
motherhood and safeguarding their children was a response to “the threat not only to
physical existence, but to the ability to maintain a viable image and identity of
responsible parenthood as well.”

Their articulation of fear was a ‘feminine’ reaction to

an outsiders’ attack, which threatened their public image as conscientious mothers who
ensured the safety of the settlement communities.
From their standpoint, the women’s reaction was both spontaneous and emotional,
“motivated by a bundle of feminine (motherly) actions.”

A circulating pamphlet during

the settlement’s establishment described how “what started as a spontaneous vigil
following the murder o f Rachel Druk and Yitzhak Rofeh, turned into a fact in the
settlement landscape of the Land of Israel.”357 Their spontaneity translated into a decisive
political action that was made possible by rallying around their identity as individual
mothers, and as the collective mother of the settlement project. Naomi Sapir, a Rachelim
co-founder, explained:
By remaining here we express the idea that life for us in Judea and Samaria is not a
political demonstration, but a simple and day-to-day wish to live. We state that life
goes on and that our answer to death is - life! We organized on a feminine basis
because the women provide the emotional organic justification fo r the entire idea o f
settling [italics mine]. As to the political authorities, some of us are of the opinion
that we should make do with exerting influence on the decision-makers, while
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others think that we should actually be in there [in parliament]. Either way, we’ve
wasted a lot o f time and there’s a lot to do.358
Feige clarifies that women were drawn to the site “spontaneously and unpremeditatively
simply by virtue of their feminine essence,” assuming that “women had a certain intuitive
understanding and reaction to the dangers threatening the safety of their families.”359
Thus, their spontaneity and emotional response were channelled into an attempt to not
only protect their own families, but also to defend the national Jewish community as a
whole.360
Finally, the women did not superficially subvert gender expectations because they
did not intend to define their action as ‘feminist.’ The women were always careful to
define their primary task as protecting their families, “which they regarded as the
quintessential role o f women,” rather than promoting a feminist political agenda.361
Recall that the religious-nationalist community considers feminism a destabilizing force
that threatens the structure of the traditional family. Not surprisingly, the Rachelim
women associated feminism with “negative attitudes and destructive goals,” while they
considered their actions to be motivated by “positive attitudes and creative goals.”362
Even if the women did not intend to subvert the normative patriarchal order, however, the
possibility remains that their actions did indeed deviate from the normative female settler
narrative.

HaKol HaNashi or the Feminine Voice
In many respects, Rachelim’s creation marked a stark departure by Gush
Emunim women from the traditional GE narrative of settlement establishment. First,
women were eager to respond in a peaceful manner, for they disliked the violent

78

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

aspects typically associated with the male settlers.363 Feige points to studies that
demonstrate how the hostile and violent aspects of Gush Emunim ideology negatively
influence the family.364 The women’s preference for peaceful alternatives surfaced in
their diction. El-Or and Aran detect sex-differences in the settlers’ language: men
spoke o f “seizing, struggling, constructing and resisting,” while women referred to
“creating, giving birth, continuity and education.” 365 Second, in what El-Or and Aran
refer to as a “form o f feminine radicalism,” women’s primary roles transformed from
supporters of men to initiators of settlements, thereby eclipsing their husbands’
roles 366 This is evidenced by the women’s decision to act on their accord rather than
ceding to the male leadership’s desires. Not only did the military and other
administrative bodies oppose the women’s actions, encouraging them to “go home,”
but the women’s husbands were also never consulted.

'if.’?

Third, the Rachelim women used their positions as mothers to speak with a
legitimate political voice. Neuman has observed a similar trend in the past, whereby “in
settlement expansion, women mask the political content of their actions by recasting them
as part o f the private sphere.”368 Neither the military nor the government, in allowing the
women to remain at the mourning site on the grounds of protecting their children, viewed
the women’s actions as political. Instead, they cast women as “non-political advocates of
children,” whose perceived maternal protective response was “natural.” 369 Contrary to
previous instances of settlement establishment, the Rachelim mothers were not auxiliaries
in their husbands’ settlement tactics, but innovators of a “novel strategy based on novel
T70

arguments.”

Their unique strategy used matemalism and “routine practices of care,”

rather than sole obstinate refusals to leave, in order to normalize an otherwise illegal
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settlement.371

These routine practices, which include protecting, nurturing and

homemaking, were previously manipulated by GE women to advocate more deliberate
political undertakings, for
the significance o f the quotidian in this case lies in the fact that politics is infused in
everyday practices and these practices serve as the foundation for more overtly
political acts, such as takeovers, protests, and political rallies.372
In willingly bringing along their children into a potentially life-threatening situation from
the outset, the Rachelim women forged a relationship between the memorial piece of land
and its female defenders that could not easily be severed by the military, the government
or even their spouses.
Moreover, their “commitment to retain childrearing routines in the face of
considerable conflict” was also imbued with political significance.374 The mother-child
bond is perceived to be “natural,” thereby lending women “the character of morally
sanctioned actions.”375 The maternal ethos, therefore, carries the moral authority. To
question women’s primacy in this instance would be to jeopardize a foundation that has
served not only the interests of the settlements, but the state as a whole.

-in /

More public

support was given to the women for their maternal motivations, which they frequently
expressed in actions and in words. In response to questions requiring ideological
explanations, they reiterated what their male counterparts professed:
Israelis are duty bound to occupy and hold all parts of the historical land of Israel,
that living in the territories was a risk to be taken today in the interest of securing
complete safety in the future.377
Thus, women’s use o f matemalism enabled them to be political actors who did not need
to account for overt political actions.
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The Gush Emunim women repeatedly justified their paradoxical decision to
protect their children in a way that many Israelis would consider even more lifethreatening.378 For the sake of national security, the women endangered their own
families, although they disagree with this assessment. One could argue, as El-Or and
Aran do, that had they truly desired to protect their children, they would not be living in
the settlements:
The full realization of the experience of motherhood would mean evacuation of the
territories, or at least an acknowledgement of the contradiction between the wish to
ensure the safety o f one’s children and the national conflict. . . If this mother does
not believe in a totally national narrative, she may experience the contradiction
between her two tasks and acknowledge the fact that her life in Israel poses a
continuous threat to herself and her children, as well as a threat to the
Palestinians.379
Israeli society has often criticized settler parents, who are sometimes regarded as “being
ready to sacrifice their children in the name of faith and ideology.”

Assuming El-Or

and Aran’s argument is true, this is a legitimate criticism. Settlement evacuation, or
recognition by the women that settlement life is more dangerous than life outside the
settlements, severely undermines Gush Emunim’s vision of a Greater Land of Israel.
Therefore, the Rachelim women cannot fully be committed to the safety of their own
families, as this would threaten their movement’s settlement goals.
Although their actions were ostensibly for their own families’ safety, the women
ultimately endangered their families’ lives for the sake of the nation.381 They argued that
it was their responsibility to the country and the nation to ensure that Rachelim and other
settlements remain, regardless of whatever events transpire.

This responsibility, in turn,

helped the women endure the difficulties of the founding days of Rachelim, knowing that
‘l O ' J

“in spite of everything that’s happening, [this] is saving the state, the whole state.”
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Alongside saving the state, however, comes a greater personal risk, one that settlers are
not to eager to admit.
Yaron Ezrhahi attributes this risk to the settlers’ inability to divorce themselves
from the children:
These parents see the children as an extension of themselves. This attitude
contradicts the liberal approach that views children as independent entities. They
don’t understand the autonomy of the child. In Western society, which has
assimilated liberal principles, life is endangered only in order to defend life itself.
The settlers are ready to sacrifice themselves and their children for the meaning of
life.384
Settler Emuna Elon, aware that people may regard her as an “irresponsible mother,” does
not deny the risk for her children, but affirms that “it’s not a matter of ideology. It’s
simply the most logical life I can live in this country.” 385 She attests that she “couldn’t
think of any place where the children would be perfectly safe, since an Israeli child is not
safe when traveling on a bus or on an outing to Dizengoff Center.”386 On the other hand,
she also claims that the settlements themselves pose little risk:
I really don’t think the danger here is much greater. If I were to come to this
conclusion, I would really have a problem. I don’t believe that there is even one
parent who thinks that he is endangering his children for the sake of his ideology.
This includes even the most extreme right-wingers — and I regard the Hebron
settlers in the same way that you regard me. People view life here as a logical
reality, not only according to their ideology, but also according to their intellect.387
Settlers argue that there is no truly safe place in Israel whenever they are challenged on
the issue of their children’s safety. They assert that Israel is dangerous everywhere, and
that people endanger themselves whenever they go out onto the streets.388 One settler
explained, “I don’t know where there is a safer place for them [children]” to justify her
family’s decision for living in the settlement.389 Either of the two arguments put forth,
that the risk of living in the settlement is no greater than living anywhere else and/or that
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this decision is based on “logic” and not “ideology,” indicate that women are sensitive to
the potential risks to their children. Nevertheless, settlers are aware that “nothing arouses
sympathy for the settlers more than an injury to a child.” 390 Thus, the increased risk to
children’s lives is politically advantageous for the movement’s ambition.
Given their assertiveness, it is nonetheless remarkable, considering the negative
connotations of feminism - “childless” and “bra-burning” -- within the religious1Q I

nationalist camp, that the Rachelim women came to regard their actions as feminist.
Within one month after the murder, the “Feminist Manifesto” was published in a settler
newsletter. It read:
We the women o f Judea, Samaria and Gaza have established a memorial vigil.
We demand we be allowed to found the settlement of Rachelim at this spot, on this
hill, where the murderers lay in ambush. There are sufficient government lands for
the establishment of a permanent settlement. We remain at this site demanding to
found a settlement, for this is the only Zionist response to this criminal murder, we
hold vigil at this place, and we will persevere in the hope that the Government of
Israel will decide to found a civilian settlement at the spot from which the shots
were fired. This will be the way to prove to those who would uproot us that they
will never achieve their goal. Not only will we not be uprooted, our roots will only
grow deeper. We call upon every woman and mother in the settlements and every
woman and mother in Israel to stand up and be counted with us at this memorial
vigil. And, of course, men too, husbands and sons, are invited. Let us find comfort
in the building o f the land.392
The call to establish Rachelim, therefore, was issued by women, for women. Although
men were “invited,” this invitation appears to be more of a formality than the heartfelt
plea targeted at the female settlement community at large. The women’s lack of
concerted effort to recruit men may be, as noted above, due to men’s political
immobilization. Furthermore, the men were not wanted at the settlement. One founding
settler, Naomi Sapir, stated:
The men need to undergo a process to make them understand that we are equal
partners. Fifty percent of the settlers are women. How can anyone come and tell me
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to stay home? That’s absurd. The women can go out and make their own livings
and ensure their own security. We came out of the kitchen long ago.
One settler emphasized that there is “no need to fight men when you’re a feminist” and
what the Rachelim did was a “feminist act. . . but it [was] done in a gentle and different
way than some other feminists choose to act.”394 Thus, the women’s descriptions of their
renegade actions allude to the ‘separate-but-equaT arguments used to religiously justify
their ‘public’ political inaction.

Conclusion
The Gush Emunim women, in advancing the fundamental ideological tenet of
their movement, did not depart from their traditional gender roles during the settlement’s
creation. Nevertheless, the Rachelim women undertook a feminist action that greatly
departed from their movement’s expectations: they founded a settlement solely for
women; innovatively used motherhood and the need to protect children as a political
platform; understood the death of Rachel Druk as particularly problematic and
threatening for women and children alike; treated the vigil as a way of uniting all
settlement women; and finally, criticized their male counterparts as politically paralyzed.
Demonstrating their utter commitment to their movement’s original ideological goals, at
a time when the movement had moderated and the movement’s men could no longer
oppose the very authorities against which they had rebelled more than a decade earlier,
allowed the women to expand their ‘private’ roles to act on the movement’s behalf. The
following two chapters demonstrate that this phenomenon is also visible among the
women whose movement holds the same territorial goal as Gush Emunim: Hamas.
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CHAPTER FOUR
HAMAS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR MANDATORY PALESTINE

As discussed above, Gush Emunim’s ideological campaign for settlement creation,
accelerated by the events of the 1973 war, stagnated in the following years due to
institutional factors. Consequently, women eclipsed their husbands’ functions as primary
settlers and political negotiators in their creation of Rachelim. During these years, a
strengthening parallel movement in the Palestinian territories encountered similar
ideological and institutional challenges, the latter of which motivated women’s increased
political participation. Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela describe the phenomenon:
The turn to Islam in the West Bank was probably also boosted by the ascendancy to
power in 1977 o f a nationalist-religious coalition in Israel. The new right-wing
government embarked on a large-scale Jewish settlement effort in the West Bank, in
which Gush Emunim (Bloc of the Faithful), a religious-nationalist messianic group,
played a central role.395
Yet Israeli measures, as Khaled Hroub counters, were not solely responsible for the
popularity o f Islamist movements:
Rather than perceiving the rise of Palestinian Islamism as a reaction to
developments within the Israeli domestic arena and their consequences for
Palestinians, this movement’s rise should be viewed as an outcome of two long,
intertwined processes: a) the internal struggle of Palestinian politics as they
developed in light of the struggle against Israel and the position of the Islamists
within this dynamism; and b) the phenomenon of political Islam, which swept the
region by the late 1970s and remained at the heart of sociopolitical change and
tension, Palestinian Islamism being the local manifestation of a much wider tide.396
Clearly, there are multiple causes for what led to the popularity of Islamist groups among
Palestinians.
Because of its use of suicide bombings, the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas
or “zeal”) has been called the “antithesis” to the ineffective, once Fatah-dominated
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Palestinian Authority.397 Since the movement’s victory in the 2006 Palestinian national
elections, the first Islamist party to win elections in the Middle East, many academics and
analysts are debating the significance of an Islamist-led government vis-a-vis political
moderation. Peace-building theorists John Darby and Marie-Joelle Zahhar argue that
Hamas is incapable of compromising its ideology.398 Others point to the incongruence of
expecting a Palestinian democracy to exclude Islamists.399 In both cases, however, it is
Hamas’s “Islamist vision, combined with its nationalist claims and militancy toward
Israel, that accounts for the prevailing image of Hamas as a rigid movement, ready to
pursue its goals at any costs, with no limits or constraints.”400 Hamas’s involvement and
institutionalization within Palestinian society has caused it to become more pragmatic
than its Charter indicates. Nevertheless, Hamas’s moderation, relative to its Charter’s
objectives, occurred more than a decade before its electoral victory, and nearly a decade
before women’s overt military and political involvement.
This chapter examines the historic role of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine
and provides a discussion of Hamas’s religious ideology. The movement’s evolution in
pragmatism is described in two stages, pre-Oslo and post-Oslo, the latter focusing on
policies vis-a-vis political participation, restrained violence and acceptance of ceasefires.
Over time, Hamas has demonstrated doctrinal flexibility and an ability to adapt its
practices to changing political circumstances. Under its exclusively male leadership,
Hamas barred women from the formal decision-making processes that resulted in the
movement’s pragmatism.
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History of the Muslim Brotherhood
In 1928, Hassan al-Banna founded the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Egypt.401
His brother, ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Banna, left Egypt in 1935 to establish contacts in
Palestine and ten years later, the MB opened an official Palestinian branch.402 Through
education, charity and social services that reflected Islamic values, this exclusively male
movement aspired to reform secular society. 403 Although al-Banna considered
nationalism to be a “secular, exclusivist and selfish value,” it nonetheless played an
important role in how the MB developed in Palestine.404
In the aftermath of the 1948 war, Egypt and Jordan gained administration and
control respectively over the Palestinian territories. Consequently, the MB in these
territories reflected the corresponding countries’ political attitudes vis-a-vis the
Palestinian issue.405 The countries’ stances on the MB also played a role in how the MB
developed. The Brotherhoods of Transjordan and the West Bank merged and devoted
much of their energy toward education and politics. The Jordanian regime considered the
MB as a ‘loyal opposition’; the movement was allowed to participate politically, thereby
countering the popularity o f the leftist and secularist opposition groups, but never gained,
or was granted, enough political power to threaten the status quo.406
The MB’s relationship with Egypt, however, was much more turbulent. When
Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser declared the MB to be an illegal movement,
many of its active Egyptian members fled to the Gaza Strip to avoid the vigilant gaze of
the government.407 Egypt nevertheless implemented repressive measures on Brotherhood
activity in the Gaza Strip. Unlike their Jordanian counterparts, Gazan MB members
focused on revolutionary and militant tactics, forming secret military cells in the
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1950s.408 After Israel gained control over the territories in 1967 and communication
between both territories was permitted, the Gaza MB was able to share its clandestine
skills with its West Bank counterpart409
Despite the latter’s moderation, however, the entire MB viewed the loss of
Palestinian land as “a major symptom of the broader malaise o f the Muslim world.”410
This spiritual ailment needed alleviation through greater social reform. For decades, an
emphasis on reforming society eclipsed the need to violently resist the occupation of the
land. Aside from 1968 until 1970, when the Palestinian MB, under pressure from the
wider Arab MB headquarters, collaborated with Fatah in military attacks against Israel,
the Palestinian MB otherwise refrained from participating in military operations 411
The policy o f abstention from active resistance did not sit well with many MB
members. As early as 1957, Khalil al-Wazir had advised the Gazan MB to create a
separate organization whose sole task would be armed struggle and whose justification
would be entirely divorced from Islamic reasoning.412 His advice was ignored.
Consequently, some members broke away and formed Fatah, attracting the support of
many secular Palestinians. Fatah became the dominant group in the Palestinian Liberation
Organization, whose legitimacy “as the embodiment of the Palestinian national will” the
MB rejected.413 Following Fatah’s example, disgruntled Gazan Brothers formed the
militant group Islamic Jihad in the early 1980s.414 During this time, the spiritual leader of
the Palestinian MB, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, began hoarding weapons. The weapons were
intended to be used upon the Brotherhood’s eventual entrance on the political stage, and
would serve two purposes: punishing Palestinian collaborators with Israel and acquiring
the support of militant MB members who might otherwise transfer their loyalty to Islamic
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Jihad.415 Describing the multiple interests with which Hamas was faced, author Husam
al-Nasir expounds:
In the second half o f the 1980s the Brotherhood had acquired the organizational
capacity and sufficient following to engage in jihad. The theoretical perspective on
the long-ranging debate concerning the priority to be accorded to the armed struggle
versus the social change thesis had arrived at an organic synthesis of the two. The
Brotherhood tried to resolve the conflict between the two priorities by arguing that
it was possible and necessary to try to achieve them simultaneously, and not to
delay one for the sake of the other.41
Therefore, the mid-1980s were years devoted to increasing the arms supply while
reconciling the divergent attitudes toward participation in the active resistance.
When Hamas emerged as an independent organization in 1987/88, the Palestinian
MB had already created extensive social networks that affected education, medical care,
food, daycare and an array o f other services. Hamas was able to capitalize on this social
infrastructure, attaining the support of individuals who might not have agreed with the
movement ideologically. For example, in the late 1990s, the social institutions created by
the MB and Hamas supported 275 000 people, not all of whom were Hamas ideologues;
this number has increased exponentially since the outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada.417
Despite women’s institutional absence in the 1990s from the exclusively male
organizational structure o f the MB and Hamas, women worked in Islamist women’s
charitable societies, although these did not fall under Hamas’s direct auspices.418 In
interviews between Islah Jad and Islamist women, the latter denied any involvement in
Hamas or any role in organizing women’s programmes. 419 Nevertheless, among
Palestinian women and men, the MB/Hamas has a well-established history as a credible
social movement.
Ideology of Hamas
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In order to understand why Hamas is perceived as rigidly uncompromising, it is
crucial to examine its religious ideology on several matters. First and foremost is the role
of Islam. The motto of Hamas, found in Article 8 of its Charter, is that “Allah is its goal,
the Prophet is its model, the Qur’an is its constitution, Jihad is its path, and death for the
sake of Allah is its most coveted desire.” 420 By employing this religious language,
identifying nationalism as “part and parcel of its religious creed,” and using significant
historical figures in Islam to support its cause, Hamas uses Islam as the basis in
constructing Palestinian national identity.421 The movement aspires to create a religious
state, “for the Islamic nature of Palestine is part of [its] religion, and anyone who neglects
his religion is bound to lose.”

AO'y

Religious and political goals are inseparable, since

nationalism is part of religion. This inseparability is especially relevant when discussing
the issue of Palestine.
The significance of Hamas’s view of Palestine as w aqf or “endowed” land for
Muslims for time immemorial, is clear: giving up any part of Palestine within the borders
defined by the British mandate is tantamount to forfeiting part of Islam, for “renouncing
any part of Palestine means renouncing part of the religion; the nationalism of the Islamic
Resistance Movement is part of its faith.” 423 Accepting a Palestinian state in Gaza and
the West Bank is “sinful if it entails conceding the rest of Palestine to Israel, an
illegitimate entity.”424 For Hamas, as for Gush Emunim, any land-for-peace agreements
are meaningless. Article 13 states that “[peace] initiatives, the so-called peaceful
solutions, and the international conferences to resolve the Palestinian problem, are all
contrary to the beliefs of the Islamic Resistance Movement.” The conferences are later
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described in the Article as a “waste of time.” Accordingly, Hamas has traditionally called
for the Palestinian withdrawal from peace negotiations with Israel.425
Before the twentieth century, Palestinian land had no special status. Faced with
the loss of land to Zionists, Hajj Amin al-Husseini issued a fatwa in 1935 that declared
Palestine a “trust” for Palestinian Muslims, as granted by Allah and Muslims worldwide.
In a similar vein, confronted with the Israeli settlement projects and possible Palestinian
land concessions for peace, Hamas raised the “trust” status of Palestinian land to waqf,426
It justified this action religiously by viewing Abraham not as the first monotheist, but as a
“full-fledged Muslim,” whose construction of the al-Aqsa mosque henceforth made the
land Islamic 427 W aqf is considered an invention of tradition, since its legal status does
not exist in Shari’ah; no Muslim country today has the legal status of waqf.

Regardless

of its legitimacy, Palestine’s status as w aqf compels Hamas adherents to ‘regain’ control
of Palestine through jih a d .429
Jihad is the holy war against the enemy and is intrinsic to Hamas’s brand of
Palestinian nationalism.430 According to Article 7, Hamas views itself as “one of the
links in the Chain o f Jihad in the confrontation with the Zionist invasion.” Other links in
this chain include the Muslim Brothers who participated in the 1948 and 1967 wars, as
well as the man after whom the militant division of Hamas is named, Izz a-din alQassam.431 Jihad involves “confronting him [the enemy] when he sets foot on the land of
the Muslims.”432
Hamas diverged from the traditional understanding of jihad as a collective
responsibility {fard kifaya), and proclaimed it to be an individual duty (fard ‘airi),
incumbent on every man and woman.

On the one hand, the emphasis on this external
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form of jihad encourages the movement to glorify ‘suicide bombings’ or ‘martyrdom
operations,’ where an “act of martyrdom [is] actually the betrothal marriage of the martyr
with the land of Palestine.” 434 Here, the individual fulfills his/her obligation toward
religion and nationalism. The call for jihad is intended not only for Palestinian Muslims
but for Muslims worldwide, to liberate both Palestine and Jerusalem, a city that is highly
symbolic in Arab political mythology.435 On the other hand, jihad for Hamas is also
defined as an internal war, a war against secularism and immorality, and indirectly, the
Palestinian Liberation Organization. Thus, in either scenario, to call off or lose the fight
for jihad would be considered demoralizing for Hamas and Muslims, a concession of
victory not only in terms of contested territory, but also contested worldviews.
Liberating Palestine requires that the State of Israel be destroyed through an
armed struggle, though Hamas also emphasizes “the eschatological significance. . . [of]
the eventual extermination of the Jews in addition to the glorification of martyrdom
among its won fighters [sic].”436 The Charter’s introduction states that Hamas’s “struggle
against the Jews is extremely wide-ranging and grave,” while Article 28 declares that
“Israel, by virtue of its being Jewish and of having a Jewish population, defies Islam and
Muslims.” Unlike the PLO, which tried to distinguish Zionists from Jews, Hamas uses
the terms interchangeably. Meir Litvak assesses that
the portrayal of the Jews as powerful arch-enemies and conspirators against Islam
departs from traditional Islamic depictions of the Jews that are associated with
cowardice, degradation and wretchedness. It has become a central element in
Hamas’ ideology and an important theme in the writings of all Islamist movements
in the Middle East as part of a broader need to explain the current crisis of the
Muslim world. It is particularly difficult within this context to explain Jewish or
Zionist success vis-a-vis the Muslims since, according to Islamic tradition, the Jews
were destined to humiliation and subjugation to Muslims after they had rejected the
message o f the Prophet. . . The only way to explain this cognitive dissonance is to
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magnify the power and evil of the Jews, and thereby help to explain Muslim
weakness.437
Israel represents both a state and people that must be conquered for Hamas’s vision to be
realized.
In this struggle, Hamas cautiously allies itself with nationalist Palestinian
movements, provided “they do not give their allegiance to the Communist East or the
Crusading West.”438 Hamas emphasizes its aversion to dividing the nationalist struggle,
maintaining that “it is there to bring to bring together and not to divide, to preserve and
not to squander, to unify and not to throw asunder.”439 Viewing the Palestinian Liberation
Organization as “the closest to the heart of the Islamic Resistance Movement,” Hamas
carefully praises and criticizes the PLO’s vision.440 Attributing perceived weaknesses of
the PLO to its upbringing in a deficient political environment, the Charter explains:
Because of the situations surrounding the formation of the Organization, of the
ideological confusion prevailing in the Arab world as a result of the ideological
invasion under whose influence the Arab world has fallen since the defeat of the
Crusaders and which was, and still is, intensified through orientalists, missionaries
and imperialists, the Organization adopted the idea of the secular state. And that it
how we view it.441
Hamas acknowledges the PLO’s important role, but nonetheless identifies the PLO with
secularism, which “completely contradicts religious ideology.”442 Even before the Oslo
accords were signed,
Hamas sharply criticize[d] the PLO’s secular discourse and its leadership, as well as
its political program calling for the establishment of a Palestinian state that would
coexist with the State of Israel. Hamas had already condemned the PLO’s
recognition o f the State of Israel and its acceptance of UN Security Resolutions 242
and 338.443
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The Oslo peace accords, however, confronted Hamas with the challenge of undermining
its staunchest political opponent without losing the mass support it had acquired before
the agreement.

Pre-Declaration of Principles
The political evolution of Hamas can be divided in the pre-Oslo (1987/88 - 1993)
and post-Oslo (1993 - present) eras, with the Declaration of Principles being the crucial
event in which Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization formally recognized
each other and made a pledge for peace. In each of these time periods, Hamas’s actions
were governed by both political and military considerations. When Hamas published its
Charter in December 1987, its ultimate aim was to preserve the Islamic core of society.
King Hussein’s disengagement from the West Bank created space for the Palestinians to
declare statehood, an action that Hamas co-founder Sheikh Ahmed Yassin opposed, for
fear it would divide the Palestinian population along religious and geographic lines.444
Nevertheless, people became divided over the question of whether religion should
precede nationalism in the struggle for Palestinian independence. In this debate, Hamas
“represented a shift o f emphasis in the Islamic movement’s strategy, from reformist and
communal to political, and from the spiritual life of the individual to national action,”
thereby appealing to more nationalist-minded individuals.445 This need to appeal to a
broader base caused Hamas to adhere less strictly to its religious doctrine.
During the initial phase of the movement, a number of factors reveal that the
creation of Hamas was clearly a deliberate political decision. First, its founding was the
result of a compromise within the movement. Throughout the 1980s, the leadership of the
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Mujamma, the MB-affiliated Islamic Centre founded by Yassin, had opted for a passive
approach to the occupation, an approach scorned by secular nationalists. When the
Intifada erupted, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) was viewed as politically
inept and militarily deficient, which created an opportune political space in which the
Mujamma leadership could participate.
More importantly, the MB was compelled to forfeit its previous passive policy,
since “non-engagement would mean losing the respect of, and political influence over, its
young activists.”446 The possibility of the Intifada failing, or the Mujamma drawing
Israeli reprisal for Intifada activities, were also risks to be considered. Hamas’s creation
as a distinct movement from the Brotherhood was therefore supported both by MB
members who favoured active resistance, namely the younger and more militant members,
and by those who opposed the Brotherhood’s direct involvement, since their own MB
participation and membership would remain unaffected. In the event of the failure of
Hamas or the Intifada, the MB could not be held entirely responsible.
When Hamas emerged, its political and military leadership were initially unified
in their strategies vis-a-vis Israel. Iyad Barghouti remarked in 1993, before the accords
were made public, that there was “not really [much discrepancy between what is
preached and what is practiced]” concerning Hamas’s military aims and its opposition to
peace negotiations.447 The independence from the MB and its perceived rigid religiosity
encouraged many individuals who had not been involved in Mujamma activities to join
Hamas and participate in its armed operations. Israeli reprisals to Hamas attacks often
encouraged more individuals to join. In response to three separate attacks carried out by
Hamas on Israelis, over the span of one week in December 1992, Israel expelled 400
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Palestinian Islamists, many of whom were affiliated with Hamas.448 “Israel,” concludes
Wendy Kristianasen, “could not have dreamed up a better way of transforming the
movement it feared into collective martyrs.”449
While the number of younger, more violent and less religious Hamas members
grew, Hamas’s full commitment to its Charter’s objectives began to wane as the new
generation was incorporated into positions of leadership.450 Within two years of the
Charter’s publication, for example, there were already changing perceptions of the Jews.
While the Charter attributes world power, wealth, influence and control to the Jews, the
prevailing notion o f global Jewish domination began to diminish. For instance, in internal
memos circulated among Hamas leaders, the enemy came to be primarily identified as
Zionists, rather than as Jews.451 It was not until after the Oslo accords were signed,
however, that discrepancies could clearly be identified between Hamas’s stated objectives
and its actual practices.

Post-Declaration of Principles
The Oslo peace accords incorporated Palestinian recognition of Israel and
received massive support across Palestinian society. Consequently, Hamas, which had at
this point acquired large popular support from disenchanted PLO supporters for its
violent campaign, was faced with the dilemma of jeopardizing its reputation for doctrinal
adherence. Frame alignment theory proposes that “movements whose power is largely
dependent on securing popular support may engage in a process of ideological alignment
to maximize ideological resonance with potential constituencies, their life experiences
and existing world perspectives”; that is, if the overwhelming majority of Palestinians
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favoured peace, Hamas would somehow need to incorporate this preference into its
ideology if it hoped to maintain support.452
When the Oslo accords were made public, the PLO recovered much of its old
popularity, thereby eclipsing support for Hamas. The Islamist movement’s reaction,
however, was not quite as zealous as might have been anticipated. Hroub makes clear that
“the strongest language used by Hamas to describe the subsequent security accords with
Israel was ‘treasonous agreements,’ but it avoided naming individuals or leaders who
negotiated those pacts.” 453 In their public statements, Hamas leaders employed “non
inflammatory” language 454 Considering that the Hamas Charter describes “leaving the
circle o f conflict with Israel” as a “major act of treason” that will “bring curse [sic] on its
perpetrators,” Hamas’s under-reaction appears astonishing. Nevertheless, democratic
transition theory posits:455
Participation in a politically competitive environment typically leads to the gradual
internalization of the underlying values of power-sharing and compromise. The
increasing manifestation of a consequentialist, rather than an absolutist logic is
likewise to be expected.456
Because o f the reinvigoration of the PLO-Hamas competition, and the new authority
given to the PLO as the Palestinian Authority (PA), Hamas would gradually be forced to
compromise if it hoped to secure any power.
Although Hamas rejected the validity of the accords, it did modify several of its
political stances over time, even though the political situation, that is the PLO/PA’s
recognition of Israel, remained unchanged.457 This was largely due to Hamas’s policy of
shura, in which power is not monopolized by the external leadership, but shared with the
internal leadership. Consequently, the internal leadership did wield power and caused the
group’s overall approaches to moderate, since “decisions, when taken by outside political

97

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

leadership, do not involve them in a direct clash with the PA, as opposed to the inside
leaders who must cope with the movement’s day-to-day affairs.”458 Signs of pragmatism
found expression in political participation and coexistence with the PLO/PA, restrained
violence, the use o f ceasefires and the normalization of the two-state solution as a
reference point.

Political Participation
The creation of the PA generated a series of political hurdles for Hamas. First, as
a consequence o f the PA’s recognition of Israel, Hamas entirely rejected the PA’s
authority. Second, its demand of 40 percent of the Palestinian National Council seats had
not been accepted in the past and was unlikely to be accepted at the present moment459
Third, the Fatah-dominated PA actively marginalized Hamas as a political group: its
leadership was frequently arrested, detained, harassed and excluded from civil and
governmental bodies.460 The antagonism between the political rivals further aggravated
Hamas’s position regarding Israel.
Initially, Hamas opposed the entire Palestinian electoral process. Like Gush
Emunim, Palestinian Islamist groups in general were apathetic in their attitudes toward
democracy, viewing it as a “secular, Western concept” inferior to the Qur’anic - and
therefore ideal - model of shura (consultation) councils.461 Theoretically, in an Islamic
state, non-Islamic parties would be banned, “but before the establishment of Islamic rule,
democracy is preferred to dictatorship as more hospitable to the flourishing of Islam.”462
Yet an aversion to democracy was not the primary reason for Hamas’s electoral reticence.
Hamas’s official electoral and party boycott of the 1996 elections is often attributed to the
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movement’s refusal to recognize Israel, since “from an Islamist’s point of view,
participation in self-rule gives legitimacy to the peace process.”463 Lending credit to this
argument is the movement’s published statements in its nascent years with the heading
“No Elections Except After the Expulsion of the Occupier.”464
The debate over political participation nevertheless grew, especially after the
formation of the PA. Given the popularity of the peace process at the time, had a
Hamas-backed party won, Hamas would have been forced to recognize the Oslo accords
regardless of its ideological objection; even a refusal to denounce the elections could
imply Israel’s recognition in the public eye. Moreover, some of the Hamas leadership
regarded the elections as an Israeli attempt to cripple the movement. Explains Mahmoud
al-Zahhar:
Israel wants to use these [1996] elections to lure us into the trap of the political
game. Just as it succeeded in luring the PLO in the 1970s. . . Israel says it is ready
to recognize the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people if the
PLO will accept Israel and the two-state solution. The rest is known. The PLO,
made vulnerable thus, was weakened even before the opening of the negotiations.
Hamas will not fall into this trap.465
Contrary to al-Zahhar’s assertion, Hamas’s stance on electoral participation had clearly
shifted from rejection to consideration toward the end of 1994, pointing to new
approaches to the Oslo accords.466 Palestinian scholar Ziad Abu-Amr elaborated in 1994:
While Hamas publicly oppose [d] a peaceful settlement with Israel on principle, the
movement’s actual position regarding an interim solution remain[ed] ambiguous, as
illustrated in recent Hamas statements that leave participation in the elections for
the Palestinian Council open.467
In spite of its secular basis, however, democracy enlarged Hamas’s room for political
manoeuvring. Hamas’s failure to label the elections as haram, or religiously forbidden,
largely made this possible 468
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In contrast to the group’s principles, Hamas members like Ismail Haniyeh pushed
for the group’s political participation, citing a number of persuasive reasons to gain
political power.469 In October and December 1995, he and three other moderates met with
the external Hamas leadership, but a consensus on Hamas’s political participation could
not be achieved.470 Although the movement had often been labelled idealist, unable to
address the “facts-on-the-ground,” its leaders also preferred not to situate the group in a
politically isolated environment. Khaled Masha’al, head of Hamas’s political bureau
based in Damascus, asserted that members of the movement
are not advocates of isolationism from reality.. . That does not mean, however, that
[they] are going to be preoccupied by any fait accompli manufactured by others; nor
are [they] going to follow in their footsteps wherever they may lead, not deviating
from their path while forgetting the true path to [their] goal. Excessive
preoccupation with realism has led the Palestinian cause to where it is now. On the
other hand, idealism may not advance [them] a single step toward the liberation of
Palestine. . . .This does not mean that [they] should become mired in reality or that
[their] vision should become so myopic that [they] are unable to see beyond [their]
feet. [They] should keep a foot in reality to launch [them] selves toward [their]
strategic objective with firm steps.471
Originally, Hamas had intended to participate in the elections and had even created a
political party, Hizb al-Khalas al-Watani al-Islami (National Islamic Salvation Party), for
that purpose.472
Unlike the secular parties, however, Hamas did not attempt to attract female
voters, nor did they recruit women for the party’s electoral list. Islah Jad explains that
the Salvation Party has no bodies parallel to those in Gaza or in the West Bank, nor
any mobilizing and organizing structures for other social groups, such as students
and workers. While party members were seen in the different activities of the
intifada (strikes, funeral processions, confrontations with the Israeli army, and so
on), female Hamas members at the time were not visible as participants. . . the
reason for this absence could be explained by the fact that Islamist organizations
target males. . . in answer to why the Islamists did not seek to organize female
students in their mainstream political parties, whether under the name of the
Muslim Brothers, Hamas, or the Salvation Party, it must be acknowledged that
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these institutions carried the imprint of the conservative gender ideology of the
movement from its inception.473
Yet even male Hamas members were officially denied their voting privileges: when they
discovered that Arafat’s win was ‘pre-arranged,’ Hamas leaders withdrew from national
electoral participation and called for a boycott of the elections.474 Their withdrawal,
however, was last-minute. In spite of the boycott, Hamas is credited with supporting the
Hamas-affiliated candidates who nevertheless ran, seven of whom won seats on the
Palestinian Council.475 The boycott was evidently not observed by Hamas followers:
between 60 and 70 percent of Hamas supporters voted, reflecting “the deep divisions
within the movement over the issue of participation in the elections.”476
Although it refrained from running in the national elections, Hamas still
demonstrated an ability to work not just within a secular political system, but with secular
parties. In joining the Palestinian Forces Alliance, a group of ten Palestinian
organizations that rejected the Declaration of Principles, Hamas demonstrated its
flexibility in working alongside non-Islamic, even communist, parties when necessary, in
spite of the Charter’s prohibition of forming communist alliances.477 Despite its absence
from the 1996 elections, Hamas’s willingness to participate begs the question of how it
approached the issue o f coexistence with its primary adversaries, the former PLO and the
PA.
The political and violent conflict between Fatah/PLO and the MB/Hamas (the
former often offensively labelled the other as “collaborators”) increased in intensity
throughout the 1980s. The Declaration of Principles in 1993, the first instance in which
Israel and the PLO officially recognized each other, further widened the ideological gulf
between both camps. In spite of its refusal to recognize Israel, however, Hamas used
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pragmatic justifications in its initial willingness to run as a party in the elections that
arose from the DOP framework, even urging its members to vote. Women did not
actively campaign for the party, although this has been attributed to their “dependence]
d .7 8

on the goodwill o f their husbands, not on the commitment of the party.”

•

While the

public gradually expected Hamas to engage politically with the PLO/PA through dialogue
and co-operation, the Hamas leadership realized that there was a diminished risk of
Hamas members charging its leadership with ideological betrayal; such a challenge
would inevitably cause an organizational implosion.479
The PLO was the sole established international voice for the Palestinians and
despite Hamas’s resentment, any legitimacy they could hope to acquire would demand
working with a PLO-based institution.480 Furthermore, Hamas was cognizant that the
PLO’s adoption of more pragmatic policies after 1973 met with strong public approval.
By intending to vote in the 1996 elections, an action the public perceived as its partial
acceptance o f the PA, Hamas demonstrated a sense of political pragmatism. This
adjustment helped prevent the marginalization of the movement and accusations that it
AO I

held “unshakable fundamentalist interests.”
Hamas’s need to compete with the secular parties prompted the movement to
consider women as potential recruits. In 1997, the Islamic Salvation Party published a
pamphlet entitled “Palestinian Woman [sic]. . . Where Next?” and distributed it at a
conference at which male and female Hamas members spoke about women and Islam.

AQ')

In late 2003, Hamas’s leaders allowed women, for the first time in MB/Hamas’s history,
to join the mainstream Islamist movement.483 This decision was not a result of the
movement’s changing gender attitudes, but the result of two calculated decisions.
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First, the women whom Hamas promoted and continues to promote are the wives
of popular Hamas leaders who have either been assassinated or imprisoned.484 The
women, therefore, represent their husbands’ legacies more than they represent themselves.
Unlike their husbands, these female Hamas electoral candidates were and still are
unlikely to be arrested, which would allow them to campaign openly without fear of
detainment.485 Second, there was an ardent need for Hamas to incorporate the increasing
numbers of educated Islamist women who desired an intellectual outlet after graduating
from university.

AQC

In spite of the women’s hope to be more involved, Hamas’s 2006

election platform called for women’s “social leadership,” the “insistence] on their purity,
shyness and moral obligation” and

the reactivation of “women [sic] voluntary

organizations.” The platform did not encourage women’s political involvement in the
movement’s leadership.

While Hamas’s moderation vis-a-vis national political

participation occurred in the mid-1990s, it only adjusted its policies toward women’s
involvement within the movement in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Moreover, the next
chapter makes clear that its female candidates deviated from their platform’s insistence
on shyness and similar ‘virtues.’487

Restrained Violence
Mishal and Sela claim that “a prolonged adoption of strategies of political
adjustment could lead to greater institutionalization and routinization at the expense of
revolutionary fervour and political and military activism.”488 On the one hand, Hamas
leaders have never relinquished their right to use violence, a right that was, until recently,
solely reserved for men. Commenting on the Oslo accords, Mussa Abu Marzuq, head of
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Hamas’s political bureau at the time, stated that “military activity is a permanent strategy
that will not change. The modus operandi, the tactics, means and timing are conditional
on their benefit. They will change from time to time in order to inflict the heaviest
damage on the occupation.”489 Moreover, as Hamas leader Khaled Masha’al believes,
“negotiating without resistance leads to surrender but negotiating with resistance leads to
real peace.” 490 Whereas Marzuq’s use of violence is a means unto itself, that is,
destructive, Masha’al regards violence as part of a constructive process, leading to “real
peace.” In either case, destructive or constructive, the use of violence is so deeply
ingrained that it is difficult to imagine a scenario in which it might be compromised.
On the other hand, despite its opposition to Oslo, Hamas did not accuse any
Palestinians of being collaborators, nor did it attempt to kill those who participated in the
accords’ creation, nor did it send its thousands of supporters flooding the streets
protesting against the PLO, as some expected.491 Moreover, as a result of Oslo, Hamas’s
use of violence became more strategic. For instance, many of the violent acts committed
against Israel were intended to disrupt the evolution of the peace process. 492
Paradoxically, the attacks were also used to strengthen the position of the Palestinians in
the negotiations.

Jamal Mansour, a Nablus-based Hamas leader, stated in 1997 that

military operations were intended to demonstrate that Palestinians were not without
means, likening Israeli planes to Palestinian bomb-makers 493 The peace process was not
only viewed by Hamas as an attempt to make peace with Israel, but as a mechanism for
preventing a Palestinian counter-elite from gaining power. Therefore, military operations
were carried out for the purposes of undermining the peace process and the hegemony of
Fatah and the PLO, and strengthening the Palestinian position in peace negotiations 494
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In the post-Oslo years, it became apparent that Hamas was not a homogeneous
movement, despite Hamas leader Jamil Hamami’s assertion in 1988 that “no matter who
is in control o f our military wing, they are subject to political decisions.” 495 Because of
the arrests and imprisonments of the leaders in the early 1990s, the movement
compartmentalized its structure according to function.496 Military operations, political
activities, internal security and da'wa (Islamic preaching and social services) became
fully autonomous units.497 Consequently, while there may have been some overlap
between the political and military wings, each could be identified as unique. Moreover,
only a minority o f political leaders has been involved in the military wing 498 By the mid1990s, the military wing therefore had ceased to reflect the entirety of the movement.
The actions by the military and political wings have since become informed by
different interests. For the military wing, clandestine behaviour and efficiency are its
primary concerns. The political wing, however, seeks to secure popular support, appear
legitimate and maintain public visibility. It even sought credit right after the Oslo accords
for the PA’s “liberalization of the dress code” that allowed women to discard their hijab
outside of mosques and meetings.499 By the mid-1990s, the Gaza leadership was more
concerned with building civil infrastructure, retaining Hamas’s political achievements,
and controlling the religious and educational institutions, than it was with military
jihad.500 The leaders later observed a limited “halt to military action in and from the
autonomous areas as a basis for establishing a modus vivendi with the PA,” although
“such an undertaking could not become part of its official agenda.” 501 While the actions
of the military wing often bolstered the status of the political wing, they also undermined
it on numerous occasions. Jeroen Gunning observes that “at times, it is precisely the
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continuation of unpopular military operations that undermines Hamas’s political
popularity (as it did towards the end of the 1990s).”502
The military wing has even transgressed policies implemented by Hamas’s
official leadership.

cai

The reason for this, mentioned earlier in the chapter, was due to the

discrepancy in ages and socioeconomic backgrounds between the militants and the
political leadership, the former being less experienced but having a proportionately
greater amount o f power within the military wing.504 Although the political wing of
Hamas is the core and “not a mere ‘front,’ in the sense of being a creation of the armed
organization and subservient to it,” it has required the co-operation of the military wing to
act.505
Yet the military wing has proved its capability for restraint. Israel’s assassination
of Islamic Jihad head Fathi Shiqaqi on 26 October 1995 and of Hamas’s chief
bombmaker Yahya Ayyash on 5 January 1996 did not prompt Hamas to renege on its
promise to the PA in September 1995 to refrain from military action. 506 None of the four
retaliatory suicide bombings that followed in February and March 1996 was directly
carried out by Hamas. Following these bombings, Hamas’s military wing circulated
pamphlets in Gaza and the West Bank that commanded its armed members to
“immediately and absolutely obey the central decisions taken by the Qassam leadership
to halt martyrdom attacks against the Jews.” 507
In the aftermath of the attacks and this statement, rumours circulated that Hamas
was partly to blame. Meetings of prominent figures confirmed the leadership divisions
within Hamas: Gazan versus the external, and political versus military. 508 Although the
PA punished Hamas for the bombings, and its supposed violation of the moratorium on
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violence, Mishal and Sela explain that “it still remained unclear whether the suicide
bombings had been specifically ordered by the Political Bureau or were the result of local
initiative and operational availability.”509 Contrary to the Charter’s insistence on constant
armed struggle against Israel, Hamas’s newspaper editor Ghazi Hamad stated frankly:
Continuous military operations do not help Hamas: in fact they have a grave and
damaging effect on the movement. We don’t want the Palestinians to blame Hamas
for their suffering, nor are we looking for a confrontation with the Palestinian
Authority. We’re ready to talk to them. The cessation of our armed actions will be
part o f an overall agreement with the Authority. And as soon as we get travel
permits, we’ll be ready to go and discuss the matter with the outside leadership in
Amman.510
Although it is not always clear which wing obeys the other, the separation of the political
and military wings and the former’s greater concern for political actions and tolerance of
the PLO indicate pragmatic adjustments within Hamas.

The Possibility of a Ceasefire with Israel
Hamas’s ultimate goal of creating a Palestinian state that incorporates all of
present-day Israel begs the question of how Sheikh Yassin could justify a ceasefire less
than two months after Oslo, or how Marzuq could trade withdrawal from the occupied
territories for a “truce to give the enemy government an opportunity to get out of the
deadlock.”511 More “opportunities” followed: since the Oslo accords, Hamas has offered
Israel a ceasefire on ten occasions.512 To illustrate how Hamas’s position on a ceasefire
with Israel evolved from utter rejection to ambiguity and finally to desirability, one must
first understand how Hamas defines ceasefire with respect to military, political and
doctrinal considerations.
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The term “ceasefire” can be translated into Arabic to refer to either a short-term or
a long-term agreement. A short-term “period of calm,” or tahdiya, is what Palestinian
factions signed on 17 March 2005 in Egypt, a temporary break from inter-factional
fighting.513 Yet in relation to Israel, the word Hamas used throughout the 1990s - and
continues to use today — is hudna, which is understood as a long-term truce. Hassan
Youssef, a West Bank Hamas leader, defines hudna as “two warring parties liv[ing] side
by side in peace and security for a certain period and this period is eligible for
renewal. . . .That means Hamas accepts that the other party will live in security and
peace,” provided conditions by the other side are met.
Even if a hudna were in effect, Hamas in no way would officially abandon its
right to use violence, since resistance is intrinsic to its ideology.514 Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi
said that if Hamas abandoned jihad, it would lose its identity.515 Whether the movement
would employ this right of violent resistance, however, would be determined by the
conditions of the hudna. Leading Hamas figure Mahmoud al-Zahhar articulated this
difference: “We must calculate the benefit and cost of continued armed operations. If we
can fulfill our goals without violence, we will do so. .. We will never recognize Israel but
it might be possible that a truce would prevail between us for days, months or
years. . . .”516 In 1997, Hamas sent a message through Jordan’s King Hussein to Israeli
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, suggesting an “indirect dialogue with the Israeli
government, to be mediated by the king, toward achieving a cessation of violence, as well
as a ‘discussion of other matters.’”

r 17

Clearly, the very act of discussing the possibility of

a hudna with Israel, let alone initiating peace negotiations, demonstrates that the idea
itself has escaped the realm of the impossible for Hamas ideologues.
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Although Hamas does not totally reject the idea of peace with Israel, it does not
accept it either. Instead, a middle-ground ambiguity exists in which three approaches to
the hudna are taken. First, the formation of a Palestinian state from the West Bank and
Gaza becomes a legitimate consideration, though not an end goal in itself, in a peace
settlement with Israel. Second, were Israel to withdraw from the territories, the borders
could be temporarily supervised by international observers. Third, peace talks could only
occur after the end of the occupation.518 These approaches, which are not mutually
exclusive, cause the same outcome: temporary tolerance of the other side.
In private, Hamas leaders admitted in 1998 that the younger generation of
Palestinians could be socialized into regarding temporary peace as the status quo.
Therefore, it would be possible and easier for the younger Palestinians to take the
ideological leap necessary to accept peace.519 Given that making a long-term peace
settlement with the Jewish state is considered a crime, the recognition by Hamas leaders
that peace with Israel could become a normalized idea among the youth demonstrates a
moderated shift in thinking.520 While one might expect more moderation, were political
and economic conditions to improve, Hamas would need to maintain enough ambiguity
so as not to appear in full contradiction to its doctrine, in order to retain the support of its
stronger ideologically committed members.
Although Hamas’s consideration of a long-term truce is ideologically significant,
it is also important for Hamas militarily. Hudnas have often been a preferred option when
Hamas was ill-equipped with arms. Some argue, for example, that all of the hudnas
Hamas offered to Israel occurred under conditions of military weakness or pressure from
•

the PA, such as in 1995.

o1

The hudna allowed Hamas time to rebuild and reorganize its
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fighters.522 Hamas’s cited examples of hudnas implemented throughout Islamic history
and used to justify hudnas in contemporary times were all ones in which fighting resumed
once the Muslim community gained the advantage.523 Following the example of
Muhammed’s ten-year hudna with the Meccans at Hudaybiya in 628 CE, Yassin stated
that a hudna with Israel should not exceed ten years. Nevertheless, some militants-tumedmoderates have pushed for twenty years.524
Even on the eve of the transfer of control over Gaza and Jericho from Israel to the
PA in the mid-nineties, then-head of Hamas’s political bureau, Musa Abu Marzuq,
offered Israel a truce if it
withdrew to its 1967 borders, disarmed all settlers as a prelude to dismantling all
settlements, released Palestinian prisoners, and permitted elections to a ‘sovereign’
body that would represent all Palestinians and possess the authority to ‘define
Palestinian self-determination. ’525
In 1997, Yassin once again broached the possibility of a ceasefire: “If a Palestinian state
[in Gaza and the West Bank] is established, our violence will end.”

Once foreign

concepts to Hamas, ceasefires and hudnas with Israel have been justified for both
political and military reasons, and have even become a normative model for peace.
Beginning in the mid-1990s, Hamas’s mention of 1967 borders and settlements as the
normative reference point not only eclipsed its original aim o f a Mandatory Islamic
Palestine, but “suggested a de facto recognition of Israel, and so placed it in the
mainstream of contemporary Palestinian nationalism.”527 More importantly, the gradual
acceptance o f the idea o f a ceasefire, a sure sign of Hamas’s moderation, occurred well
before Hamas women became visibly active in the public domain.
The concept o f a two-state solution with a long-term truce, as iterated by Yassin
and Youssef, also became normative for Hamas in the late 1990s.528 One Hamas official
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even asserted that there is “only one taboo and that is recognition of Israel. . . anything
else is permissible.”529 In Hamas’s first year of existence, however, the movement fully
rejected any land concessions to Israel. For example, in 1988 one leaflet asserted that “the
Muslims have had a full - not a partial - right to Palestine for generations. . . No
Palestinian generation has the right to concede the land, seeped in martyrs’ blood.”530
Another leaflet declared that they were strongly “against conceding so much as an inch of
[their] land.”531 Palestinian leaders who might have been tempted that year to make land
concessions to Israel risked losing body parts: “Let any hand be cut off that signs [away]
a grain of sand in Palestine in favour of the enemies of God.”532
The ushering in o f the Oslo era forced Hamas to reorient its nationalist goal, as
one leading Islamist explained in 1994:
The Islamist tendency has reached the conclusion that it is no longer possible to halt
the [Declaration o f Principles] negotiations, since the U.S., which rules our region,
is pushing towards [their] completion. But the negotiation with Israel must grant the
Palestinians minimal rights, such as the 1967 borders, and at this time they will be
satisfied with that. The continuation of
problem will
MOthe solution of the Palestinian A
be in the hands of future generations.
The 1967 borders therefore replaced the borders of the British Mandate as the “minimal
rights.” One could argue that Hamas’s short-term goals do not contradict its long-term
aspirations, but at least one Hamas leader implied that Hamas would no longer continue
its armed struggle if a Palestinian state along 1967 borders were created. Speaking in
1998, leader Ismail Abu Shanab was quite blunt:
What is the point in speaking rhetoric? Let’s be frank, we cannot destroy Israel. The
practical solution is for us to have a state alongside Israel. . . When we build a
Palestinian state, we will not need these militias; all the needs for attack will stop.
Everything will change into a civil life.534
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In accepting and referring to a Palestinian state along the pre-1967 borders, Hamas
“achieved political flexibility without forsaking its ideological credibility” by the mid1990s, years before women were actively involved in either elections or armed
resistance.

535

Conclusion
Since its inception, Hamas has demonstrated pragmatism and flexibility, in spite
of banning women from participating in Hamas’s military wing and from running as
candidates in the Salvation Party. Once unheard of, Hamas’s political participation, its
employment o f ceasefires and its implicit and explicit references to a two-state solution
became increasingly normative as the movement became institutionalized. Much of
Hamas’s popularity, argues Abdel Sattar Qasem, was acquired through domestic violent
and political opposition to Fatah and the PA, rather than to Israel:
Hamas’s doctrinal discourse has diminished in intensity since the mid-1990s, and
references to its Charter by its leaders have been made rarely, if at all. The literature,
statements, and symbols used by Hamas have come to focus more and more on the
idea that the core problem is the multi-dimensional issue of usurpation of
Palestinian land, and the basic question is how to end the occupation. The notion of
liberating Palestine has assumed greater importance than the general Islamic
concept. 36
Thus, because Hamas’s popularity is derived from its admirable social movement aspects,
the group has not taken an “all or nothing” approach to many aspects of its doctrine,
unless the public has desired it. Having demonstrated that Hamas moderated before
women overtly became militarily and politically involved in the movement, the next
chapter explores how these women’s actions have challenged the normative role for
Hamas women.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CHALLENGING ‘TRADITION,’ REINFORCING RELIGION:
THE WOMEN OF HAMAS

While Hamas excluded women from its military operations and its lists of
potential party candidates throughout its moderation process, women’s eagerness to
become more involved forced the movement to overturn these restrictive policies. In the
years following Hamas’s pragmatic adjustments in the mid-1990s, therefore, women’s
involvement in the movement became visibly apparent, particularly as campaigners and
candidates in the 2006 Palestinian national elections, and as fighters in the movement’s
armed operations. Yet this begs the question of how women became more involved and
why they have chosen to do so.
Women’s prescribed role is encapsulated on Hamas’s English website in a cartoon.
Two hands representing the United States extend from the right, one holding a bowl of
soup labelled “compromises” and the other offering a loaf of bread labelled
“submission.” 537 The woman whose baby is sticking its tongue out at the person offering
the food says, “A free woman goes hungry but does not submit.” The free woman here is
one who is not forced to compromise, who is able to assert her independence and who
submits only to Allah. Alternatively, some might look at the depiction of this woman and
argue that even in hunger, she is neither free nor independent, forced to submit not to the
deity only but also to the religious and political ideologies of her milieu. This chapter
argues that following Hamas’s moderation, in spite of the women’s full commitment to
the movement’s original political goals, some women have subverted aspects of Hamas’s
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gender ideology, thereby enabling them to occupy a more prominent role in the public
arena.

Hamas’s Gender Ideology
Hamas’s Charter outlines the role of women and states that Muslim men and
women have an equal individual obligation with men to fight the enemy who occupies
their land. 538 For this task, a woman needs neither the permission of her husband nor that
of her male relatives.539 Nevertheless, the primary ways in which women may fight the
enemy differ from those of men. Article 17 of the Charter states that
the Moslem woman has a role no less important than that of the Moslem man in the
battle o f liberation. She is the maker of men. Her role in guiding and educating the
new generations is great. The enemies have realised the importance of her role.
They consider that if they are able to direct and bring her up the way they wish, far
from Islam, they would have won the battle. That is why you find them giving these
attempts constant attention through information campaigns, films, and the school
curriculum, using for that purpose their lackeys who are infiltrated through Zionist
organizations under various names and shapes, such as Freemasons, Rotary Clubs,
espionage groups and others, which are all nothing more than cells of subversion
and saboteurs. . . The Islamic peoples should perform their role in confronting the
conspiracies of these saboteurs.540
Women’s primary responsibilities, therefore, are to produce male children and
educate them, while “the Islamic peoples” are responsible for protecting Muslim
Palestinian women from the corruptive forces of the enemies. Women maintain
responsibility for the preservation and transmission of Islamic culture. Consequently,
they are the cultural locus of the battle between secularism and religious conservatism.
Women’s domestic role within the family is further stressed in Article 18:
Woman in the home of the fighting family, whether she is a mother or a sister, plays
the most important role in looking after the family, rearing the children and imbuing
them with moral values and thoughts derived from Islam. She has to teach them to
perform the religious duties in preparation for the role of fighting awaiting them.
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That is why it is necessary to pay great attention to schools and the curriculum
followed in educating Moslem girls, so that they would grow up to be good mothers,
aware of their role in the battle of liberation.
She has to be o f sufficient knowledge and understanding where the performance o f
housekeeping matters are concerned, because economy and avoidance of waste o f
the family budget, is one of the requirements for the ability to continue moving
forward in the difficult conditions surrounding us. She should put before her eyes
the fact that the money available to her is just like blood which should never flow
except through the veins so that both children and grown-ups could continue to live.
“Verily, the Moslems of either sex, and the true believers of either sex, and the
devout men, and the devout women, and the men of veracity, and the women of
veracity, and the patient men, and the patient women, and the humble men, and the
humble women, and the alms-givers of either sex who remember Allah frequently;
for them hath Allah prepared forgiveness and a great reward” (The Confederates verse 25).541
Once again, the emphasis is placed on childbearing, education and proficient
housekeeping. Women educate their children in a jihad ethos: boys become fighters and
girls support fighters. Islah Jad observes that “women were thus advised to give to their
family and nation instead of taking, a notion that Hamas stresses to differentiate Islamist
women from secular activists. In this vision, women are portrayed as dependent on men,
confined to their homes, and segregated from public space.”542 As indicated in the last
verse of Article 18, women will receive the same reward as men for fulfilling their
parental and domestic duties.
In the Palestinian national struggle, the sacrifice required of women is often
highlighted in the context of martyrdom. Ibrahim Z’arour, a professor at Damascus
University, observes that “the mother in our Arab and Islamic history has always
sacrificed her children and prepared them for martyrdom. This is rooted in our religion,
our culture, in our values, and our upbringing.”543 If sacrifice is rooted in cultural history,
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one may assume that the struggle for national independence has exerted even greater
pressure on women to conform to these precedents. Z’arour further explains that
the mother is the school that prepares the children and sends them to martyrdom in
defense of the homeland. This culture is within all of us. I always see mothers who
utter cries of joy when they learn that their sons were martyred in battles in
Palestine, in the Golan Heights, or Iraq.544
Thus, Z’arour’s observation of the joy of the mother who sends her son to ‘battles in
Palestine’ is both descriptive and prescriptive.
Sacrificing their sons in this way is also what enables women to achieve, before
that of their children or homeland, their own freedom. Adnan Kanafani asserts that “the
mother knows perfectly well that if she does not sacrifice her son, she will never be
liberated, or her son’s sons, or the homeland, will never be liberated.” As a result of this
sacrifice, however, a woman “may weep a lot, but she will not weep over the martyrdom
of her son, because she believes that he has ascended to a better world, leaving a mark of
pride on her forehead.”545 Women have nonetheless wept over the martyrdom of their
sons; Kanafani’s statements only reinforce the notion that it is not socially acceptable to
do so.
These attitudes concerning motherhood, sacrifice and jihad embody both political
and religious beliefs. Although there are no official statistics that identify how many
women belong to or identify with Hamas, this number is likely significant. First, Hamas
is the largest religious group in the Palestinian territories, and its only serious political
rival is the secular group Fatah.546 Hamas’s predecessor, the Muslim Brotherhood, was
well-established in Palestine for decades.547 Second, throughout the 1990s, Hamas gained
popularity in the territories because of the perceived political failure of the Palestinian
Liberation Organization/Palestinian Authority and the success of Hamas’s social
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institutions.548 The rise in popularity, however, was accompanied by restrictions on
public behaviour. Ray Huntington and his colleagues describe how
one manifestation of this revival [of Islamic fundamentalism] during the intifada
was the intense pressure put on women to wear the hijab as a sign of their
commitment to Islamic orthodoxy. Further, the Islamic revival may have also
pressured women to drop out of the labour force, curtail their education, and retreat
back into the private sphere of the home. Indeed, supporters of Hamas openly
express their desires for a Palestinian state governed by strict Islamic law.549
Thus, the rise in popularity of Hamas was associated with increasing curtailment of
women’s freedoms. This finding alone, however, does not explain why significantly more
women than men support Hamas, with at least one poll pointing to a 14 percent gap.550
Women’s support for Hamas involves two interlocking factors: poverty and
religion. Households with women as the primary breadwinner tend to be poorer and
therefore more reliant on religious institutions for financial and social support. 551
Hamas’s vast charitable institutions cater more to these women than men. Moreover,
women are not only likely to identify with Hamas because of social support, but also
because o f religious affiliation. Palestinian women tend to be more religious than
Palestinian men.552 Only 6 percent of Palestinian women say they are not religious.553
Even these women, however, cannot escape the Islamic influence due to the overlap of
religious and cultural expectations. Both secular and religious women often attend sexsegregated schools and regardless of religious observance, similar familial roles are
taught in the schools.554 This is due to Hamas’s control of a multitude of educational
institutions, where Islamic/Hamas political and gender attitudes are reinforced.555
Hamas’s greater popularity among women than men is surprising given
Forskningsstiftelsen Fafo findings that “men [tend to be] more religiously activist
[Islamist] than women (24 percent versus 12 percent).”556 Asked to choose among Islam,
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democracy, Arabism or Socialism as the principle attribute in a future Palestinian state,
three times as many respondents favoured Islam over democracy, with women primarily
supporting the former and men the latter.557 This suggests that women would be more
supportive o f Hamas and its importance on implementing religious law than would men.
Forskningsstiftelsen Fafo accounts for this phenomenon as follows:
With regard to Islam’s support among women, two aspects need to be mentioned.
First, Islam can be understood in at least two different ways. It can be understood as
a religious belief and practice, primarily a matter of scripture. It can also be
understood as a political framework, primarily a matter of law, government and
society. Survey results suggest that women tend to see Islam more in terms of
religious orthodoxy than of political activism. Second, in comparison to men,
women seem less politicized and consequently their understanding of various
political options tends to be more restricted. Therefore, there are indications that to
some extent women overwhelmingly have chosen Islam because this is the attribute
with which they are most familiar.5 8
Nearly 60 percent of Palestinian male Islamists, not all of whom are necessarily affiliated
with Hamas, believe that that “women should stay at home, take care of their children and
not indulge in money generating activities of any sort.”559 Women are more likely than
men to “make the ultimate sacrifice” for their families and the Palestinian people than are
men, but are less inclined to do so for the Islamic nation.560 Nevertheless, many women
still turn to religion for support.
Nearly four out o f every five Palestinian women use religious beliefs as a way of
coping with the occupation.561 Statistics indicate that many women practice their beliefs,
with 30 percent of women following any four out of five of these practices: fasting during
Ramadan, celebrating Eid al-Adha, attending Friday services at the mosque, abstaining

from alcohol and making the hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca).562 Ten percent have made the
relatively expensive trip to Saudi Arabia to perform hajj, a large number considering the
C / 'T

many women who live in poverty.

The majority of women identify themselves as
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moderately religious because they believe that “only religious leaders or scholars, who
devote their life to the study of the Koran, the hadiths of the prophet Muhammed, and the
Sharia could be considered extremely religious.”564
The most revealing statistic is that 31 per cent of Palestinian women regularly
attend mosque, despite the absence of any religious or cultural obligation to do so.565 This
is significant not only because it demonstrates their voluntary religiosity, but because the
mosques have traditionally fallen under the control of Hamas. The messages, the beliefs
and the practices to which women adhere originate from the mosque and hence reflect the
tenets of Hamas’s ideology.566 Not surprisingly, Ray Huntington and his colleagues
discovered that “those women who pray in the mosque on Fridays, celebrate the feast of
Eid al-Adha, fast during Ramadan, and who refrain from alcohol, practice more
traditional family roles than do less religious involved women.”567 Thus, Islam, and by
extension nationalist groups that preach an Islamic message, are contributing factors to
the maintenance of traditional female roles.
The emphasis on traditional roles and women’s place in the home, however, does
not appear to discourage women’s involvement in the resistance. Huntington et al. were
surprised to learn that women’s “extensive political involvement was not related to less
traditional family roles or to greater family power for wives.”568 During the Al-Aqsa
Intifada, women were heavily involved in the resistance. In a survey of 5,600 Palestinian
women, each woman performed any combination of the following activities an average of
ten times: protecting Palestinians from the Israeli authorities (44 percent of women did
this); protesting in demonstrations or marches against the occupation (38 percent);
distributing pamphlets for the uprising (9 percent); and throwing stones at the police or
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Israel Defense Forces (28 percent).569 Women’s performance of these particular activities
was not unique to the second intifada; many women had participated in these very same
forms of resistance in the beginning stages of the first intifada.570 What characterizes
women’s unique involvement in the second intifada, however, is their participation in
suicide missions.

Female Suicide Bombers
Suicide bombing is defined by the Institute for Counter-Terrorism as an
“operational method in which the very act of the attack is dependent upon the death of the
perpetrator. The terrorist is fully aware that if she/he does not kill her/himself, the
planned attack will not be implemented.”571 Although suicide terrorism has existed for a
millennium, the first female suicide attack occurred relatively recently, in Lebanon in
1985.572 Beginning in 1994, Palestinian groups began to employ suicide attacks.573 Until
2002, however, all suicide attacks were carried out by men.574 The second intifada
marked the first time in history when Palestinian women participated as suicide
bombers.575 Traditionally, women who participated in the revolutionary cause did so by
relaying messages among male militants, supporting male relatives involved in the cause
and sacrificing their children.

Terri Toles Patkin notes that “historically, Hamas and

Islamic Jihad were adamant that women should not participate in violent demonstrations
but rather remain at home in their established roles as mothers and homemakers, donning
traditional dress and head coverings.”

enn

Regardless of their political or religious

affiliation, Hamas venerates the “female martyrs in the Al-Aqsa Intifada”: those who
helped implant and transport explosive objects, assisted others in militant operations,
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high-jacked airplanes and “hundreds of women who participated in some of the heroic
operations o f the Palestinian revolution.”

r*70

Thus far, there have been 11 successful female Palestinian suicide bombers, only
one of which has died in a suicide mission carried out by Hamas. Nevertheless, several of
the other successful women were Islamist, in spite of their being sent by the more secular
Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades.579 Hamas glorified all of these women, regardless of the
group that organized their missions. Notwithstanding the relative lack of women who
have participated in operations under the movement’s banner, Hamas now strongly
supports women’s roles in suicide operations. As noted above, however, the Hamas
Charter identifies women’s primary function as producing men for jihad. While men and
women are equally obligated to participate in jihad, women’s participation comes in the
form of having children and of providing them with a religious upbringing that will
eventually prepare them for the day when they, too, must fight.
An understanding o f these differences explains why just as male martyrs are
glorified, women whose sons are martyrs are also highly honoured. In particular, Mariam
Farahat or Um Nidal, has received much international press coverage as the
contemporary Khansa’a o f Palestine, a historical figure in early Islam who rejoiced in her
four sons’ deaths for the sake of defending Islam.580 Um Nidal is well known for
encouraging her son Muhammed to “become a martyr,” telling him to return from his
mission only as a shahid, and celebrating his then-upcoming mission with him in his
testimonial video.581 Rasha al-Rantisi, the widow of Hamas co-founder Abdel Aziz alRantisi, has also heavily stressed in public the importance of educating male children on
martyrdom.

CO-}

Moreover, a multitude of interviews are available in Palestinian media that
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glorify mothers who rejoice in their children’s choice of martyrdom.

Women have

therefore been encouraged to be a “symbol of a tender mother who gives the blood of her
her children.” 584 Nevertheless, some women have chosen to give their own blood in
jihad operations, rather than, or in addition to, that of their offspring.
Women’s participation in militant operations not only endangers their lives, but it
threatens the roles defined for them in the Hamas Charter. On the one hand, they are
encouraged to produce soldiers for the struggle and to keep active their warrior wombs.
On the other, Hamas believes that “it is the duty of every Muslim to struggle for an
Islamic state.”

If women are killed, however, they are unable to produce the fighters

necessary for the greater struggle. These two notions must be harmonized for both to be
simultaneously accepted by Hamas. Consequently, the religious basis for allowing
women to participate in militant jihad is ambiguous. Commenting on women’s
participation in jihad, David Cook observed that “according to the usual interpretation,
women are not permitted to fight in jihad, but were told that their jihad was a righteous
pilgrimage to Mecca (hajj),” since the trip itself was once extremely dangerous.586 He
goes on to demonstrate that the historical instances in which women did participate in
jihad were when they played auxiliary roles in assisting or encouraging men.587
With the rise o f Islamic feminism in the last few decades, the discourse over
women’s participation in jihad has greatly expanded. Muhammed Khayr Haykal’s threevolume work on jih a d explains that it is obligatory for Muslim, adult, sane, free, male and
able-bodied individuals.588 Women’s participation is optional in fa rd kifaya (community),
but mandatory for fa rd ‘ayn (individual). Although many scholars state that women’s
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participation in the most extreme cases remains optional, Haykal argues that women must
be trained for armed operations:
From this we believe that it is incumbent upon the Islamic state to prepare training
centres for women so that they can learn the use of arms and methods of fighting in
them. This is because as long as it is possible that jihad could become fard 'ayn
upon the woman, it is incumbent to train her for this eventuality so that she will be
prepared to fulfill this obligation.589
Cook is critical of Haykal’s use of sources: “It is interesting to realize to what extent a
writer such as Haykal -whose command of the legal and historical literature is near total
- is willing to disregard it and make the exception the rule.”590
Haykal, however, is not the only religious scholar making this exception. Syrian
Nawaf al-Takruri raised the issue of female fighters in the fourth edition of his work
Martyrdom Operations in the Legal Balance. 591 Al-Takruri does not permit jihad in
situations that involve contradicting some aspects of Islamic law. For instance, a woman
cannot attain permission to fight jihad if it involves her limbs being naked.592 In his book,
al-Takruri points to six fatwas that have been issued allowing women to participate in
jihad: “Yusuf al-Qaradawi, (the famous TV and radio personality), three faculty at alAzhar University in Egypt, Faysal al-Mawlawi of the European Council of Research and
Legal Opinion (based in Dublin), and Nizar ‘Abd al-Qadir Riyyan of the Islamic
University of Gaza (Palestine).”593 Nevertheless, these six fatwas are associated with
Egyptian and Palestinian cultures, considered the most liberal in the Arab world.
The absence of fatwas from conservative countries like Saudi Arabia indicates a
lack of consensus over women’s role in jihad. When compared to the corpus of literature
that either ignores the issue or prohibits women’s participation, the Palestinians’
inclusion of women in jihad suggests that the use of women as fighters has arisen out of
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necessity. David Cook concludes that women’s participation in jihad is “seen as a radical
change in Islam and has been treated with suspicion by Muslim conservatives. It is also
clear, however, that the radicals have been able to establish a fairly strong intellectual and
religious case for women fighting.”594
Only after the first female Palestinian suicide bomber blew herself up in 2002,
with crowds flooding the streets of Gaza and the West Bank in support of her action, did
Hamas condone the use of female fighters.595 Three years earlier, a Hamas leader had
rejected Dareen Abu Aisha’s request to participate in the military wing, saying, “When
we finish with men we will ask women to come in.”596 Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi affirmed
women’s right to participate half a year earlier, stating that “there is no reason that the
perpetration of suicide attacks should be monopolized by men,” but others were not
convinced.597
The spiritual leader of Hamas, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, maintained several
reservations. First, immediately after the first female suicide bombing, he argued that
recruiting women would break Islamic law, since the recruiter would be “taking the girl
or woman without the permission of her father, brother, or husband, and therefore the
family o f the girl confronts an even greater problem since the man has the biggest power
over her, choosing the day that she will give her life back to Allah.”598 Second, he stated
that women undertaking martyrdom operations needed to be accompanied by a male
chaperone.599 Thus, the spiritual leader of the movement was more reticent than other
Hamas leaders in accepting women’s new role in jihad.
One month after the bombing, Yassin denied the necessity of women’s
involvement:
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At the present stage, we do not need women to bear this burden of Jihad and
martyrdom. The Islamic Movement cannot take all the Palestinian males demanding
to participate in Jihad and in martyrdom operations, because they are so numerous.
Our means are limited, and we cannot absorb all those who desire to confront the
Israeli enemy. But the days of decisive conflict with the Israeli occupation will
come, and then men, women, the elderly, and children will participate in Jihad, in
the crucial battle for the liberation of Palestine, Allah willing. We have entered a
new phase o f history, in which Palestinian women are willing to fight and to die a
martyr’s death as the men and youths do. This is from the grace of Allah. But,
meanwhile, women have no military organization in the framework of the [Islamic]
movement. When such an organization arises, it will be possible to discuss widescale recruitment of women.60
Less than half a year later, however, Yassin was more confident about women’s military
role:
We are men o f principle and according to our religion, a Muslim woman is
permitted to wage jih a d and struggle against the enemy who invades holy land. The
Prophet would draw lots among the women who wanted to go out with him to make
Jihad. The Prophet always emphasized the woman’s right to wage jihad.601
Gazan Hamas leader Ismail Abu Shanab clarified that “Islam has never differentiated
f.(yy

between men and women on the battlefield.”

Expressing concern that Hamas’s change

in attitude appeared to be based on popularity rather than religion, West Bank Hamas
leader Sheikh Hassan Yussef iterated:
We [Hamas] do not act according to the opinion of the street or of society. We are
men [italics mine] of principle. . . [and act] according to what our religion dictates.
A Muslim woman is permitted to wage Jihad and struggle against the occupation.
The Prophet [Muhammad] would draw lots among the women who wanted to go
out to wage Jihad with him. The Prophet always emphasized the woman’s right to
wage Jihad.603
Thus, as a result of the popularity of female suicide bombers, Hamas’s official stance
shifted from refusal to ambiguity to acceptance of female fighters.
Hamas women appeared to make this transition faster than their male counterparts.
The women’s branch of Hamas was not as concerned with issues of modesty in the
course o f jihad as the male leadership. Contradicting al-Takruri’s assertion that women
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cannot undertake jihad if it involves a breach of modesty, and brushing aside Yassin’s
concern of women being unaccompanied, widow of Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi, Jamila Shanti,
clarified:
The issue o f martyrdom [operations] has gained much popularity in Palestinian
society. There is no difference between the martyrdom of sisters and the martyrdom
o f brothers, because the enemy does not differentiate between firing on men and
firing on women. . . Islam does not prohibit a woman from sacrificing herself to
defend her land and her honour. It is she who was attacked, and she has the right to
defend herself in any way. It is not puzzling that Muslim sisters have been carrying
out heroic operations within Palestine since 1948. On the contrary: It would be
strange if the Palestinian woman had not done so, as Jihad is a personal imperative
for her and no one can prevent her from waging it, provided. . . she avoids fitna [in
this case: inappropriate behaviour] - which is not on the agenda in martyrdom
operations because she is going to her death. Perhaps these activities require the
woman to wear a particular garment in order to mislead the enemy, and therefore
she may have to relinquish part of her veil when she goes to martyrdom. But there
is nothing wrong with this, because the clerics are in consensus that martyrdom
operations are the highest level of martyrdom.604
According to Shanti, women are equal to men in the struggle and may even partly
unveil in the course o f action, provided they avoid “inappropriate behaviour.”605
Unveiling is not always an option but a command, and Patkin recounts that at least
one potential female recruit “rejected her orders to dress in modem clothing.”606
While opinions differ as to whether concerns over modesty can be overridden by the
imperative for jihad, the statements made by each personality mentioned thus far have
emphasized women’s right, equal to that of men, to fight in jihad.
Reaffirming the movement’s commitment to women’s equal participation in jihad,
the military wing o f Hamas created a women’s unit. The separation of this unit from the
male unit is consistent with Hamas’s conservative approach to the interaction between the
sexes. In an interview with the weekly Al-Risala, the leader of the women’s unit
explained the rationale for joining the ‘Izz Al-Din Al-Qassam Brigades.607 On the one
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hand, the initial explanations the leader offered as to why women joined the brigades
indicated that women had the same motivations as men. For instance, women joined the
military wing because “the Al-Qassam Brigades are considered the standard-bearers and
the pioneers of jihad.”608 They joined the group fully of their own volition, from their
“[love of] jih a d and its path.”609 Although they secured the permission of their husbands
to join the group, the Hamas Charter indicates that women do not require permission
from spouses or male relatives to bear arms. The women’s aim, like that of their male
counterparts, is to liberate the land of Palestine through resistance and jihad. Raphael
Israel explains that “Palestinian clerics are unified by the theme o f what they perceive as
a concrete, daily and all-persuasive national struggle to which they provide theological
responses. And once they sanctified Islamikaze as a legitimate form of struggle, indeed
encouraged it, they could not exclude women and children from it.”610
Hamas’s use o f women has also been justified for tactical reasons. First, women
are recruited because they attract less attention from the Israel Defense Forces than do
men. For instance, Hamas has disguised female militants as pregnant women, “assuming
correctly that they would not be frisked or subjected to intense scrutiny.”611 Hussein alSheikh, a West Bank Fatah commander, reaffirms Hamas’s supposition:
The tight Israeli security measures and the strict searches of young men by the
occupation forces drove the Palestinian organizations to incorporate women. Girls
and women were not subjected to strict Israeli security measures, and it was easier
for them to reach a certain place and carry out a mission than it was for young
men. 612
Concurring with al-Sheikh, Sami Abu Zuhri elaborates:
The Palestinian resistance, at times, purposely uses women in some operations that
men cannot carry out, especially in high security areas, which male Palestinian
Mujaheedin cannot easily reach. This is why the Palestinian woman has an
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important role in the Palestinian resistance, and at times she may even have roles
that the young male Palestinian Mujaheed cannot fulfill.
In the case of al-Riyashi’s operation Col. Yoav Mordechai, in charge of Erez crossing’s
District Coordinating Office, affirmed that al-Riyashi “took advantage of her gender,
knowing that she would not be asked to lift her clothes as the males are to ensure they
have no explosives strapped to their bodies. She also took advantage of her medical
situation.”614 Because of their apparent modesty and their ability to use pregnancy as a
disguise, Hamas women possess ‘natural’ military tactical advantages that have
successfully been exploited.
Women’s ‘innocence’ has also been instrumental in the success of their operations.
Patkin observes that Israel Security Services are reluctant to search women who appear
Western in appearance or who don maternity clothing, effectively exploiting “the
presumption o f innocence.”615 For example, “the perception that women are less prone to
violence, the Islamic dress code and the reluctance to carry out body searches on Muslim
women made them the ‘perfect demographic.’”616 Viewed by the public as a suicidal
ingenue, the female suicide bomber generates more sympathy from the public than does
her male counterpart. Journalists Alexis B. Delaney and Peter R. Neumann write that
women’s participation in suicide missions contradicts a familiar notion upheld by many:
women are the preservers of life, not its destroyers.617 Thus, the female suicide bomber is
viewed as both a perpetrator and a victim.
In justifying the tactical need for women’s military participation initially, Hamas
attempted to minimize the potential shock value of women’s incorporation into the
militant fold. The movement expected that after female suicide bombings would
repeatedly occur, “it [would] become routine and no one [would] talk about it any
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more.”

/TIO

Nevertheless, the very participation of women has encouraged more men and

women to join in jihad. Women, especially young women, are given role models to
emulate. Since becoming the first shahida, Wafa Idris “has become a source of pride.
Many girls, for various reasons, wanted to play the same role,” explains al-Sheikh.619
Women’s motivation has translated into increased numbers of women seeking suicide
operations. According to Zuhri,
there are hundreds o f female martyrdom bombers, who stream en masse and insist
on participating in martyrdom operations. This is a unique phenomenon, reflecting
the live spirit of Jihad among this people. . . We see this stream of young men and
of women seeking martyrdom. This people [sic] emphasizes its adherence to the
option of martyrdom, especially, in light of the models of female martyrdom
bombers.620
Between January 2002 and January 2003, at least 38 women attempted suicide
operations.

Between the onset of the second intifada and 2003, more than 250 women

were either involved in or attempted suicide attacks.622
In addition to the tactical advantages, the growing number of women willing to
participate in these missions also carries economic benefits for Hamas. The families of
female bombers are paid half as much in compensation as those of male bombers.
Furthermore, where men require months of preparation, women only need two to eight
weeks o f training because they “require less persuasion (they are considerably less
inclined to be swayed by promises of virgins in paradise).. . women have already made a
long ideological journey before they set foot in the door of the terrorist organization; they
arrive ready to take that final step.”623 The use of female bombers, therefore, is the
cheaper option between the two sexes.
Women’s recruitment not only causes an increase in the number of female recruits,
but also the number of males, as Mia Bloom observes:
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The recruitment of women by insurgent organizations can mobilize greater numbers
of operatives by shaming men into participating. . . this point is underscored by the
bombers themselves. . . Before Ayat Akras blew herself up in Israel in April 2002,
she taped her martyrdom video and stated, “I am going to fight instead of the
sleeping Arab armies who are watching Palestinian girls fight alone.”624
Akhras added that “now even women are martyring themselves for the Palestinian
cause,” questioning where “the Arab leaders [are].”625 Her last words are not merely an
observation, but a negative judgement on the Arab political leadership and military.
Akhras’s challenge to the “Arab armies” alludes to sharaf, a notion of male honour that is
upheld or denigrated through a man’s actions and public image. Raphael Israel writes that
the man’s honour
is redeemable if he only applies himself to maintain it, shelter it and retrieve it when
lost. The woman’s honour, by contrast, refers to her intimacy, modesty and decency
in dress, the preservation of virginity until marriage, gentle behaviour and keeping
aloof from male society, which is corrupt by definition. If she should fail in one of
those categories, her honour is lost forever.6 6
In the instance of a woman fighting jihad, her honour is not lost provided she upholds
expectations of modesty throughout the battle. Nevertheless, jihad is still viewed as more
of a man’s obligation. Women’s participation, therefore, may be perceived as challenging
men’s role by demonstrating that men are no longer capable of fighting. This idea was
reaffirmed in an article published by the Egyptian Islamist newspaper Al-Sha ’ab. Entitled
“It’s a Woman!,” the editorial proclaims:
It is a woman, a woman, a woman who is a source of pride for the women of this
nation and a source of honour that shames the submissive men with a shame that
cannot be washed away except by blood.. . It is a woman in the spring of her youth
who swore in the name of her God, with every drop of her blood, with every limb of
her body, and with every one of her cells that turned into coals that burned the
hearts o f the enemy with the fire of fear, loss, and pain. . . 627
Women’s actions therefore shame and challenge men who are not fighting in jihad.
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Women’s participation in military operations, however, conflicts with their
prescribed roles, as outlined in the Hamas Charter. First, women’s participation alongside
men undermines the belief in a complementary familial role structure. Some argue that
women use violence as an empowerment tool to challenge the “norms [that] have dictated
the separation of the sexes and prescribed that women restrict themselves to the private
space of the home.”628 Members of the female military of wing o f Hamas have expressed
their desire to “become like [Reem al-Riyashi] at once,” a “crown on [their] heads and a
pioneer o f the resistance.”629 Al-Rantisi observed that “those Palestinian women who
dared to risk their lives by committing acts of jihad fardi were determined to continue to
struggle against the occupation on an equal basis with the men.”

What al-Rantisi

neglects to say, however, is that his movement forbade women from participating
alongside men in jih a d fardi operations during the first intifada.631 Therefore, female
martyrdom in the second intifada is, for the first time, upheld as a religious and
nationalist ideal for women.
Conversely, when asked, “What do women like you tell your children,” the head
of the women’s military unit emphasized teaching the importance of jihad to children.632
Commenting on women’s role in the intifada, after having exemplified Al-Riyashi’s role
and sacrifice, the head asserted that women’s “role is very important and is no less
important than that o f the man. The woman is the fighter’s wife and sister. She carries the
difficult burden of making a living and educating the children to jihad.,,m Similarly, she
added:
It’s all one path. We raise our children and perform our domestic duties, the duty of
encouraging devotion to religion, as well as the other everyday duties, and the
epitome o f them is jihad for the sake of Allah. Jihad is a duty that every Muslim is
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required to fulfill if he can. Our joining the military organization is one of the
essential everyday tasks.634
Nevertheless, the “essential everyday” task of being part of a military organization
demands time that might otherwise be devoted to caring for one’s family. The female
military head adheres to the Charter’s primary expectations of women, that is, supporting
male fighters and educating children. She simultaneously advances women’s right to
fight in jihad, thereby challenging Hamas’s prescribed gender roles.
By participating in militant jihad, Hamas women challenge their movement’s
notions of familial structure and motherhood. Referring to actions undertaken by
Palestinian women in the first intifada, Julie Peteet observed that
when they engaged in defense of their communities as mothers they acted in
reference to culturally dominant and highly charged symbols of maternal sentiment
and behaviour. Yet a transformation in meaning was occasioned by a praxis that,
while culturally sanctioned, subverted the space and meaning traditionally
associated with maternal practice.635
Simply, the private sphere was politicized and motherhood became a platform on which
political objectives could be achieved. The Palestinian political leadership exalted the
‘fertile mother’ o f Palestinian society, whose reproductive capabilities would enable the
demographic triumph over Israel.636 For this reason, “motherhood has been exalted both
in the political and cultural texts, but only the right kind of mother is socially and
nationally validated - the mother who can bear sons for the revolution.”637 In choosing or
being encouraged to participate in suicide or martyrdom operations, Hamas women
threaten their future status as emblematic icons of normative motherhood.
The tension between women’s duty toward militant jihad and motherhood is
clearly discemable. Hamas’s decision to send Reem al-Riyashi, the 21/22 year-old
mother of two, on a suicide mission that left four dead at the Erez Gaza border crossing,
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was highly controversial.638 Numerous Palestinian writers have debated whether Reem alRiysahi should have been dispatched. The editor of the Palestinian Authority’s daily AlHayat Al-Jadida wrote that it is their
right to wonder about what made Hamas urge a mother of two to carry out the
operation, even though Hamas is not the first [movement] to do so. But the other
factions stopped pressuring women into carrying out operations of this kind because
they are likely to increase the abuse of women by the occupation.639
Not only is Hamas implicated in using coercive measures, the mother-bomber issue is
perceived as furthering women’s oppression.
Other writers emphasize the need for mothers to choose motherhood over
militancy. Hassan al-Battal, a writer for Al-Ayyam, implored in an article: “The women’s
organizations must not stop with copious sentiments for the two orphans [left by Reem
Al-Riyashi], but must raise their voices and declare that the obligation of motherhood and
breastfeeding comes before the obligation of fighting.”640 Writing in the Gaza-based
paper Al-Karam, Ziyad Abu al-Hijja questioned how
a 22-year-old mother of two children, one an infant boy and the other a girl, carried
out a martyrdom operation. Who issued a Fatwa taking an infant’s mother from him?
Who decided to add two more orphans to the list of Palestine’s orphans? On the
basis of which Qur'an verses and Hadiths does a young mother leave her true place
of Jihad, which is raising the two children, one of whom needs her milk? By what
right do they present us to the world as lacking the most basic of human
emotions?641
The sentiment condemning al-Riyashi’s action forced al-Rantisi to modify the fatwa
permitting women to participate in suicide operations: female recruits were now required
to produce one male and one female child before they could pursue suicide operations.642
Al-Battal and al-Hijaa also expressed concern that sending mothers on suicide missions,
or what he euphemistically referred to as a “sacrifice [of] our humanity,” would discredit
the nationalist movement on the world stage.643
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Others are less clear in their condemnation of Al-Riyashi’s decision. For example,
‘Adnan Kanafani stresses that
the Palestinian mother, or the Arab mother in general, is the most compassionate
mother on the face of the earth, because she is dedicated to the upbringing of her
children, and would rather eat dirt than refrain from breastfeeding. This is a well
known fact about the Arab woman, in complete contrast to the other women.644
If this is indeed the case, then the mother’s suicide operation must be harmonized with
her sense of compassion. Adli Sadeq, former PA Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs,
suggested that perhaps Al-Riyashi foresaw her own death and chose to die in a
“meaningful” way.645 He understands her choice as one of “two options for her children:
between the tragic loss of a peace-seeking mother, or the painful loss of a warriormother,” in which al-Riyashi chose the latter.646 Regarding her controversial decision,
Sadeq is adamant that no woman “has the right to claim that her own maternal sentiments
are stronger than Reem’s.”647 Clearly, Hamas’s use of mothers in suicide operations
generated much debate, both condemnatory and apologetic, over normative motherhood.
From the evidence cited above, mothers who choose to fight in jihad are rebelling against
Hamas’s expectation that their roles be primarily restricted to childrearing.
Women’s participation in Hamas’s jihad operations not only challenges
conceptions of motherhood but also notions of male authority. First, female martyrs are
perceived to occupy a higher rung on the sacrificial ladder than are mothers of martyrs.
The Egyptian government-backed Al-Akhbar published an article in which Dr. Samiya
Sa’ad Al-Din professed that
Palestinian women have tom the gender classification out of their birth certificates,
declaring that sacrifice for the Palestinian homeland would not be for men alone; on
the contrary, all Palestinian women will write the history of the liberation with their
blood, and will become time bombs in(LA
the
face of the Israeli enemy. They will not
Q
settle for being mothers of m artyrs.. . .

134

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Mothers o f martyrs, therefore, are not viewed as contributing equally to the struggle as
male fighters; rather, female fighters are women who refuse to “settle,” whose
participation assures them an equal place in history.
Clara Beyer argues that “when women become human bombs, their intent is to
make a statement not only in the name of a country, a religion, a leader, but also in the
name o f their gender.”649 These women’s actions help their spouses and male relatives
recover some o f their “lost manhood” that results from men’s insufficient military
participation, thereby restoring their families’ reputations.650 Furthermore, as Islah Jad
argues, “their acts do not seek a total equality with Arab men, let alone Hamas men, but
aim to supersede men to activate their lost role as their women’s protectors. . . ris[ing]
above the male order and gain[ing] power over all structures of power, whether
patriarchy, despotism, or Occupation.”651 Thus, women who carry out suicide operations
are both asserting their prescribed protective roles and revealing the failure of their men
to fulfill their own masculine roles.
Women’s rebuke of male authority is not only expressed by carrying out public
acts without the permission of their husbands or close male relatives, but also in
challenging the authority of the political leadership of Hamas itself. These women
directly undermined the attitudes of the spiritual head of Hamas. Initially, Sheikh Yassin
deplored the use o f women as suicide bombers.652 After the first female Palestinian blew
herself up, he modified his position, iterating that women’s participation was unnecessary
given the influx o f male volunteers. He changed his position yet again after al-Riyashi’s
operation:
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The fact that a woman took part for the first time in a Hamas operation marks a
significant evolution for the Iz a Din al-Kassam brigades. The male fighters face
many obstacles on their way to operations, and this is a new development in our
fight against the enemy. The holy war is an imperative for all Muslim men and
women; and this operation proves that the armed resistance will continue until the
enemy is driven from our land. This is revenge for all the fatalities sustained by the
armed resistance.653
Yet he still harboured reservations concerning female militants’ preservation of modesty.
Yassin initially made female participation conditional on women having male
chaperones on their missions.654 He modified his position several days later, clarifying
that a chaperone was unnecessary provided the woman was not alone longer than one day
and one night.655 Since the chaperone must either be a spouse or male relative, Yassin’s
amendment and restriction fully contradicts the Charter’s stipulation that women be
allowed to wage jihad without male permission. Especially because the end itself is
considered most virtuous, attempted female suicide bombers have ridiculed Hamas’s
demand that a male chaperone accompany the prospective female martyr.656 Ironically,
the very modesty that Hamas can exploit and Yassin seeks to preserve in women ceases
to be a military advantage due to the chaperone’s presence.
Crucial to understanding the ‘significant evolution’ of which Yassin speaks is
women’s forefront position in his decision-making process. Only after women have
carried out actions that are fully compliant with the movement’s goal — ceaseless
fighting until Palestine is restored — but contradict the opinions of the male leadership,
do leaders such as Yassin modify their positions, sanctioning the women’s actions post
facto. Women have thus expanded their roles as protectors and destabilized men’s roles
as defenders, while challenging the authority of the Hamas leadership.
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Participation in National Elections
Unlike the issue of female suicide bombers, women’s electoral participation as
both voters and candidates did not conflict with the decisions of the male leadership. In
order to run in the 2006 elections, the Palestinian government imposed upon each party a
party list minimum quota of 20 percent female candidates.657 Although parties freely
determined the placements of their female candidates on the national lists, and could
technically place all their female candidates at the bottom said lists, Hamas nonetheless
ranked Jamila Shanti as its third candidate.658 The movement’s realization of the need to
cater to an otherwise politically neglected female electorate prompted Hamas to place
Shanti in this prominent position. Yet the question arises of how Hamas women could
campaign and run for a group that forces many women to wear its conception of Islamic
dress, and continually asserts that a woman’s place is in the home.659
Women’s increased participation as fighters may have bolstered their political
popularity. Both men and women listed “fighter” (27.4 percent) as the most important
factor in choosing a candidate, followed by religious observance (24.1 percent), good
character (17 percent) and active community service (16.3 percent).660 Not only was the
women’s military wing o f Hamas formed around the time Hamas announced its intention
to participate in the 2006 elections, but images of the religious khaki-clad military
women holding guns and grenades were used as campaign posters.661 In spite of their
leverage o f belonging to a new class of warriors, the female candidates have often
emphasized reform over military struggle.

c.f/y

Hamas’s gender ideology is contradictory: it

regards women as soldier-producing wombs but also emphasizes the “new Islamic
woman.”

137

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

In “Neo-Ottomanism and the New Islamic Woman in Turkey,” Jenny White
discusses a belief held by many individuals in Turkey that the “new Islam is a route
toward upward mobility,” where women adapt new and trendy styles in veiling and dress
that have no precedent in their own cultural histories.

Similarly, the adoption of

‘Shari’ah’ dress, long robes and a particular kind of hijab, became an “invented tradition”
in the Palestinian territories.664 Because relaxed clothing standards were perceived as “a
Western scheme to invade the country’s culture,” ‘Shari’ah’ dress was intended to
counter this cultural invasion by protecting and veiling Palestinian women.665 Within a
year of the outbreak of the first intifada, Hamas’s pressure on women to wear hijabs was
so great that unveiled Gazan women could not walk the streets bareheaded.666 At the time,
Hamas’s primary targets were “educated, urban and petit bourgeois women.”667 The
imposition o f the hijab on women was therefore an oppressive tool, what Palestinian
writer Rima Hammami calls “a direct disciplining of women’s bodies for political
means.”668
In the years following the first intifada, however, the ideology that drove Hamas’s
‘Shari’ah’ dress campaigns altered as Islamist women within Hamas slowly began to
acquire power, in both the religious and social spheres. In spite of the prohibition of
women serving as imams or preachers, in 1998 women nonetheless constituted 16 percent
of the Hamas-controlled Gazan religious establishment and 9 percent in the West
Bank.669 The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics postulates that the recruitment of
women into the religious establishment is an attempt to “mobilize housewives and ensure
interpretation equates religious affiliation with conservatism, the validity of the latter
interpretation is dependent on the nature of message being transmitted - whether it
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encourages equity between men and women, or endorses male dominance.”

f\K\

Regardless

of whether or not the motivation of the recruitment is to indoctrinate women with a
particular gender and religious ideology, a different kind of woman, modem and religious,
was promoted by the movement. Hamas-affiliated political parties and the movement’s
women’s branch began to advocate the image of the “new Islamic woman”:
[They] opened [their] doors to the “new Islamic woman” who is highly educated,
outspoken, moltazemah (veiled), and modern (a new form of veiling). Modernity is
reflected in the fact that these women are educated, professional, and politically
active. The veil is seen as a signifier o f modernity, since it is different from
traditional dress. The new Islamic dress (a long rober of plain colour and a white or
black head scarf) is seen as a uniform of conviction.
7 i

In dressing in this particular fashion, women are not only able to recognize their fellow
“sisters,” but are also able to differentiate themselves from their less-educated and often
illiterate mothers and grandmothers. 672 As Hamas enlarged their network of social
services, the movement became a source of employment and upward social mobility for
many women.
By the late 1990s, the integration of women into Hamas became a prominent
concern for the movement. In response to the secular parties, which incorporated women
into their political structures, the Islamists “focused on women - particularly the highly
educated - and integrated them by the thousands into their party’s (Khalas) structure at
all levels.” 674 Beginning in 1997, Hamas held annual conferences with the goal of
increasing its female membership and widening its social base.675 These conferences
were taken seriously by the Hamas leadership, many of whom presented papers.676
At the conferences, Islamist women’s approach to women’s issues evolved. At the
first conference, the Islamist women undermined other female voices in the hopes of
asserting their own authority as the voice representing women’s welfare.677 Speakers
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rejected gender concerns in favour of nationalist aspirations, and NGOs, wellsprings of
secular women’s employment, were said to be linked to the corruptive West.

By the

third conference, the women were launching feminist critiques of the liberal rights
approach, stressing the need for scriptural re-interpretation that “incorporated women’s
achievements thus far due to modernization processes.”

/<7Q

The change in the women’s

approach, from rejection to engagement of gender concerns, paralleled Hamas’s
increasing development from a purely military wing into a political party. Unlike the
military wing, the political wing could not afford to ignore its primary supporters.
In 2003, Sheikh Yassin announced the creation of a women’s wing of Hamas,
which would concern itself with women’s activism.

/OA

Run by the widow of Hamas co

founder Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi, Jamila Shanti, the wing hosts a variety of programmes for
women.681 For instance, Hamas sends one of its militants on a weekly basis to host a
religious class for women. Other classes include literacy for the elderly, education and
health, and are attended by up to 250 women.

fiO'y

Women within the wing frequent the

families of suicide bombers and those killed in operations against Israel to give them
/ O '!

moral support, in addition to the financial support they may receive from Hamas.
Given these services, a seemingly stark contrast to the movement’s oppressive measures
in the early days of the intifada, it is not surprising that up to 70 percent of women voted
for Hamas.684
The 2006 Palestinian national elections marked the first instance in which women
ran as candidates for Hamas. Speaking a few weeks before the election, Hamas leader
Mahmoud al-Zahhar foresaw that “Palestinian women [would] have an important role to
play in the upcoming elections” alongside men, in part due to the “huge sacrifices” made
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by women during the second intifada.685 His statement reflects the confluence of two
contradictory trends. Khalil Shikaki observed that Palestinian women had a certain
degree of political equality with men because of the mass mobilization of society in the
struggle against the occupation.

Similarly, the very struggle also caused society to

cling more strongly to “conservative social values” embodied in “its most traditional
social networks: the family, the tribe, and mosque.” 687 Lama Hourani, a women’s rights
activist in Gaza, concurs with Shikaki, asserting that the Hamas Islamists view men and
women unequally. Women, she claims, are raised to subordinate themselves to their male
relatives and husbands.

roo

Contrary to al-Zahhar, the female Hamas candidates did not explain their right to
participate in the elections as a consequence or reward for their sacrifices. The Minister
of Women’s Affairs under the Hamas-led government, Mariam Saleh, considers
Palestinian women to be the strongest and most courageous members of society.

/o n

She

did not, however, explicitly use this as a justification for participating in the elections.690
Many of the female candidates stress the importance of religion and use religious
justification to be both active politicians and family members. Muna Monsour, an elected
Hamas candidate and the widow of a Hamas leader, views the Qur’an as a means of
solving any policy question.691 Her dual responsibility toward public office and family
embodies her concept of a ‘modem woman.’

Moreover, she regards religion as the key

to women’s emancipation, an idea supported in her claim that “the low key role of
women nowadays [is] due to the society’s habits and traditions rather than the Islamic
standpoint.”

She cited the decision by the Islamic-dominated Bani Zeid council to

appoint a woman as mayor an example of Hamas’s “matured” regard of women.694
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In accord with Mansour’s observations, the movement claims that “Hamas
women are striving hard as equal [sic] as the Hamas men in delivering the Movement’s
ideology.” 695 The widow of Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi admitted that Hamas hoped to
implement Shari’ah law, as she “will not accept secularism.” 696 Moreover, she
maintained a traditional Hamas outlook on Israel. “I reluse any compromise,” she said.
“The liberation struggle will continue until we liberate all our land. Even if we enter
elections our weapons will not grow dusty against Israel.”

Promoting this position,

female Hamas supporters visited hundreds of family homes campaigning in the national
elections.698 They also had access to the vast array o f social programmes in which women
worked and sought assistance.699 Mkhaimar Abusada affirms that women’s campaigning
is “something noticeable in the Gaza Strip” because Palestinian values “do not accept
women to go out and campaign in the street.”700 Unprecedented in the territories “to a
degree specialists said was new in the conservative Muslim society of the Gaza Strip,”
notes journalist Ian Fisher, “Hamas used its women to win, sending them door to door
*7/ v i

with voter lists and to polling places for last-minute campaigning.”
In addition to door-to-door campaigning, female candidates hosted rallies and
meetings, attended by a multitude of supporters. Hundreds of women attended lectures
given by Mansour around Nablus.

709

Hamas candidates Noha Saymah and Huda Naeem

also hosted meetings in which tens of female Palestinians participated.703 The week
preceding the election, Mariam Saleh spoke at a rally attended by 400 female Hamas
supporters in Nablus, many of whom were professionals.704 Public meetings were also
held in Nablus and hosted by the Islamic League for Palestinian Women. 705 Meanwhile,
the candidates convened conferences in mosques, schools and villages, in order to raise
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“women’s consciousness” among the female attendees, and to make them aware of their
rights.706 Throughout the campaign, both male and female Hamas candidates brought
attention to women’s roles in supporting the Palestinian resistance “through offering sons,
husbands, brothers, and fathers for the sake of Allah and for the sake of Palestine,
pledging to enact pro-woman legislations [sic] if succeeded in the elections.”707
At the rallies, however, there was more emphasis on pro-woman legislation than
on sacrificing men for jihad. Jamila Shanti, the third candidate on Hamas’s “Change and
Reform” list, stressed the future parliament’s intention to safeguard and improve
women’s rights, in the familial, social, economic and political domains. 708 Female
candidate Dr. Majeda Fedda highlighted Islam’s recognition of wom en.709 Even the
“Mother o f Martyrs” made references to active female fighters, telling the female crowds
that it was their “role to fight corruption, make reform, and avenge humiliation, like the
women [suicide bombers] who took revenge on the streets of Tel Aviv, Netanya, and
Jerusalem.”710
Concurrently, the women expressed beliefs that appealed to both men and women.
Jihad was naturally a safe starting point on which women could campaign and maintain
support from both sexes. “The role of women in jihad,” Shanti told supporters in October
2005, “is to encourage their sons and husbands to participate. But women also have the
right to wage jihad.”711 Candidates like Saleh also emphasized the need to serve the
Palestinian people, help society and improve the lives of marginalized groups. 712
Mansour, meanwhile, encouraged women to “set a good model in terms of steadfastness
and resoluteness in face of the Israeli arrogance.713 She also highlighted the need for
economic improvement and employment opportunities, as well as a reduction in
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poverty.714 Both Mariam Farhat and Huda Naeem emphasized preparing their “children
to die when the homeland calls for it.” 715 Thus, throughout the election campagin, Hamas
women advocated the need for gender reform on the one hand, and preparing their
children for jih a d on the other.
Since their electoral victory, the Hamas female candidates, in their quest to
eradicate gender inequality, have stressed the need to follow religion instead of tradition.
According to Jamila Shanti, tradition is to blame for restricting women’s rights:
There are traditions [in Palestine] that say that a woman should take a secondary
role - that she should be at the back. .. But that is not Islam. Hamas will scrap many
o f these traditions. You will find women going out and participating. . . This
doesn’t mean that [they] will depart from Islamic law. People think that Islamic law
is about being veiled, and closed and staying at home - but that’s wrong. A woman
can go out veiled and do all kinds of work without any problem.
<
71/

Al-Rantisi’s widow, however, does not explicitly state the Hamas treats women unfairly:
“I speak for my sisters. Hamas has always honoured women, but now the time has come
for Hamas to give a role to women. We can participate in health and education, and
politics too.”717 Shanti cautions that challenging gender discrimination and making legal
reforms will be a process to which “men may not agree.”718 Like Shanti, Mariam Saleh
also discusses the need to make women aware of their rights through education at school
and at home, in order to make them efficient members of the evolving society.719 This
sentiment is likewise shared by Huda Naeem, who before the election stated that she
would
work hard to accord the Palestinian woman the position she deserves and to activate
her role in the community, and to block all traditions that deny her such a right as
well as impeding all attempts to turn her into a cheap propaganda item, in order to
propagate anarchy and immorality in the community. . . the Islamic Movement is
focusing on the woman being the cornerstone of education, change, and
construction in the community.720

144

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

For Naeem, all Palestinian women should be granted “complete rights” as accorded by
religion, not tradition.721 Thus, for the female Hamas parliament members, both strict
adherence to religion and reform of existing legislation concerning women occupied a
paramount place in their political messages.

Conclusion
Since Hamas’s moderation, some women affiliated with Hamas have used the
political goals of the movement’s discourse to challenge its gender norms. On the one
hand, the Hamas Charter enjoins women to raise their children for jihad, and to be model
homemakers. Accordingly, some members of the women’s military wing, as well as the
female electoral candidates, have emphasized these imperatives in the movement’s fight
to end the occupation of Palestine. On the other hand, the extent to which women can
adequately educate their children if they themselves are training for, or carrying out,
suicide operations is questionable. Nor can they fully care for their families as the Charter
envisions while rallying for upcoming elections or serving as members of parliament. The
statements o f the female Hamas candidates embodied the tension between these
expectations. Moreover, their potentially subversive calls for reform within their
movement and tradition were offset by their devotion to religion, their encouragement of
their sons’ martyrdom and their uncompromising stance toward Israel, in spite of the
movement’s moderation nearly a decade earlier. Thus, in both instances, female
participants promoted the political goals of the movement, while expanding the public
space in which women were able to act.
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CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION

The study of fundamentalist religious-nationalist movements in the IsraeliPalestinian conflict has often diminished women’s political participation. In the few
instances where women’s roles in the transition or moderation processes are discussed in
contemporary discourse, women’s active political involvement is understood as a force
that causes or hastens moderation. Contrary to this claim, women’s involvement in Gush
Emunim and Hamas occurred after their respective groups’ moderation, and
demonstrated strong ideological commitment to their groups’ original tenets.

Summary
This work focused on Gush Emunim and Hamas, two movements whose
territorial conquest goals are similar and understood as divine mandates. In spite of
women’s heavy involvement within the groups, the roles of the movements’ women have
received little academic attention. Moreover, the movements have not been contrasted in
comparative political discourse. As Gush Emunim and Hamas became institutionalized,
they were forced to adopt more moderate stances toward their expansionist territorial
goals. Naturally, these concessions restricted the political and military freedoms of the
leaderships. Criticizing the men’s political ineffectiveness, some women assumed more
prominent positions within their movements by advocating actions that were in line with
their movements’ founding principles: territorial settlement for GE and constant jihad for
Hamas.
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Chapters 2 and 3 discussed the settlement movement Gush Emunim. In the first
few years after its formal creation, Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook strongly emphasized the
importance of settling the territories acquired during the 1967 war, namely the Sinai
Peninsula, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Overnight, young male settlers established
illegal settlements. This tactic was repeatedly and successfully employed, until it became
commonplace. When the party favouring the settlers gained power in 1977, Gush
Emunim’s influence and devotion began to weaken. Since the movement had received
strong political support, administrative and political bodies were created to represent its
interests.
As a result, however, Gush Emunim lost much of its strong leadership, leaving
behind an inexperienced leadership to run the movement. The evacuation of the Sinai
settlements failed to produce the anticipated extremely violent reaction from the settlers,
marking a trend in the movement’s adjustment to political realities. Had Gush Emunim
members been fully committed, that is, faithful to the merkaz harav philosophy and
willing to endanger their own lives for the preservation of land under Israel’s control, a
violent battle between the settlers and the military would have ensued. With one
exception, the extent of women’s involvement throughout GE’s institutionalization was
limited.
Almost a decade after the dismantlement of the Sinai settlements, a group of Gush
Emunim women spontaneously founded a settlement. The act of settlement creation
against the will of all authorities —the government and the military - was a ‘masculine’
Gush Emunim tactic before the leadership adopted a more pragmatic approach. Yet the
Rachelim women even opposed their husbands. They related to the murdered victim in
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whose name the settlement was founded and therefore justified the settlement’s creation
through their identities as mothers, and to a lesser extent, as settlers. In defining their
motives for establishing the settlement, they conformed to their movement’s gender
expectations by regarding themselves as homemakers and as mothers concerned for their
children’s welfare.
Perceived as safeguarding the individual and national family, the GE women
secured the implicit support of the military and the government through their roles as
protectors. Disgusted with the violence male settlers had used in the past, the women saw
their act as a peaceful and constructive alterative. They expanded their roles from
homemakers and mothers, to settlement initiators, before criticizing the male members
for their political immobilization. Reticent in acknowledging the danger to their own
families’ lives by living in settlements, the women understood this threat as one facing
every Jewish Israeli family. Nonetheless, they were determined to continue their maternal
routine practices in the midst of conflict.
In Chapters 4 and 5, the moderation of, and women’s involvement in, Hamas was
discussed. Between the publication of the Charter in 1987, which outlines Hamas’s
objectives, and its participation in the national elections in 2006, Hamas adopted
moderate policies as it become more integrated into the Palestinian social and political
fabric. Although the movement’s military and political branches were unified upon the
movement’s creation, following the Oslo accords, a clear divergence between these two
wings was discernible. As its political presence became more prominent, Hamas
increased its pragmatism through references to ceasefires with Israel, a two-state solution,
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and a willingness to participate in elections that were constructed within a framework that
recognized Israel.
With its institutionalization and moderation also came a shift in the emphasis o f
the core problem: the need to regain lost Palestinian land eclipsed the need for creating an
Islamist society. Like Gush Emunim, the political, military and religious leadership o f
Hamas has been exclusively male. Like Gush Emunim, again, discussions of the
movement’s moderation neglected the role of Hamas women as potentially hastening or
stalling the moderation process.

As made evident, however, Hamas’s moderation

preceded women’s overt military and political campaign for the movement’s foundational
goals.
Women have used Hamas’s charter to expand the very gender roles outlined for
them. The Hamas Charter stresses the importance of women bearing males for the
struggle, acting as model homemakers and educating their children. It also emphasizes
that the commandment to participate in jihad is equally incumbent upon both men and
women. A few women have embraced jihad in the form of suicide bombers, and many
others have tried. In fulfilling this expectation, the women are simultaneously defying the
norm that they be male-producing homemakers. Yet Hamas’s female electoral candidates
emphasized the need for women to fight in jihad, and encouraged their sons to seek
martyrdom. Given their active public involvement, these women could not preach that
women’s primary obligation was to stay at home. Throughout the campaign, female
candidates promoted the need for eradicating women’s inequality in Palestine, while
affirming that tradition was solely to blame.
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The Mythologies of Women’s Involvement
The lack o f scholarly attention concerning women’s role in fundamentalist
religious-nationalist movements is due to a convergence of four myths. The first myth
posits an essentialist bond between women and peace. The depiction of women as
pacifists assumes that motherhood carries with it a moral compulsion to preserve life and
prevent destruction at whatever cost. This heightened moral awareness, in turn, prevents
women, but not men, from divorcing their own actions from the moral consequences o f
those actions. Women’s innate moral obligation arises from their roles as preservers o f
life and protectors of society. Consequently, their conscience does not permit them to
isolate their actions from the moral implications.
Women supposedly channel their heightened moral awareness into their role as
nurturers in the family domain. In this role, they develop preservative love and are also
forced to learn the art of negotiation and compromise. By contrast, men are not subject to
compromise as frequently and are thus more aggressive and focused on hierarchal
relations than on ‘sharing’ interrelationships. Such attributed values are the very
antithesis to the culture of war and destruction. Consequently, women are typically
portrayed as non-combatants in violent conflicts. As a result of this myth, women become
transformed into one-dimensional players whose motivations are often assumed,
simplified and rarely questioned.
This study reveals the mendacity of women’s innate pacifism. Both Gush
Emunim and Hamas women encouraged their husbands and sons respectively to
aggressively carry out their goals against the other community. GE women’s perception
of their actions as “peaceful” further illustrates that maternal thinking, which in this case
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helps feed settler militarism, can be the more destructive of the two forces. Similarly, the
“Mother of Martyrs” and others like her, who effectively discourage their sons from
reneging on suicide operations and returning home, manipulate matemalism for a
destructive means. Conversely, the women of both movements emphasize construction
over destruction, and the imperative for women to take part in the former’s process: for
Gush Emunim, this is in the building of the settlements, and for Hamas, it is in the
creation o f an Islamic society. The preservation of life at whatever cost, as this study
demonstrates, can be set aside for the preservation of the homeland and the national
community.
The second myth assumes that women’s public political participation is coupled
with a feminist agenda. Within nationalist discourses, the negation of the presence of
women who do not promote feminism is once again overlooked. For this reason, women
who affiliate with religious-nationalist movements that hold essentialist beliefs do not
become objects of academic political curiosity, since they are thought to be fully
complicit in their own subordination and subjugation. Yet this work highlights the
participation of women who have embraced their movements’ nationalist aspirations,
without promoting a separate feminist agenda. Increased women’s participation, they
believe, would ultimately benefit their entire movement. Although the women later
emphasized the importance of women’s involvement, they were careful to do so within
the discourses their movements would allow: GE women could call for women’s
initiative in creating settlements, in conformity to their movement’s primary goal; while
Hamas women could exercise their right to participate in jihad, and to call for the
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implementation o f women’s Qur’anic rights, since these too were consistent with their
movement’s beliefs.
The third myth, originating in fundamentalist discourse, supposes that
fundamentalism entirely and rigidly relegates women to the private sphere. History
teaches that waves of fundamentalism arise as backlashes to women’s greater access into
the public sphere. The origins of these backlashes are blamed on men, and rarely are
women regarded as complicit. Defining fundamentalism as the preservation of traditional
patriarchal structures within the familial, political and economic realms reveals that
fundamentalism is not a gender-free term. This definition has diminished women’s
importance as political actors by focusing on the movement’s (male) leadership,
organizational structure, ideology and public persona. The emphasis on structural aspects
not only undermines women’s involvement outside of formal political and administrative
bodies, rather it ignores women’s sense of agency within these movements. Consequently,
this study has employed a “women’s studies” approach to fundamentalism.
This unconventional methodology sharply diverts from the traditional focus of
fundamentalist movements’ structures and instead emphasizes ethnography. By
incorporating women’s attitudes, feelings and individual perceptions, and by explaining
how women situate themselves within the ideological and social parameters of their
movements, this study reveals how exemplary women in fundamentalist religiousnationalist movements experience a strong sense of agency in promoting their
movement’s ideology. Gush Emunim women created a manifesto, imploring all
settlement and Israeli women to “stand up” for the creation of Rachelim. Similarly,
Hamas women preached women’s right to participate in armed operations and spoke to
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thousands of Palestinian women throughout the 2006 election campaign, emphasizing the
rights owed to them by religion.
Ignored by the “men’s studies” of fundamentalism, these actions draw attention
to some women’s vigorous involvement and empowerment within the movement, in spite
of their absence from formal decision-making processes. The “women’s studies”
approach asserts that women’s experiences cannot be essentialized, nor can their decision
to be involved in these movements exclusively be attributed to their manipulation by men.
In using women’s standpoint as the centre of reference, and stressing the role of agency, a
more sophisticated understanding of women’s degree of autonomy within fundamentalist
religious-nationalist movements emerges.
In the last of these myths, the Western public-private division is erroneously
applied to the Middle Eastern context, in which the relationship between the two spheres
is inextricably interconnected.

Western social contract theory assumes the citizen’s

universality and complete independence. In the Middle East, however, a relational or
connective form of citizenship is prevalent, where one’s citizenship status is dependent
upon sex, religion, family and the status of the family in society. These patriarchal
hierarchies frequently lend greater authority to men over their female counterparts.
Religion and family serve as a defining mechanism of citizenship, shaping women’s
status as citizens through personal laws. The laws are deferred to religious courts whose
rulings by the exclusively male composition frequently discriminate against women.
The division between the public and private domains is not clearly discernible,
and women’s actions can occur in the semi-private domains. In both cases, motherhood is
at once ‘private’ and ‘public,’ as this study found; Gush Emunim women mourned the
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loss of a fellow mother and established their settlement around this perceived common
identity, while Hamas women used the authority of motherhood as a means o f
encouraging their sons’ embracement of martyrdom. With each side seeking victory in a
demographic war, childrearing is a private, semi-private and public issue. Yet, the greater
community of each side repeatedly called into question the women’s conception of the
mother-child relationship: Israelis accused the settlers of needlessly jeopardizing
children’s lives, and Palestinians criticized the (potential) female suicide bombers for
orphaning their children. In justifying their actions, both GE and Hamas women
subordinated part o f their obligations and responsibilities to their families to the broader
national communities.
Citizenship identity for these women is heavily influenced by religious and
familial structures. Women’s full membership in society does not occur through their
rights as individual citizens, but through families whose national affiliation is clearly
defined. The family, therefore, is a domain in which women have the potential to be
prominent political actors, even as wives or relatives of prominent politicians. Women’s
small presence in the public domain gives the mistaken impression that the public-private
division is to blame, when in actuality, the family is a unit in which women exercise
considerable power. Both Gush Emunim and Hamas defined a woman’s primary duty as
instilling religious values in her children and guiding her family’s religious course. These
prescribed roles, therefore, allocate responsibility and a measure of autonomy to women.
This thesis examined in greater detail women’s political involvement within
fundamentalist religious-nationalist movements and compared the occurrence of some of
their political activities with the groups’ political moderation. Since gender issues were
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traditionally considered outside the scope of institutionalization processes, after decades
of neglect, only recently has a gendered approach to movements’ institutionalization
emerged. Considering women’s heavy involvement in fundamentalist religiousnationalist movements, the dearth of knowledge concerning women’s motivations and
actions within these two movements is appalling.
This study o f Gush Emunim and Hamas women has revealed that at least a
minority o f women in fundamentalist religious-nationalist movements are, at times, able
to subvert some o f their movement’s gender expectations. They do so by demonstrating a
strict fidelity to their movement’s original political goals and by following a tradional,
that is, male, script. By emulating the primary actions of the men in the movement, rather
than drastically departing from their movements’ traditional narratives, Gush Emunim
women’s decision to create a settlement and Hamas women’s resolve to participate in
military jih a d garnered the eventual approval of their male leadership.
Conversely, in undertaking these actions, women used their movements’
prescribed female roles to draw attention to and criticize men’s lack of participation. To
some extent, they felt they were left with little choice but to act. Gush Emunim women
believed they had waited too long, even lamenting the lost time in which they could have
acted as assertively as in Rachelim. Hamas women also implicitly criticized men for not
being more involved in jihad, as well as their movement for its differential treatment of
women, citing tradition as the main problem and pledging to rectify gender inequality
through legislation. The women’s increased ‘feminist’ consciousness, however, raises the
possibility of their retroactive dissatisfaction with their prescribed roles. Consequently,
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they must constantly and carefully negotiate their leadership roles within the family and
within the community.
The notion that women’s political involvement is both an indication and a cause
of a movement’s moderation, as mentioned in the introductory chapter, is prevalent.
Nevertheless, contrary to what some theorists have argued, women’s political
participation is not inherently a moderating force. Lacking the support of their male
counterparts initially, GE and Hamas women, unconstrained by their movements’
institutionalization, forced their movements’ formal leadership to accept their new roles
in the quest for settlement expansion and military jihad respectively. When women in
movements such as Gush Emunim and Hamas are as militant as men, if not more so, their
motives and the implications of their actions can no longer be ignored in favour o f
simplistic assumptions that they are unknowingly subjugated and oppressed by men.
Clearly, a more differentiated approach is needed in understanding religious-nationalist
women’s political involvement.
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